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Army Values



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Building Blocks for Leadership



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
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From the Editor



The Army is a hierarchical organization that demands accountability at every level. While individuals are accountable for their own actions, leaders have a unique responsibility to ensure appropriate behavior and attitudes in groups of individuals. Leadership makes a difference in every organization. Ineffective leadership results in ineffective units characterized by poor performance and poor discipline.

Leaders must exhibit three traits to create the proper conditions under which soldiers, and units, can be successful. First, leaders must be cognizant of their part in preserving the Army's traditional role as the guarantor of America's fundamental values. Second, they must be ethical standard-bearers to model the ideal and to forge an atmosphere of trust and confidence. And third, they must be teachers to show subordinates how to do what is required and to encourage them to do it.

Communication of standards is the foundation upon which leadership is built. While official policy may be clear and specific, if leaders, by their actions, indicate ethical and moral behavior is not important, that perspective will dominate. Good leaders make it clear that there is no excuse for poor behavior.

In this edition of *Military Review*, we explore the relationship between leader and led and between values and behavior. In the lead article, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer says that creating the right environment for leaders to develop and mature is only part of the task of growing great leaders for the 21st century. Building future leaders also requires long-term, purposeful leader and soldier development programs. Reimer emphasizes that leaders not only must steep their soldiers in Army values and traditions from the day they join up until the day they leave, they also must set the example and create a command climate where soldiers can put values into practice.

Well-known writer retired Colonel Lloyd Matthews leads off the second section with an assessment of the services' values and ideals. He points out that the Armed Forces' broad ethical ideals have remained relatively constant since the rise of military professionalism at the beginning of the 19th century, and that in today's services, an enlightened leadership philosophy based on principles of human motivation has taken hold. He observes that future operational success may well depend on how forthcoming leaders are in empowering subordinates to act independently.

Elsewhere in this issue, Colonel Walter Schumm et al. argue that we must uphold the highest standards of enemy prisoner of war treatment not only because our national ideals demand it, but also because international law requires it and, more important, fair treatment of prisoners tends to be reciprocated by most enemies.

Finally, Colonel Jon Moilanen provides an overview of this year's Command and General Staff Officer Course capstone exercise, *PRAIRIE WARRIOR 98*, and outlines its importance in preparing leaders for the rigors of military leadership in today's complex operations environment.

LJH

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Letters

Understanding Unconventional Warfare Challenges

The difficulty in reaching any viable conclusions when examining "The Counterinsurgency Paradox" in the July-August 1997 issue of the *Military Review* underscores the subject's intricacy. Sergeant First Class John T. Broom, a respected instructor with superb academic credentials, grapples with almost every doctrinal and historical hazard the study of unconventional war presents. For example, the terms and definitions he uses—rebellion, insurgency, resistance, insurrection, civil war and guerrilla war—have distinct and separate meanings and cannot be used interchangeably. To refer to the Peninsular Campaign (where 300,000 French soldiers died), General Nelson Miles' pursuit of Geronimo (with more than 400 followers) and the Malayan Emergency (primarily a police effort) collectively as "small wars" abets confusion, not "simplicity." Inventing new and unhelpful terms, such as "antiinsurgency" or redefining "sanctuary," further muddles the argument.

The same logic applies to sources and references. For example, to assess the Peninsular Campaign without consulting David Chandler, Donald D. Howard, Jean-Jacques Pelet and Charles Oman, among others, unfortunately results in omission of critical information—such as the regular Spanish Army's effect during the campaign, the British Royal Navy's role and the overarching political context. In general, there is no one work or anthology on insurgency that provides a basis for a practical comparison of conflicts.

As for historical accuracy, touting French success in counterinsurgency in the 1870s ignores the French defeat by Mexican insurgents in the 1860s. Also, declaring widespread failure of counterinsurgency since World War II goes against the notable British victories in Kenya, Malaya and Borneo; the American successes in Greece, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador; and the Russian repressions in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Comparisons and contrasts are valuable in analysis, but arbitrarily choosing wars from 1800 to 1914 and from 1950 to the present does not provide a valid sampling. Why not include wars before 1800, particularly the American Revolution? Why is the Second Anglo-Boer War included, but not the concurrent Philippine Insurrection? Why is the American Civil War not considered—or the time from 1914 to 1950 when General John J. Pershing chases Pancho Villa, Ivan Franco seizes Spain, Mao Tse-tung fights Japanese invaders and overthrows the Chinese government and Vladimir Lenin wins the Russian Civil War, despite European and American intervention?

Broom's essay ignores theory, so the selected wars, campaigns and actions seem to proceed haphazardly, with virtually accidental outcomes. The assumed absence of a theoretical cogency in unconventional warfare betrays a bias toward "regular" war, as if insurgencies are merely a discrete component of general warfare—such as tanks or logistics. A "small war" is still a war, with all its elements; to treat it as less undermines any attempt at analysis.

Nonetheless, attempts at analyzing unconventional wars and warfare are to be welcomed—90 percent of all wars since 1945 have been internal wars. But students of the field should be prepared to discover a troublesome "paradox of counterinsurgency"—apparent simplicity disguising daunting complexity.

Lieutenant Colonel KALEV I. SEPP,
USA, Headquarters, US Army
Training and Doctrine Command,
Fort Monroe, Virginia

Army Community Life— The Glue That Holds Us Together

"Schilling Manor," a November 1971 *Military Review* special feature, highlighted Army values and their application to military family support programs. Values—essential group components—make practical sense but need fertile soil such as structures, reminders and communication to as-

sure continuity.

Values are the glue that holds groups and societies together, and they help make economic and job-accomplishment sense. Behavioral and social science theory and research clearly indicate that a family having no community identity sense has a hopeless attitude, misuses available resources and expresses frustration via aberrant behavior.

The program and research to which the 1971 article alludes resulted in the Army Community Life Program. In the early 1970s, Fort Lewis, Washington, hosted the first all-volunteer Army Installation/Division—the 9th Infantry. General William B. Fulton and Colonel W.F. Konopka anticipated a dramatic increase of married soldiers. Fulton and Konopka sought to develop a family-oriented program that would promote community identification and belonging. Since then, the Army Community Life Program has extended Armywide.

The program's essential elements—dividing military housing areas into small neighborhoods linked to military organizational units for support and establishing well-defined avenues of communication to community resources—are still evident. However, thanks to well-nourished soil, the program is now more clearly defined and directed. During a recent visit with Fort Lewis Family Resource Director Jim Ratcliff, it was apparent the program has thrived. It is larger, more clearly directed and is productive and well supported. The program now exists in some form Armywide, providing families with a neighborhood extending beyond the immediate geographical area.

Army personnel have a tendency to "touch base" with Army post facilities such as the post exchange, commissary, chapel or club wherever they are. This process's importance lies in home and community feelings. Several years ago, at a civilian conference on geographical relocation, representatives from some of the Fortune 500 companies expressed envy of the Army's ability to provide a sense of international community. They noted advantages in regard to retention, geographical flex-

ibility and human resource problem prevention.

Downsizing, civilian contract employment, working spouses and medical care constraints threaten to derail Army community identification values and our ability to take care of our own. Therefore, we must remind ourselves that these values and structures are worth preserving. Communication means such as the *Military Review* play an important role and have long-lasting and unforeseen effects.

**COL Jerry L. McKain, USA, Retired,
Steilacoom, Washington**

Sajer—A Real “Guy”

Regarding Retired Lieutenant Colonel Ed Kennedy's response (in the July–August 1997 issue of *Military Review*) to my letter in the March–April 1997 issue, I would like to offer one more perspective, then let the debate rest concerning the authenticity of Guy Sajer's book *The Forgotten Soldier*. Kennedy holds to his opinion that the book is a *roman à clef*, that Sajer is an assumed name and that the book is beneath the military professional's dignity—not worthy of time and effort unless as an interesting diversion from normal military studies.

Webster's New World Dictionary defines *roman à clef* as “a novel in which real persons appear under fictitious names.” One could argue little details forever, but Sajer's own testimony is more convincing. In a letter to an associate, Sajer said his book records his actual World War II experiences while fighting on the Russian Front in the ranks of the *Grossdeutschland* division. While admitting to many errors in the chronology of events, weapon calibers and geography, he says he wrote about “my innermost emotional experiences as they related to me in the context of the Second World War.” What is of importance to him is his description of an infantryman's life on the Russian Front—not strategy and tactics. To some, the distinction between a *roman à clef* and an autobiography may be a fine line. My point is this: Sajer wrote about his experiences—not those of a fictitious person. Sajer never claimed to have written a definitive history of the war—only what he experienced.

Guy Sajer is not a *nom de plume*—never has been. His last name was originally Monminoux, but because he wanted to pass as a German, he enlisted under his mother's maiden name—

Sajer. He has been using the name of Guy Sajer at least since 1952, probably earlier. He signs his artwork Guy Sajer and receives his mail (and probably his royalty checks) as Guy Sajer.

Why should soldiers read books such as Sajer's? Simply, to read about what battle is like, what to expect and to find out just how bad it can get. Sure, there are many other more comprehensive books about the Russian Front than Sajer's in terms of troop movements, strategy and such. But, if a reader wants to know what it was like to be a Russian Front soldier, to be afraid, to fight alongside a band of brothers, then Sajer's is still one of the finest accounts and deserves to remain on professional military reading lists.

**LTC Douglas E. Nash, USA,
US Southern Command, MacDill
Air Force Base, Florida**

Wart or Gemstone?

Lieutenant Colonel Diane Smith reviewed *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler* in the November–December 1997 issue of *Military Review*. It is a first-rate review of a first-rate book, and I agree with most of what she wrote. My disagreements are minor, except where she states that “(t)he extensive maps are not easy to follow.” These are the clearest operational-scale maps of the conflict that I have seen. Operations maps are, by their very nature, complex and take the place of extensive verbiage. These maps present a clear, concise picture to the professional. The map makers should be congratulated on their superior product. I talked to David Glantz (one of the authors), who told me that more maps were submitted but fell victim to the editor. Their exclusion is the reader's loss.

I have been fortunate enough to review several books for *Military Review*, and I know that reviewing is a more difficult task than one might initially think. My purpose is not to criticize Smith but to state that what she sees as a wart is, in reality, a gemstone. I think we would both agree that *When Titans Clashed* is the major work in the field, clearly showing how the entire war on the Eastern Front (or Western Front—depending on your perspective) was fought and evolved. The military professional is well served by this excellent book.

**Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau,
USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**

Avoiding Mission Creep: A Legitimate Concern or Just a Misnomer?

Is *mission creep* something that should concern operational commanders, or is it nothing more than an existing problem merely couched in a term, or misnomer, that conceals a nation's inability to properly reassess ongoing missions while neglecting to appropriately match objectives and criteria? Much research describes the distasteful idea of a military force being associated with an ill-defined operation infested with mission creep. The 1992 to 1994 US Somalia operation was the first time mission creep was used to describe an operation.

In the 5 July 1993 *Army Times* article titled “Warriors or Angels,” staff writers defined mission creep by citing an example where a US Army field artillery colonel commanding the 10th Mountain Division (Light) [10th MD(L)] divisional artillery was sent to Somalia. According to writer Tom Donnelly, the colonel was not sent to command his unit in artillery engagements with a hostile enemy, he was sent to “Kismayo to assess the situation, rendezvous with Belgian paratroopers and meet with local relief workers.” This “instantaneous and completely unexpected” conversion from artilleryman to civil–military coordinator” is what the *Army Times* authors deemed mission creep. Certainly, a military officer working outside his specialty area is not a new concept to the Army.

The Army has been employed in what it eventually called military operations other than war (OOTW) since its inception in the late 1700s. Why all the hype now? I suggest first that the media is not only more capable, it is more apt to bring difficult situations, such as Somalia, into the limelight today than in the past. Second, the increase of technology, coupled with the Soviet Union's downfall, has left the United States the sole superpower, having to participate in more situations than ever before. Finally, there is an ever-present inability of politicians and subordinate commanders to properly translate objectives across the spectrum and levels of war into appropriately measurable objectives with associated criteria.

In short, mission creep is just a “politically correct” way for Americans to label an operation that does not have clearly defined goals and measures of

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Leadership



Leadership is the key to victory on the battlefield. As this section's articles suggest, current and future leaders must meet the 21st century's expanding challenges. To do this, we must develop leaders who understand and can exploit our doctrine's full potential. Doctrine will continue to provide a holistic base for the Army in incorporating new ideas, technologies and organizational designs. It will also spark the philosophical impetus to help leaders become the adaptive, creative problem solvers required for future military operations success.

In a world undergoing unprecedented and accelerating change, the Army must fulfill its vital role in supporting national security and developing military strategy. To achieve this, leader development must be a continuous, progressive and sequential process that teaches leaders the skills, knowledge and behavior characteristics necessary to execute future operations. Therefore, leaders must be skilled in operational art, adjust rapidly to temporal and spatial battlespace variations and master the complexity and use of advanced technology today to meet tomorrow's knowledge-based warfare challenges. Leader development must incorporate formal and informal training; progressive and sequential duty assignments; and self-assessment, counseling, coaching and feedback. Commitment to leader development will assure that the Army's enduring legacy of competent, confident and highly skilled officers and noncommissioned officers continues well into the next century.

**"Fairness, diligence,
sound preparation, professional skill
and loyalty are the marks of
American military leadership."**

General Omar N. Bradley

Developing Great Leaders in Turbulent Times

General Dennis J. Reimer, US Army

THE US ARMY is about winning. The mere thought of anything less is repugnant, because when the Army loses, America loses. I think this determination goes a long way toward explaining our success. The Army's history is a history of change, but no amount of change or adversity has ever dampedened our quest for victory. The magnitude and speed of the Army's transformation over the last decade has been particularly challenging. Yet, throughout this difficult transition, we held on to the constants—the unshakable belief that America's Army can and must always be a winner. At the same time, we embraced change because it made us a better Army and because it best served the nation's needs.

Balancing change and continuity is the secret of our success. It is also the key to developing the leaders who will carry that winning tradition into the 21st century. We have the leader and soldier development programs to grow great 21st-century leaders—programs that preserve the constants while accounting for the human dimension of change in a changing world. Embracing and implementing these programs are critical tasks for America's Army, and it all starts with understanding the dynamic relationship between the constants and the changes that drive our Army.

Back to the Future—Leadership's Past and Potential

During a recent one-day trip, I experienced first-hand the feel of the great change and continuity that chart the course of America's Army. This journey took me to Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, and Fort Hood, Texas. At Camp Beauregard, I participated in the change of command of Louisiana Adjutant General Major General Ansel "Buddy" Stroud. As I landed at that small, beautiful post, I was reminded of what took place there over 50 years ago. The camp was a staging area for the Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM)—large-scale wargames used to get

Some worry that a "zero defects" mentality might resurrect itself and that opportunities for assignments and promotion will diminish. Others fear a return to a "hollow army" . . . [or] concerned that the high OPTEMPO will detract from training to the point that units will lose their war-fighting edge. These concerns . . . highlight another important constant we can never compromise—the Army's concern about taking care of people.

the first divisions ready for World War II.

The maneuvers' scope was vast. The exercises developed new tactics and techniques for combined arms warfare, integrated Active (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces, validated new weapon systems and organizations, established requirements for future developments and identified leaders with potential for promotion and those who were not suited for combat. While the tasks were great, resources were scarce. Units substituted drainpipes for mortars and beer cans for shells because they did not have the proper equipment. Although the results were not perfect, they were good enough to start the American Army on the road to victory. The enormous obstacles facing the Army in those difficult times made the maneuvers' success even more impressive. LAM succeeded, in large part, because they relied on the soldiering fundamentals—values, teamwork and discipline, the constants that always make the difference.

From Camp Beauregard I flew to Fort Hood for the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) [4th ID (M)] Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE). The experiment was the latest step in our Force XXI process and was designed to provide insights that will guide the Army's future. Upon arrival, I immediately felt

the excitement and enthusiasm for what was taking place. Without seeing a single command post, I knew that something important was happening. You could see it in people's eyes. I could not help but be impressed with the teamwork I saw there—AC, Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers working side by side with Department of the Army

Values that emphasize only individual self-interest are cold comfort in times of hardship and danger. Rather, the Army emphasizes "shared" values, the values that make an individual reach beyond self. Army values build strong, cohesive organizations that, in turn, become the source of strength and solidarity for their members in difficult and turbulent times.

civilians (DACs) and industry representatives. The 4th ID (M)—reorganized, reequipped and retrained, backed by great organizations from the 138th Field Artillery Brigade (Kentucky National Guard) and 493d Engineer Group (US Army Reserve) from Texas—challenged the world-class opposing forces, outthinking, outmaneuvering and checkmating every attempt to adjust and react to the 4th ID's initiatives.

What I witnessed was more than just a technological change, it was a cultural change as well. Leaders at all levels were confident, because we had created the right leadership environment and given soldiers the opportunity and the tools to harness the potential of a lethal, information-age force. Consequently, I observed commanders willing to take prudent risks to achieve extraordinary gain. I imagine I witnessed the same basics at work that built an army of excellence during the LAM over 50 years ago, but I saw them operating in a new environment, a culture based on information-age warfare. I returned from this trip more confident than ever that the Army can and will be the master of its own future as long as we keep the dynamics of *constants* and *change* in balance.

Constants We Must Preserve

First and always, we must remember that we are a profession of arms. Our profession is unique and, as General Douglas MacArthur once said, predicated on "the will to win. The sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory. That if you fail, the nation will be destroyed." As a young observer/controller at Fort Polk's Joint Readiness Training Center

put it, being a soldier is "more than just holding a job and going home for dinner." We are a profession committed to unlimited and unrestrained service to nation, wherever and whenever America calls.

Our profession's purpose says a great deal about our soldiers and what they do every day. Our mission is too great to be achieved by any one individual or any single task. There is a tremendous depth and breadth to our profession. The Army's purpose for being is to "win our nation's wars," but this means far more than just killing or the willingness to be killed. The American warrior has been and will always be more than the soldier fighting at the point of the spear. We deter and respond to aggression, but we also shape the international environment by building regional stability and reducing the possibility of conflict. The Army's responsibilities include everything from destroying targets to caring for and safeguarding civilians and dividing warring factions. Often these very different tasks have to be done by the same force, with precious little time and space dividing one mission from the next.

It takes the combined effort and sacrifice of the Total Army team to perform such extraordinary service. Every team member and mission contribute to the victories that secure America's place in a free and prosperous world. In the American profession of arms, even apparently mundane tasks take on extraordinary meaning. Throughout our proud history, these tasks have always been part of our mission and they always will be.

Another Army constant is the performance of our people. The soldiers who maneuvered across the forests and lowlands of Louisiana over 50 years ago were great Americans, patriotic and dedicated. Despite the difficulties and turbulence of our own time, the men and women of today's Army are no less exemplary. Of the 32 major post-Cold War deployments by US forces, the Army has participated in 28 of those operations, providing more than 60 percent of the personnel. In 1997, the Army averaged over 31,000 soldiers deployed away from their home station and families, in 70 countries around the world. All of this activity took place in tandem with one of the most significant force reductions in our nation's history. We have taken more than 600,000 AC and RC soldiers and DAC employees out of the force. We have closed over 700 bases. In Europe alone, we reduced the force from 232,000 soldiers to 65,000. The total drawdown in Europe would be equivalent to closing major installations in the United States.

While these reductions took place, Army operations tempo (OPTEMPO) increased approximately

An M3 half-track armed with a .50-cal. machinegun joins a horse cavalry outfit during the summer maneuvers of 1940.



The exercises developed new tactics and techniques for combined arms warfare, integrated Active and Reserve Component forces, validated new weapon systems and organizations, established requirements for future developments and identified leaders with potential for promotion and those who were not suited for combat. . . . The enormous obstacles facing the Army in those difficult times made the maneuvers' success even more impressive. LAM succeeded, in large part, because they relied on the soldiering fundamentals—values, teamwork and discipline, the constants that always make the difference.

300 percent. Despite the magnitude of our efforts and the everyday pressures and stresses on the force, our soldiers continue to perform magnificently. They have the same willingness to take prudent risk, boldness to seize the initiative and professionalism to do their absolute best—trademarks of successful armies from our past.

I recognize that the service of our soldiers has not come without cost. We are not perfect. Many are concerned whether the Army can maintain the tremendous progress we have made since the Vietnam War's end. Some worry that a "zero defects" mentality might resurrect itself and that opportunities for assignments and promotion will diminish. Others fear a return to a "hollow army," where requirements far outstrip resources. Some are concerned that the high OPTEMPO will detract from training to the point that units will lose their warfighting edge. These concerns are understandable and bear watching because they highlight another important constant we can never compromise—the Army's concern about taking care of people.

As I think back over my 35 years of military service, I have learned that the Army's waxing and waning has had less to do with the resources available than with our commitment to pull together. The Army is, at heart, a community of AC and RC soldiers, DAC employees and their families. Communities thrive when people care about one another, work with one another and trust one another. I believe today's Army carries within it this spirit and sense of community, the commitment to address our shortfalls and build upon our strengths. I am optimistic about the future and convinced that because we hold tight to a strong tradition of commitment to one another, we are and will remain the best army on Earth.

A Values-Based Army

Undergirding these constants is the most important constant of all—*Army values*. We must never be complacent about the role of values in our Army. That is why we have made a concerted effort to specify and define the Army values in the insert. Army values are thoroughly consistent with the values of

American society, but it is a bad assumption to presuppose that everyone entering the Army understands and accepts the values that we emphasize.

The Army is a values-based organization that stresses the importance of the team over the individual. Values that emphasize only individual self-interest

Creating a predictable environment begins with setting and enforcing standards.

A sergeant major once told me that "the Army is an easy place in which to succeed. The Army has standards for everything, and all we have to do to get ahead is to meet those standards." He had it about right. Every time leaders waiver from a commitment to standards, trouble follows. . . . All leaders understand standards and enforce them—leaders must set the example.

are cold comfort in times of hardship and danger. Rather, the Army emphasizes "shared" values, the values that make an individual reach beyond self. Army values build strong, cohesive organizations that, in turn, become the source of strength and solidarity for their members in difficult and turbulent times.

Values-based leadership means setting the example and then creating a command climate where soldiers can put values into practice. It is leadership best described by the simple principle "be, know, do." Leaders must not only exemplify Army values in their words and deeds, they must create the opportunity for every soldier in their command to live them as well. To do anything less is to be less than a leader.

General John M. Schofield described the link between a leader's thoughts and actions when he coined his definition of discipline. "The discipline which makes soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such action is far more likely to destroy than make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and give commands in such manner and tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels this respect which is due others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels disrespect for others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself."

Schofield framed these words in 1879, but they are as true today as they were then. The reality of leaders' performance must match the rhetoric of their words. Schofield's definition reminds us that values-based leadership is not about weakening standards or detracting from the Army's warrior spirit. There is nothing incompatible between the warrior spirit and treating all soldiers with dignity and respect. In fact, when we deny soldiers the opportunity to "be all they can be," the Army as an institution is immeasurably diminished. There is no better guarantee for maintaining our warrior spirit than preserving the constants of Army values and traditions, the bedrock of America's Army.

Changes We Must Accept

While change is itself another constant in Army history, the level of physical and cultural change in the past decade is almost without precedent. Developing great leaders depends as much on acknowledging what will change in the future as on a commitment to preserving past values and traditions.

We must start by recognizing the importance of balancing moral and physical courage. Physical bravery is without question an important part of being a soldier. There will always be a special place for the extraordinary heroism that is the legacy of American soldiers in battle. This courage was epitomized by Master Sergeant Gary I. Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall D. Shughart, who were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions during a firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia, on 3 and 4 October 1993. Without a moment's hesitation, both rushed to the aid of a downed helicopter crew despite the fact that they knew they were facing certain death. The courage of America's soldiers represents unparalleled commitment. As Stephanie Shughart said so eloquently at the award ceremony for her late husband, "It takes a special person to not only read a creed and memorize a creed, but to live a creed."

Living the creed is what Army courage is all about. However, it should not diminish the importance of unbound physical courage to recognize that bravery in battle is only part of what makes a successful soldier. Soldiering is also about the moral courage reflected in the discipline and mental toughness to handle both lethal and nonlethal engagements. Today's soldiers must be able to implement disciplined rules of engagement under stressful and demanding conditions. Our soldiers' performance in Bosnia is an outstanding example of the other "face" of courage. An effective team of AC and RC forces,

Chief of the Task Force *Eagle* Joint Military Commission Colonel Henry W. Stratman meets with Muslim military leader Brigadier General Mahmuejin in the 1-4th Cavalry area, circa April 1996.



US Army

The Army's purpose for being is to "win our nation's wars," but this means far more than just killing or the willingness to be killed. The American warrior has been and will always be more than the soldier fighting at the point of the spear. We deter and respond to aggression, but we also shape the international environment by building regional stability and reducing the possibility of conflict. The Army's responsibilities include everything from destroying targets to caring for and safeguarding civilians and dividing warring factions.

they performed a complex range of daily tasks and did every one of them to standard. They are a living testament to the Army's capacity to accommodate a rapidly changing international environment.

Perhaps the greatest change we face today is becoming comfortable with using the technologies of an information force to enhance the execution of leadership. Leading in the information age requires new trust and confidence—trust in technology and the confidence to share information and decision making. What I witnessed at Fort Hood during the 4th ID's AWE was the beginning of a fundamental cultural change in the Army. The 4th ID (M) is without a doubt a world-class “learning team.” They discovered, like Peter Senge in his book *The Fifth Discipline*, that “the organizations that excel in the future will be organizations that discover how to tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organization.”

Throughout the experiment, the 4th ID (M) demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for collaborative action, where teammates complement one another’s

strengths and compensate for one another’s limitations. The result is a unit whose performance as a whole is greater than the sum of the individual efforts of its members. Learning teams have the ability to “suspend assumptions” and enter into a genuine “thinking together.” This process allows organizations to discover solutions they might overlook if approaching problems merely as a collection of individuals.

New information systems have served as “enablers” for shared understanding and trust. They allow for rapid and accurate commander’s intent dissemination and promote immediate group discussion and interaction to foster high-quality, effective battlefield performance. The 4th ID’s results tell us that the key to winning future wars is learning how to use information systems to best advantage. Getting the most out of our future force will not happen without deliberate, disciplined effort. Technology can become a straitjacket for the military mind as easily as it can be used to unleash the power of our soldiers. During the Vietnam War, helicopters could whisk

We are working hard to give leaders the confidence that they will have the people they need to get the job done. This effort focuses on reducing the personnel shortages and staff vacancies many commanders see in their units. . . . We are in the process of balancing "faces and spaces," as well as vigorously recruiting to fill chronically short, critical military occupational specialties.

commanders to any battlefield at any time. Some used this technology to extend their control over subordinate leaders. We called them "squad leaders in the sky." We must be smarter than that!

Without discipline, accumulating masses of data through information technology can quickly lead to overcentralized decision making. We must have the trust and confidence to empower leaders at all levels with information, allowing them to exercise their good judgment and initiative.

Building Predictability

Today's Army must create an environment that teaches, nurtures and builds on the constants while embracing and leading necessary change. This effort begins with creating a positive, predictable and ethical command climate for our young leaders and soldiers.

In many respects we are not masters of our fate, controlling neither the missions nor budget allocated to the Army. We can, however, give our soldiers a powerful tool for the demands of Army life—predictability. *Predictability* in the force and the training schedule is the key to creating a positive environment. There are responsibilities leaders at every level share, as well as specific actions the senior leaders and field commanders must take to ensure predictability for the force.

We all have a role to play here. Creating a predictable environment begins with setting and enforcing standards. A sergeant major once told me that "the Army is an easy place in which to succeed. The Army has standards for everything, and all we have to do to get ahead is to meet those standards." He had it about right. Every time leaders waiver from a commitment to standards, trouble follows. We must ensure that all leaders understand standards and enforce them—leaders must set the example. In particular, I have charged our Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps with being the keeper of Army standards. Standards are the "crown jewels of the Army." Without them, soldiers will never know

what to expect from their leaders.

However, just setting and enforcing standards is not enough to create a predictable environment. Senior Army leaders have an obligation to give commanders and soldiers a reasonable expectation that they will have the time and resources they need. For starters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are committed to reducing joint training and exercise requirements by 25 percent. This reduction is designed to eliminate the least effective training events and should help reduce the burden on commanders who all too frequently meet themselves coming and going, racing from one training exercise to the next.

Within the Army, we are working hard to give leaders the confidence that they will have the people they need to get the job done. This effort focuses on reducing the personnel shortages and staff vacancies many commanders see in their units. As the Army drew down, a significant gap grew between the number of "spaces" in the force structure and the number of soldiers to occupy those spaces. We are in the process of balancing "faces and spaces," as well as vigorously recruiting to fill chronically short, critical military occupational specialties.

Over the next 12 months these efforts will result in a more predictable and consistent level of manpower for our Army. We are also working hard at maintaining the quality of the force. I am satisfied with the adjustments we have made to recruiting efforts. As a result, the quality of the force today is every bit as high as the Army that fought in Operation *Desert Storm*. Our initiatives will not solve every unit's shortfalls, but they should give commanders confidence that they can expect to continue to have high-quality soldiers, in greater percentages, to fill their ranks.

Leaders in the field also need to do their part in building predictability. This starts with a commitment to stick to the principles of effective training management regardless of how much turbulence and changes pull on leaders to abandon their effort to take control of the schedule. They also have an important part to play in "slowing down the train." More training is not always better training. I do not believe we can do more with less. However, I do believe we must get the best out of what we get. Fewer but higher-quality training events are more important than ensuring every moment on the training schedule is chock full of activity. Sometimes less is better. In addition, leaders must set and monitor key indicators, such as borrowed military manpower, signs that will tell them if we are making the most efficient and appropriate use of our soldiers.

Creating Ethical Environments

The environment Total Army leaders create needs to be *ethical* as well as predictable. Ensuring an ethical command climate requires commitment to Army values and leadership, as well as a core of relevant, focused programs that build on those constants.

Creating ethical environments starts on the first day of initial entry training (IET). Leaders must recognize that individuals entering the Army have different values bases, and we must pay increased attention to inculcating and reinforcing our standards and values in these soldiers. To help energize the process, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, in cooperation with the US Army Center of Military History, is developing a structured program that places greater emphasis on Total Army values and traditions during IET. Soldiers will leave for their first assignment enriched with the proud history, winning traditions and deeply held values that stand behind our Army.

But that is not enough. Building soldiers of character only starts in IET. Leaders must immerse their soldiers in Army values and traditions from the day they join up until the day they leave, ensuring that both leaders and led show respect and tolerance of others and unwavering commitment to doing what is morally and legally right. Once soldiers arrive in their units, leaders have a responsibility to reinforce and sustain the ethical foundation built in IET. One aid that has been provided to leaders is the *Ethical Climate Assessment Survey*, which affords commanders a quick self-assessment of their unit and indicators to guide sustaining or improving the ethical climate of command.

Another important tool is the *Consideration of Others* Program that provides commanders a systematic approach for training and sustaining an ethical work force. Modeled on an innovative program developed at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, *Consideration of Others* reinforces Army values through small groups that emphasize basic leadership and respect principles. We are institutionalizing use of the *Consideration of Others* Program and *Ethical Climate Assessment Survey* throughout the Army. They are important tools for building the positive, ethical command climate needed to grow great leaders.

Building for the Future

Creating the right environment to help leaders develop and mature is only part of the task of growing great leaders for the 21st century. Building future leaders also requires long-term, purposeful leader



[FM 22-100, Army Leadership, provides] concise and understandable doctrine that demonstrates the important linkages between the intent and actions of soldiers and junior and senior leaders [It] puts the "mystery" of leadership into clear, plain language, reaffirming the Army's tested and proven approach to leading. The manual admonishes that there are no easy answers, no substitutes for competent, caring and courageous leaders.

and soldier development programs. The Army is developing these programs under an umbrella concept called *Character Development XXI*.

The *Character Development XXI* centerpiece effort is the revision of US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership*. The manual's objective is to provide concise and understandable doctrine that demonstrates the important linkages between the intent and actions of soldiers and junior and senior leaders. The FM puts the "mystery" of leadership into clear, plain language, reaffirming the Army's tested and proven approach to leading. The manual admonishes that there are no easy answers, no substitutes for competent, caring and courageous leaders. FM 22-100 also provides special focus on the character-development process, the importance of teaching values, evaluating an organization's ethical climate and creating a positive, productive leadership environment.

The *Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI* and the new Officer Evaluation Report (OER) are also important components of *Character*

Development XXI. Although these are officer programs, they have relevance to the Total Army. They are intended as a start point for institutionalizing Army leader programs for the 21st century. Not only do we expect them to produce officer leaders with

The environment Total Army leaders create needs to be ethical as well as predictable. Ensuring an ethical command climate requires commitment to Army values and leadership, as well as a core of relevant, focused programs that build on those constants.

the "right stuff" to teach, coach and counsel NCOs, soldiers and DAC employees, we believe these programs will serve as a blueprint for other personnel development initiatives.

OPMS XXI restructures how active duty officers will be managed, developed and promoted over a career of service. The changes it introduces are significant. There were clear signs that the old system was struggling to answer concerns about career security, opportunities to get the right assignment and the stress of high personnel turnover. *OPMS XXI* addresses these concerns by establishing a new career field framework. The career fields are designed to enhance the Army's warfighting capability, shape the structure of the future officer corps and provide every officer with a reasonable opportunity for success. The new system will not only open new opportunities for advancement, command and education, but will better serve the Army's demanding and diverse needs for officer leadership in the 21st century.

We developed *OPMS XXI* hand-in-hand with the revision of the OER system. The new OER will apply to all AC and RC officers. The OER's intent is to create an effective tool for teaching, coaching and counseling, not just rating officers. The new report places special emphasis on ethical attributes and the ability to share and instill those qualities in subordi-

nates. The OER changes, along with *OPMS XXI*, are important steps in building a personnel development system for the future, one that builds better leaders at all ranks and at all times.

Measuring Future Success

For the last 222 years, we have been an Army prepared for turbulent times, an Army that never relinquished its zest for victory or unshakable dedication to serve the nation—an Army postured to win. I believe that we are still that Army today and that we will remain a relevant, powerful force as the Army continues to change. We will keep the winning edge by holding fast to the constants that make a difference while never losing the confidence that we can adapt to the challenges ahead.

If we are successful at developing great leaders, what will soldiering in our Army look like in the next century? We will see a Total Army team—a seamless team—of AC and RC soldiers, backed by a contingent of dedicated DAC employees and proud partners in industry. We will also see a team of dedicated, enthusiastic and adaptable professionals. They will be prudent risk takers who are unafraid to share information and unleash initiative. Their potential will manifest in powerful organizations built on trust, teamwork, cohesion and discipline.

I am confident we are on the right path to the future and that we have the tools to develop great leaders in turbulent times. During the 4th ID(M) AWE, I watched the young men and women who will lead tomorrow's Army. As I watched them, I asked myself whether I could envision them in battle. Do they have the right stuff to secure America's interests around the world? Can they be entrusted with leading our nation's sons and daughters?

The answer is a resounding "Yes! We have the right leaders." What we need now is the courage and commitment to follow through on the programs that will take those leaders and the Army into the 21st century. **MR**

Editor—For more command information from the Army chief of staff on a variety of issues, visit the Chief of Staff's Homepage at <<http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocsa/chief.htm>>.

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Leadership in the Digitized Force

Major Jack Gumbert, US Army

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, military leaders have wrestled with the question of how to lead their organizations.¹ Sun-tzu offered the military leaders of his day insights for effective leadership. Likewise, the great Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote at length about the necessity of good leadership and provided a glimpse of which leadership qualities were necessary to excel in combat. Recently, the rapidly changing international security environment has led to a reassessment of all things military—including leadership. Now, the Cold War global threat is gone, replaced by unknown threats and different missions from that which our Cold War Army was trained to accomplish.² Today's US Army leaders understand that *change* will be a constant theme far into the future. This article discusses change in terms of the Army's ventures into learning organizations and digitization. I will focus on the effect of these trends upon leadership and, specifically, how digitization will impact a leader's ability to provide purpose, motivation and direction in Army learning organizations.

The Evolving Army Leadership Model

US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Pam) 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, states that "Our Army also has recently changed itself to become a learning organization better suited to the wide variety of requirements for service to nation in a much different strategic environment."³ Accordingly, Army leadership doctrine and thought are evolving in conjunction with the technological advances of recent years. This new body of thought closely follows scientific advancements through an interdisciplinary methodology known as systems thinking. Together, systems thinking and learning organization models are helping shape how Army leaders view the world and the relationship of our Army in the ever-changing world security envi-

ronment. Significantly, these concepts are creating new leadership ideas and developing new relationships between leaders and subordinates.

Systems thinking. *Systems thinking* represents a true revolution in how individuals view cause and

Leaders must thoroughly understand mission-type orders and the effects of micro-managing their subordinates. . . . The five disciplines of a learning organization are predicated on senior leaders allowing the learning process to take place. This requires leaders who understand that decentralized execution is not just a mission orientation, but a learning methodology. Further, mission-type orders are an engine of generative growth for soldiers and the organizations to which they belong.

effect relationships. Further, it represents a unique method of understanding and analyzing the environment. Systems thinking involves establishing a new paradigm, a new world view. The overarching importance of becoming a systems thinker is critical to being a successful leader in the future. Systems thinking involves looking at the complete picture of events when determining cause and effect. The theory posits that there is no true reductionism of cause and effect, apart from the scientific laboratory. The key point to understand is that systems exist within systems. We must realize that each action taken by a leader has an effect on some part of a system, often in an unintended way. Systems thinking focuses on the relationships between the arrangements of the various systems and subsystems that operate in a given environment.⁴

Learning organizations are designed, equipped and structured to learn at a rapid pace. They adapt,

survive and grow within their environment by maximizing the capabilities of all members. Learning organizations are growth and success oriented. Peter Senge developed the phrase "learning organization" to describe those attributes he believed were necessary for an organization to become a truly emergent, adaptable organization. He named five prerequisite

In a learning organization, the leader designs the organizational structure to take advantage of the inherent capabilities of the entire organization. This process involves integrating the five disciplines to gain a synergistic effect within the organization. The leader designs the organization in accordance with its vision, values and purpose. Thus, the organization develops direction within a learning context.

disciplines for a learning organization as: personal mastery, mental models, team learning, shared vision and systems thinking.⁵ Learning organizations can only be understood within the context of systems thinking. Senge described the relationship of the core disciplines to systems thinking in the following way. "Systems thinking also needs the disciplines of building shared vision, mental models, team learning and personal mastery to realize its potential."⁶ Further, "I call systems thinking the fifth discipline because it is the conceptual cornerstone that underlies all of the learning disciplines."⁷

Senge defined his five disciplines of a learning organization as:

Personal mastery—learning to expand our personal capacity to create the results we most desire, and creating an organizational environment which encourages all its members to develop themselves toward the goals and the purposes they choose.

Mental models—reflecting upon, continually clarifying and improving our internal pictures of the world and seeing how they shape our actions and decisions.

Shared vision—building a sense of commitment in a group, by developing shared images of the future we seek to create and principles and guiding practices by which we hope to get there.

Team learning—transforming conversational and collective thinking skills so that groups of people can reliably develop intelligence and ability greater than the sum of individual members' talents.⁸

Systems thinking—learning organizations cannot

effectively operate unless the organization understands and adheres to systems thinking. Systems thinking is the ability to understand all the interrelated components and systems involved in creating the current situation. Further, it is an awareness of how these systems may dynamically change over time. Systems thinking integrates the four other disciplines into a coherent body of theory and practice.⁹

To be effective in a learning organization, the leader must adopt a new conception of leadership. Leaders must move beyond traditional roles and create learning organizations where they are designers, stewards and teachers who impart direction, purpose and motivation.¹⁰ In a learning organization, the leader designs the organizational structure to take advantage of the inherent capabilities of the entire organization. This process involves integrating the five disciplines to gain a synergistic effect within the organization. The leader designs the organization in accordance with its vision, values and purpose. Thus, the organization develops direction within a learning context.¹¹

The leaders of learning organizations must be stewards. They perceive the purpose of the organization and guide it toward goal accomplishment. These leaders understand the deeper meaning of why the organization exists and toward what ends the organization should move.¹² Last, a learning organization leader should be a teacher. Teaching concerns helping individuals "learn how to learn," and empowering them to understand and cope with reality. Leaders must teach systems thinking coupled with an understanding of the mission and organization's purpose. In the Army, the ability to impart the "how" and the "why" of the organization motivates soldiers to learn and do so while unleashing the creative tension needed to energize the organization.¹³

These disciplines, and the learning organizations they underlie, are bound in an environment more complex than ever known in the history of mankind. In creating such a complex environment, man must develop a means to make sense of the environment




Figure 1. Common Situational Awareness.

Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway inspecting 25th Infantry Division positions along the west central front in Korea, March 1951.



Computer mastery and related C² processes provide freedom for leaders to visit subordinates. Not being tied down to computers gives leaders the advantage of face-to-face communication with key subordinates and the ability to provide the critical element of combat power—leadership—at the critical time and place. . . . The commander's personal presence on the battlefield is essential for inspiring and motivating soldiers, especially during combat. . . .

The front is only understood through the eyes and minds of the men who fight there. Further, soldiers at the front know that a leader who is physically present will understand their tactical problems and do all he can to help solve them.

and each particular situation that arises. Systems thinking is an antidote to the complexity that engulfs Army leaders today. It provides a methodology to see and understand the environment and the relationships that exist between the complex systems operating in dynamic fashion throughout the battlespace. Learning organizations allow leaders to overcome complexity by giving them a method to adapt and grow within the dynamic, complex environment of combat.

Digitization. Force XXI digitized hardware will equip the leader with capabilities that facilitate learning organization processes. *Digitization* will help create the conditions for successful learning organizations by creating viable systems. These systems will enable the leader to share and process information, thereby giving leaders a valuable tool to use in dealing with complex environments. This in turn will reduce ambiguity and confusion through en-

hanced situational awareness.

For example, before a unit engages in a combat mission, most, if not all, of the unit leaders have a common situation understanding. After the mission's start, the number of individual leaders with a common situation understanding is reduced over time and degraded by operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and casualties. The effect of this process is that longer operations conducted at higher OPTEMPO result in fewer leaders with a common situational awareness, as represented in Figure 1.¹⁴

Digitization will help prevent the degradation of leader common situational understanding by allowing leaders at all levels to continuously share information. Therefore, digitization should work to reduce the slope of the line induced by OPTEMPO, casualties and time. Further, if unusual circumstances prevent leaders from maintaining a relevant

common picture (RCP) of the battlefield, digitization provides a methodology to quickly address the unit situation. This type of information sharing has the capability to provide for the generative and adaptive

Leadership is . . . a projection of personality and character and is essentially creative in nature. FM 22-102 provides a more refined and detailed leadership definition. "Leadership is the process, through direct or indirect means, of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing resources, purpose, direction and motivation and of creating the conditions for sustained . . . success. It involves the commander's ability to impart his vision of success."

components which are a requirement of growth-oriented learning organizations. Together, digitization and learning organization theory will meld to provide a winning framework for Force XXI leadership.

Evolutionary Leadership Concepts

The Army's future leaders will operate in dynamic, complex environments where the ability to learn will be as important as the actual individual lessons. Due to the nature of this changing environment, Force XXI leaders will face situations where their ability to impart purpose, motivation and direction will be challenged in unique ways. The future leadership model must contain all the elements of systems thinking and learning organizations to obtain the utmost from the organization. These concepts will allow the Army to reap the benefits of quality soldiers operating enhanced combat systems in unique, highly adaptive and flexible organizations.

The Battle Command Battle Laboratory recently provided a glimpse of future leadership changes in a

briefing titled "The Evolution of Army Leadership." This briefing discussed how future leaders' stock of tacit knowledge may be more important than their stock of explicit knowledge.¹⁵ Moreover, leaders' skills and abilities will be more conceptual or cognitive than mechanical.¹⁶ The briefing compared a concept of the "old to new" Army leadership paradigm using the nine leadership competencies as a guide while describing the specific differences in a digitized unit. Some of the data considers the effect of digitization upon leadership. Figure 2 highlights a few key considerations by leadership competency.

While the assumption is that basic leadership will not change, Figure 2 illustrates the specific differences in a few leadership competencies. The briefing contained many other specific examples of change in leader skills. The summary slide proposed a concept called the "learning leader," who would be flexible, versatile, adaptable and innovative.¹⁷ Great leaders have always incorporated many of these talents into their leadership philosophies. These writings merely posit a change in influence or substance between the various qualities of effective leadership.

Throughout emerging doctrinal publications there exists a trend toward maintaining the human dimension of leadership. The main topic in US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-102, *Command* (draft), is human dimension considerations in getting soldiers to fight.¹⁸ The manual asserts that moral authority is the most effective means to exercise command and leadership.¹⁹ Further, leadership is determined to be a projection of personality and character and is essentially creative in nature.²⁰ FM 22-102 provides a more refined and detailed leadership definition. "Leadership is the process, through direct or indirect means, of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing resources, purpose, direction and motivation and of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success. It involves the com-

| Competency | Old | New |
|---|---|--|
| Technical & Tactical Proficiency | "Push to talk" FM Send and receive information Linear, stovepipe and hierarchical | Watch and listen, digital Assimilate information Multidirectional, echelon |
| Use of Available Systems Techniques | Specialist Mechanical skills Knowledge & comprehension level | Generalist Cognitive skills Synthesis and evaluation level |
| Decision Making | Apply known techniques Static frame of reference Reactive and adaptive Minimize risk Analytical decision making | Develop and apply Dynamic frame of reference Proactive, innovative Maximize opportunity Recognition-primed decision making |

Figure 2. Evolution of Army Leadership: Old to New Paradigm.

mander's ability to impart his vision of success."²¹


The direction and impetus of these new sources of thought is clear. The Army is moving the nexus or balance of leadership and command away from a strict scientific application of knowledge toward a more creative, intuitive process which emphasizes the human dimension of battle. Clausewitz called the development of genius "a harmonious combination of elements."²² The combination of elements he would have called genius, the Army normally associates with intuition. TRADOC Pam 525-200-1 defines intuition as "the ability to demonstrate immediate cognition without evident rational thought and inference. It is in fact born from the range of experiences and reflections upon similar occurrences by the commander in the course of his development as a leader."²³ The Army tries to instill these elements through a combination of training and education.

This emphasis on dynamic, intuitive leadership seems counterintuitive in an era of advancing technology and robust communications. Therefore a new philosophy is called for, one that reestablishes the art form of leadership, not in contravention to scientific and technological advance, but in harmony with progress.²⁴

Leadership in Digitized Organizations

FM 100-5, *Operations*, states "The most essential dynamic of combat power is competent officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. Leaders inspire soldiers with the will to win. They provide purpose, direction and motivation in combat."²⁵ Given the digital environment and the evolutionary leadership model presented, what changes in leadership result from these influences? How will these changes impact the commander's ability to provide purpose, direction and motivation to the digitized learning organization in combat? To answer these questions, the following elements must be in place:

- Development of systems thinking is paramount if leaders are to master the techniques of either theory. Leaders must be able to see their environment in its totality, not just as reductionist pieces and parts. Digital hardware will help leaders do this.
- Leaders must have extensive personal mastery of tactical and technical methods to effect their decisions.
- There must be a development process of rich, elaborate, mental models capable of providing the background knowledge needed to understand the situation.
- Leaders must develop combat teams that grow through team learning.



Force XXI digitized hardware will equip the leader with capabilities that facilitate learning organization processes. Digitization will help create the conditions for successful learning organizations by creating viable systems. These systems will enable the leader to share and process information, thereby giving leaders a valuable tool to use in dealing with complex environments. This in turn will reduce ambiguity and confusion through enhanced situational awareness.

- Leaders must develop a shared digitized vision with their subordinates and allow them the latitude and authority to execute the plan within their intent.
- Army leaders must accomplish the above within the context of heroic leadership.

Personal mastery. The digitized leader will have to master many new skills to be effective on tomorrow's battlefield. It is axiomatic that leaders must continue to be tactically and technically proficient. However, in Force XXI, digitized unit leaders need to take the competency of technical mastery to new levels. Of critical importance is developing complete computer mastery and an understanding of the processes by which they work. Such mastery will set a firm example for the troops to follow. As with any other system the Army has employed in the past,

leaders must understand the system to make intelligent decisions concerning its use.

Computer mastery and related command and control (C²) processes provide freedom for leaders to visit subordinates. Not being tied down to computers

Digitized units will become more dispersed . . . [and] trust must span the distance between soldiers in order for individuals to operate as effective teams. Therefore, soldiers must trust the digital systems as well as the leaders using them. Trust and confidence are initially built through interpersonal contact between leaders and subordinates. The training a unit receives prior to combat provides the base upon which trust and confidence are built.

gives leaders the advantage of face-to-face communication with key subordinates and the ability to provide the critical element of combat power—leadership—at the critical time and place.²⁶ Further, a commander on the scene better understands the human dimension of battle. The soldier's spirit and will to win are lost in computer-processed displays.²⁷ The commander's personal presence on the battlefield is essential for inspiring and motivating soldiers, especially during combat.²⁸ Sharing personal experiences with subordinates helps leaders develop a heightened awareness of the realities of combat. This provides an important, additional perspective from which to understand the effect of battle upon their soldiers. S.L.A. Marshall expressed this concept best when he offered the idea that the front is only understood through the eyes and minds of the men who fight there. Further, soldiers at the front know that a leader who is physically present will understand their tactical problems and do all he can to help solve them.²⁹

The personal computer mastery aspect must permeate the leader's training program. The skills of computerized digital C² may be relatively perishable, requiring constant practice.³⁰ Therefore, effective leaders will have to master computer processes and continue practicing those skills to remain "current." Personal mastery is a baseline knowledge capability which must exist in order to experience further leader growth and cultivate an organizational climate conducive to expansive learning.³¹

Additionally, leaders must develop personal computer mastery to free up time to exercise reflective

thought. Reflective thought and introspection are mental processes the leader uses to help develop expertise. Synthesis and integration of information are the underlying processes leaders use to learn and increase their levels of expertise.³² To "see the big picture," leaders must have time to remove themselves from the detailed complexity of running the organization. Reflective thought allows the leader time to analyze the environment's dynamic complexity, including its time and space aspects. Cause and effect are not easily recognized and the effect of a leader's actions over time are not obvious.³³ Understanding a dynamic complexity environment requires that leaders take time to think about the situation.

Mental models. Much has been written concerning the need for leaders to exercise their intuitive sense on the battlefield.³⁴ What is intuition and how does it work to make leaders more effective in combat? The larger answer centers on how expertise is developed and the knowledge that exceptional leaders seem to possess.

Leaders must develop elaborate mental models—frames of reference—to equip themselves with the mental tools necessary to cope with complex, dynamic and ambiguous situations.³⁵ Leaders must formulate these elaborate mental models as part of developing expertise needed to become effective commanders.³⁶ As leaders gain experience and learn, they develop rich, complex, elaborate mental models to organize, store and use large amounts of data.³⁷ However, this increase in information will not eliminate ambiguity or uncertainty.³⁸ These mental models provide leaders with mental tools that help them deal with multiple interpretations of data and conflicting reports. Leaders with rich mental models may be able to quickly discern patterns in seemingly unrelated information that are virtually unrecognizable to others.

There are other factors in the development of elaborate mental models. Leaders must understand how they think about a problem to know if they are "on track" in problem solving. Some leaders possess a quality known as *metacognition*—the ability to monitor one's own thinking, choose the appropriate problem-solving approach or adapt an existing approach to the unique situation.³⁹ These metacognition skills are valuable to leaders when deciding to trust their intuition.⁴⁰

A concept related to the development of intuition is "tacit knowledge." Tacit knowledge has three characteristic features:

- It is procedural, resulting in "knowing how."
- It is instrumental to goal attainment.

- It is acquired with little help from other people.

Tacit knowledge often is unknown to the user, or poorly understood relative to its importance. This trait is important because it helps leaders adapt to, select and shape behavior to the environment.⁴¹

Mental models, metacognition and tacit knowledge are all part of the intellectual development necessary for Force XXI leaders. The ability to apply the "art" of leadership on uncertain future battlefields demands leaders who can creatively use their forces to meet the enemy in an intelligent, purposeful method. They must understand the holistic systems approach to apply complete and seamless creative leadership. Leaders who refine these skills to a high degree will be able to impart purpose and direction for their force, thereby dominating future fights.

Team learning. Leaders must set the conditions for the generative growth of individuals and ideas within a learning organization by exercising "team learning." *Team learning* allows the very best talents and abilities within individuals to come to the surface.⁴² Because the Army is made up of a variety of organizations, each individual unit can be thought of as a team. Together, the Army consists of systems of teams bound together by organization, mission or situation. Leaders must understand how to create conditions which exact the most from these teams. Providing the conditions for successful team learning helps accomplish this goal. Leaders must set the conditions for creative team learning and the generative growth of their team's soldiers, which in turn provides purpose, direction and motivation.

The leader as commander must permeate his will throughout the organization.⁴³ He accomplishes this by instilling trust and confidence in his soldiers. However, in the digitized era the trust and confidence concept will take on a different dimension. Digitized units will become more dispersed due to their command, control and communications capability.⁴⁴ Trust must span the distance between soldiers in order for individuals to operate as effective teams. Therefore, soldiers must trust the digital systems as well as the leaders using them.⁴⁵ Trust and confidence are initially built through interpersonal contact between leaders and subordinates.⁴⁶ The training a unit receives prior to combat provides the base upon which trust and confidence are built.⁴⁷ After combat is joined, trust is maintained or elevated through mutually shared experiences.

The process of information flow and effective communication includes more than the ability to simply pass data. Leaders must be able to judge the emotional and psychological state of their soldiers.

Soldiers of a 1st Armored Division scout platoon with Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie on Hill 425, Bosnia, circa May 1996.



The Army believes in the concept of mission-oriented orders which work to develop subordinate responsibility. Subordinate empowerment is a key concept behind developing team learning. . . . Team players must understand that they make a difference in the organization and are not simply easily discarded spokes in the wheel. Truly dynamic team learning is not just "groupthink," but a genuine learning advance for every individual . . . [and] a necessary element in the development of purpose and direction for the organization.

Presently, tactical digital systems do not provide a methodology for transferring this important aspect of communication. Therefore, voice FM and face-to-face communication remain the only ways to pass nonverbal information. Leaders must look in the eyes or hear the voice of subordinates in critical situations.⁴⁸ The ability to transmit various forms of communication, including voice and interpersonal, was an important piece of the communications plan during Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) *FOCUSED DISPATCH*. The communications plan provided the specific times when messages would be sent digitally or by voice. Anytime a subordinate came into contact with the enemy or a critical situation developed, the message traffic was via voice. The reason was twofold. First, voice traffic via FM is currently faster than digital. Second, the commander wanted to hear the voice of his subordinates to listen for nonverbal clues.⁴⁹ Further, the

immediate response of FM voice allows the leader to maintain trust and confidence. TRADOC Pam 525-200-1 states the matter succinctly: "A soldier's spirit and will to win are lost in the computer-processed displays."⁵⁰ Trust and confidence are key components of motivation in soldiers.

Subordinates and leaders must be able to share ideas and concepts in a mutually beneficial way. Senge, in his book *The Fifth Discipline*, discusses the

Discussion occurs when the subject to be analyzed is dissected from different points of view with one or more positions determined to be correct or superior. Dialog occurs when the participants collectively work to access a larger meaning, providing a free flow of ideas and move to a greater capacity to learn. Additionally, dialog provides for the generative development of soldiers through shared information and problem solving. Soldiers understand there are many occasions when discussion must take place. Soldiers also know that sometimes purely one-way conversations will occur.

use of two types of communication—discussion and dialog. *Discussion* occurs when the subject to be analyzed is dissected from different points of view with one or more positions determined to be correct or superior. *Dialog* occurs when the participants collectively work to access a larger meaning, providing a free flow of ideas and move to a greater capacity to learn.⁵¹ Additionally, dialog provides for the generative development of soldiers through shared information and problem solving. Soldiers understand there are many occasions when discussion must take place. Soldiers also know that sometimes purely one-way conversations will occur. However, there is a time and place for dialog within the Army. When analyzing a problem or confronted with a situation, the leader must trust in his subordinate to help devise a solution. Leaders must allow for generative development by empowering subordinates. Soldiers who believe they are an integral part of the organization will participate fully in mission execution.

Digital systems must be designed to allow for the empowerment of subordinates. Systems that mesh audio with video capability offer the most promise. Current digital systems, such as those used during AWEs *DESERT HAMMER* and *FOCUSED DISPATCH*, may work to deny important information

from the leader in terms of nonverbal information and psychological indicators.⁵² Current digital systems require a high proportion of interface conducting "housekeeping" tasks. The systems are very complex and not necessarily easy to use. The result is leaders and soldiers spend precious time and energy managing the computer. In the future, computer systems must become sophisticated versus complex. Sophisticated computer systems will be easy to use, easy to manage and will incorporate pull-type data. This development will free leaders and subordinates to spend time using their creative processes in other ways.⁵³ Further, sophisticated computers will empower subordinates to think by expanding and assisting the creative process. Eventually, computers will promote generative idea sharing through inter- and intra-active use.

Leaders at all levels should allow maximum freedom of action for subordinates to accomplish their missions. Digital systems offer tremendous opportunities for leaders to generate an accurate battlefield RCP.⁵⁴ However, leaders should not use these systems to preempt the command or leadership prerogatives of subordinates.⁵⁵ Further, leaders who overuse or misuse digitized equipment could lose the necessary interpersonal contact mentioned earlier.⁵⁶ This development could have a negative impact on motivation and decision making. *Increased situational awareness does not equal perfect situational awareness.*

The Army believes in the concept of mission-oriented orders which work to develop subordinate responsibility. Subordinate empowerment is a key concept behind developing team learning. Empowering subordinates increases their desire and capability to learn. Team players must understand that they make a difference in the organization and are not simply easily discarded spokes in the wheel. Truly dynamic team learning is not just "groupthink," but a genuine learning advance for every individual in the group.⁵⁷ Further, team learning is a necessary element in the development of purpose and direction for the organization.

Shared vision. *Shared vision* is a creative process that seeks to answer the question "what does the organization want to create?"⁵⁸ At the tactical level, this concept has utility in an organizational *and* tactical mission sense. Shared vision also means allowing leaders to work together to develop a vision for the organization or for mission execution that every member believes in. Allowing for all members' contributions in developing a shared vision promotes a vested interest in accomplishing the organization's

Then Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Fontenot reviews the tactical situation with his battalion staff during a lull in the 1st Infantry Division's breaching operations west of the Rugi Pocket, Phase Line Colorado, 24 February 1991.



US Army

Army leaders face situations where they order subordinates into harm's way.

It is essential that leaders understand this problem's dynamics and personal nature. . . . The advances in digital communications do not always allow for the complete communication needed by leaders. A battalion commander participating in FOCUSED DISPATCH observed that "Orders to units that require people to go kill other people must be made by voice . . . Platoon leaders want to hear their commander's voice . . . critical information must still be face to face, or by voice in order to feel the situation."

goals, and it provides focus, energy and purpose for the organization.⁵⁹

Vision for the tactical commander means developing a proper end state, understanding the operation's nature and purpose as a whole. These are the elements that constitute the commander's intent. The commander's intent is time or event specific, but it serves to guide the unit toward mission accomplishment in much the same way as shared vision does for the organization. The result is a sense of purpose for the organization and a sense of direction for its members. In a learning organization, Army leaders must be proficient at developing both types of vision.

Heroic leadership. The US Army is an organization that exists to fight in combat and win wars. Therefore, the Army will be similar, but never identical to civilian organizations in setting leadership standards. Army leaders face situations where they order subordinates into harm's way. It is essential that leaders understand this problem's dynamics and personal nature. Army leaders must make it clear that there exists a sense of purpose and meaning to the decision. Soldiers want to hear their command-

er's voice or sense his presence before committing to battle. The advances in digital communications do not always allow for the complete communication needed by leaders. A battalion commander participating in *FOCUSED DISPATCH* observed that "Orders to units that require people to go kill other people must be made by voice . . . Platoon leaders want to hear their commander's voice . . . critical information must still be face to face, or by voice in order to feel the situation."⁶⁰

Heroic leaders understand the effects of battle upon their soldiers and the systems they operate. Furthermore, heroic leaders know that battle influences every system which comes into its domain. Intuition and experience bring insight, which Army leaders must use to their organization's advantage—particularly the soldiers fighting to survive as a part of the organization. The Army leader must go beyond the designer, steward and teacher components of the learning organization leader. Heroic leaders must provide purpose, direction and, most important during the fight, motivation for their soldiers and the organization.

Leader Development and Training Implications

In the future, capable leaders will depend on educational and intellectual foundations more than ever. For leaders, failure to think becomes failure to lead.⁶¹ To prepare Force XXI leaders for tomorrow, the Army must start training them today. The future battalion and brigade commanders in the year 2010 are currently first lieutenants and captains.⁶² These future leaders are learning how to lead and command via the experience and education they are receiving now. This article points to several implications for training future Army leaders today.

- Leaders at all levels must know how to effectively use computers. While our nation's youth have had the most exposure to computers, that does not automatically mean they will have the proficiency required to master computer processes. Many future training requirements could reside in the self-development pillar of leader training.

- Leaders must become systems thinkers. The development of systems thinking should start with an understanding of the process. Currently, our system of military education does not always develop systems thinking.⁶³ Developing systems thinking is imperative for providing leaders who can creatively leverage future dynamic learning organizations. Teaching the systems thinking process must begin early in leader development. Systems thinking should permeate all subsequent educational and operational experiences.

- Leaders must develop mental agility. These thought processes can be developed and exercised through mentally stimulating training that challenges leaders to quickly, yet comprehensively, provide answers to battlefield problems. For example, most field training and computer-simulated exercises generally follow this basic format: The unit leader receives a mission, conducts decision making, issues an order and then executes the mission. During this process, a situation change might dictate issuance of a fragmentary order (FRAGO). To stimulate mental flexibility and agility, future training events may be designed so that the basic mission changes some time before execution. This will require the leaders to quickly redesign the operation. Further, during execution, three or more situation changes requiring FRAGOs will stress the flexibility of the initial order and the mental agility of the leaders who issue it. The thought process is important here. Errors in solution must be tolerated if the development of thought process is the goal. Further, working with

senior officers on a regular basis will help junior leaders broaden their views. The senior officer teaching component is important to developing leaders in learning organizations. Computer simulations, which allow leaders to experience a wide range of situations, provide insight into the leader's cognitive process. Adding various levels of difficulty or ambiguity will teach leaders how to deal with complexity.

- Leaders must thoroughly understand mission-type orders and the effects of micromanaging their subordinates. The future Army learning organizations will take full advantage of decentralized execution of centrally planned operations. The five disciplines of a learning organization are predicated on senior leaders allowing the learning process to take place. This requires leaders who understand that decentralized execution is not just a mission orientation, but a learning methodology. Further, mission-type orders are an engine of generative growth for soldiers and the organizations to which they belong.

- Leaders must have realistic but varied training experiences. An often-declared goal of training managers, realistic and varied training experiences work to develop elaborate mental models in leaders. This in turn assists the incorporation of tacit knowledge and intuition. Together, these abilities facilitate the leaders' decision-making process. This development enables leaders to operate in familiar circumstances or in vague, ambiguous or new situations.

The international and domestic security environment abounds with signs of rapid and continuous change. Gone are the "good old days" when Army leaders could apply doctrinal solutions to Central Europe's predicted mass warfare. Today, the Army has no clear enemies, has seen an expansion of its traditional roles and can expect to fight as a power-projection force anywhere in the world. Coupled with equipment modernization and changes in doctrine and structure, these developments point to a new Army far different from that which executed the Persian Gulf War. These immense changes demand that Army leaders make the absolute best use of available systems. Further, new concepts and evolutions of old ideas will combine to offer a multitude of options for channelizing and promoting the benefits of new technology. Digitization and learning organization concepts are two ideas that can fundamentally assist Army leaders now and in the future.

Digitization will offer many advantages to leaders at all levels. Of particular importance will be the increase in situational awareness acuity. The ability to rapidly communicate and share information will be a natural consequence of digital development. Lead-

ers must learn how to maximize the use of this technology while not losing sight of its limitations.

Because many core Army beliefs are inherent in a learning organization, the principles of Army leadership—and the competencies required of leaders—will not fundamentally change. The twin concepts of decentralized execution of centralized plans and mission-oriented orders are clearly compatible with learning organization theory. The learning organization leader as designer, steward and teacher is also understood in Army leader ethos. However, Army

leaders must also be heroic leaders if they are to provide the purpose, direction and motivation vital to the future Army's success. With the advent of digitization, it is a good time to incorporate the concepts of learning organizations. The combination of digitization and learning organizations will furnish the Army a decisive advantage over future enemies. This combination will also provide the framework for the growth and maturation of a whole new generation of capable leaders prepared to lead America's Army in the 21st century. **MR**

NOTES

1. Numerous books and articles discuss the dynamic of leaders attempting to understand leadership. Some authors believe that once effective leadership is understood, it can be applied to the situation at hand, while other authors attempt to demonstrate the existence of universal leadership principles that transcend time. A few of the more contemporary authors relevant in this discussion include John Keegan, *The Mask of Command* (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), Introduction; Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), various sections with reference to leadership in command.
2. The changing environment and capabilities to wage war are discussed by GEN Gordon R. Sullivan and COL James M. Dubik in *Envisioning Future Warfare* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College [CGSC] Press, 1995).
3. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Pam) 525-5, *Force XXI Operations* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, TRADOC, August 1994), 4-1, 4-11.
4. Center for Army Leadership, *Organizational Leadership for Executives, Organizations as Systems* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press, 1994), 21.
5. Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: Doubleday Publishing, 1990).
6. Senge, 12.
7. Ibid., 69.
8. Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization* (New York: Doubleday Publishing, 1994), 6.
9. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, 12.
10. Ibid., 340.
11. Ibid., 341-45.
12. Ibid., 345-52.
13. Ibid., 353-58.
14. GEN Frederick Franks (Fort Leavenworth, KS: briefing and slides conducted at School of Advanced Military Studies, CGSC, 8 November 1995).
15. Battle Command Battle Laboratory (BCBL), *The Evolution of Army Leadership, An Initial Effort to Describe Force XXI Commanders Echelons Divisions to Company* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: BCBL, 30 December 1994).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-102, *Command* (draft) (Washington, DC: Headquarters, DA, 28 June 1995).
19. Ibid., 1-1.
20. Ibid., 2-12.
21. Ibid., 1-4.
22. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 100.
23. TRADOC Pam 525-200-1, *Battle Command* (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Battle Command Dynamic, Headquarters, TRADOC, 1 December 1994), 4.
24. Special Text 71-3, *Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Digitized Brigade* (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor Center, February 1995), 4-2.
25. FM 100-5, 2-11.
26. TRADOC Pam 525-200-1, 12.
27. Ibid.
28. TRADOC Pam 525-5, 3-5.
29. S.L.A. Marshall, *Man Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War* (Magnolia, MA: Peter Smith, 1990), 102-5.
30. MAJ O.T. Edwards III, "Digital Battlefield Training and Tactical Insights of a User," *Armor* (May-June 1995), 12-14.
31. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, chap. 9.
32. Army Research Institute (ARI), *The Human Dimensions of Battle Command: A Behavioral Science Perspective on the Art of Battle Command* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: ARI Battle Command Research, June 1996), 16. The discussion of reflective thought is found within the broader examination of the development of expertise. The emerging expert is thought to utilize consistently developing mental models upon which to draw perceptions of the world and reach understanding of complicated events.
33. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, 71.
34. A discussion of intuition invariably starts with Clausewitz in chapter 3, "On Military Genius." Clausewitz was describing what he considered military genius; today we hold many of these same qualities as attributes present when a leader is said to possess a highly developed sense of military intuition. For more modern discussions of intuition see
35. Howard T. Prince II, "Developing Leaders for Force XXI Battle Command" (San Jose, CA: Association of the United States Army [AUSA] Symposium), 3.
36. ARI, *The Human Dimension of Battle Command*, 14-15.
37. Ibid., 16.
38. Many publications speak to the future environment of combat. Most indicate that combat will be full of ambiguous, complex situations. Certainly, Clausewitz would have recognized the idea that the fog of war still exists no matter how good our information systems become. In this regard see Van Creveld, *Command in War*, chap. 7. Concerning the environment of future war see TRADOC Pam 525-5, 3-4; see COL Herbert F. Harback and COL Ulrich H. Keller, "Learning Leader XXI," *Military Review* (May-June 1995), 30, for a discussion of ambiguity.
39. Ibid., 17.
40. Ibid., 18.
41. Ibid., 27.
42. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, 236.
43. BCBL, *Battle Command* (draft 2.1) (Fort Leavenworth, KS: BCBL, 22 April 1994), 11.
44. TRADOC Pam 525-5, 2-8.
45. Interview with LTC Joe Orr, commander, 2d Battalion, 33d Armor Regiment, 5 October 1995. Orr indicated that trust in the digital communications system was of paramount importance in gaining and maintaining organizational effectiveness.
46. Many articles and books discuss this important point at length. See Marshall, Van Creveld, FM 100-5 and FM 22-100 among many others.
47. Ibid.
48. Mounted Battlespace Battle Lab, "Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) FO-CUSED DISPATCH" (update slides, observations provided to the American Defense Preparedness Association 1995 Combat Vehicle Conference, 19 September 1995).
49. Orr interview.
50. TRADOC Pam 525-200-1, 12.
51. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, 238-48.
52. The concept that some types of nonverbal communication is lost over radio messages is not new. Further, the concept that some communication is lost through digital message traffic is not new. What is interesting is the need for leaders, and all soldiers, to feel connected with their fellow soldiers. S.L.A. Marshall wrote extensively about the phenomena of part of combat cohesiveness as a function of proximity. During interviews with Orr, MAJ Andy Dreby (S3) and CPT Tom Deakins (Assistant S3) of 2d Battalion, 33d Armor Regiment all stated a desire to keep close contact with significant members of the organization. Digital message traffic left out key components of communication that were important for these soldiers in the execution of AWE FO-CUSED DISPATCH. Therefore, frequently the key members of the command would use FM or personal visits to reinforce the communication flow between system users.
53. Interview with BG Lon Maggart, commanding general, Fort Knox and Commandant, US Army Armor School, conducted 5 October 1995.
54. Greater situational awareness is a main topic in many areas of digital development. Most observers believe that situational awareness will be greatly increased via digitization. Further, nearly every publication dealing with digitization discusses the advantages of the increase in situational awareness. See TRADOC Pam 525-5, chap. 3 and BCBL's *Battle Command* (draft 2.1), along with any of the newer publications dealing with command or leadership.
55. TRADOC Pam 525-5, 4-4.
56. TRADOC Analysis Center, *Leader Competencies: Implications for Force XXI* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: FY 95 Mobile Strike Force Experiment, June 1995).
57. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, 238.
58. Ibid., 206.
59. Ibid., 206-10.
60. Orr interview.
61. James J. Schneider, "How War Works: The Origins, Nature and Purpose of Military Theory" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: unpublished paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, CGSC, 16 June 1995), 2.
62. BCBL, "The Evolution of Army Leadership" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: briefing slides, 30 December 1994).
63. Interview with Dr. Kathy Quirkert, ARI, Fort Knox, KY, conducted 4 October 1995.

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Vision Precedes Success

Major James M. McAlister, US Army

DURING HIS BATTALION change of command ceremony, Lieutenant Colonel John Smith mentally relives the past two years of command. His mind fills with memories of one triumphant training event after another, glowing inspection reports and praise from his seniors and subordinates alike. Smith is proud of his two superior command officer evaluation reports and recent selection to the US Army War College. However, after all is said and done, he unmistakably feels something is missing. As he reflects, he remembers doing great on all the calendar stuff, but did he prepare the unit for the future? Because he always felt so overwhelmed by the calendar and inspections, he never had time to focus on the organization's future. Of course, history will be his judge. In fact, his former soldiers might even think that all he did was try to look good, punch his ticket and run before anyone was the wiser. Only time will tell if Smith made a positive or negative impact on the unit. He really wanted to have a positive impact, but he just didn't know how to get to his vision.

Smith is not alone. With the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) as high as it is today for most units, it is a wonder any commanders fulfill their vision. However, many journals, magazines and newspapers have devoted considerable time and attention to the subject of vision in the past few years. Leaders are often baffled, thinking "I can see it but I cannot seem to get my arms around it," or "I know a great vision when I see it but I don't know how to . . ." A vision often appears hazy and fails to produce tangible results. This article will provide a simple explanation of vision and review important research on the subject.

Why a Vision is Important

Current issues facing our Army appear so overwhelming that it seems pointless to think about the future. From OPTEMPO, deployments and budget

There is a pattern among the great nations studied by Pollack, the great naval ships in the Gullickson/Chenette study and high-performance students studied by Singer—all had a strong, positive vision of their future. Positive vision precedes significant success at all levels. One of the most inspiring and memorable visions was contained in Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s "I have a dream" speech. It inspired and captured the imagination of an entire nation and generations that followed.

reductions, to sexual harassment issues, erosion of benefits and women in combat, Army leaders have a plateful.¹ Despite today's difficult issues, it is extremely important to have a positive future vision. A vision is the most forceful motivator for action and change.² The *Book of Proverbs* states "Where there is no vision, the people perish." It is difficult to rise above everyday life and see beyond the present issues.³ Therefore, one must look to the future to rise above the present.

Historian Fred Pollack detailed his findings on vision—a positive vision of the future is the key ingredient to greatness.⁴ Pollack studied many nations throughout history to see how positively they envisioned their futures, and then he examined how well these nations lived up to their expectations. From this research, Pollack discovered that significant vision preceded significant success.⁵ In each great civilization, he found the same results—vision was the decisive factor. Leaders offered a compelling future vision for their societies. Then, leaders and societies worked together to transform their visions into reality. Pollack found this true for every great civilization he studied. The astonishing fact was that many

civilizations began their rise to greatness without the proper resources, succeeding despite their obvious limitations. Their *vision* looked beyond obvious limitations and described a compelling future.⁶ If a powerful, positive future vision works for complex societies, can it work for smaller organizations?

In a Naval Postgraduate School thesis, several top Navy ships were studied to determine what distinguished great ships and their captains from ordinary ones. The two researchers, Navy Commanders Gregg G. Gullickson and Richard D. Chenette, concluded that the extraordinary commanding officers' success was neither due to technical expertise nor administrative skill, but to communicating a compelling vision of the future and to gaining the crews' supporting commitment. The commander and crew worked together to transform their vision into reality.⁷ If a powerful, positive future vision works for ships in the Navy, can it work for individual soldiers?

Educational psychologist Benjamin Singer conducted research on student performance. Singer found that low-performance students had a blind or nearsighted view of their future. The students believed they were powerless to shape their own future. The research also indicated that high-performance students believed they had a greater sense of control over their future. The high-performance students' focus was long term, often five to 10 years out.⁸ Singer found that success *can* be achieved in the classroom despite limitations such as low IQs, family resources and background. The students, like the nations Pollack studied, literally outperformed their assets.⁹ There is a pattern among the great nations studied by Pollack, the great naval ships in the Gullickson/Chenette study and high-performance students studied by Singer—all had a strong, positive vision of their future.¹⁰ Positive vision precedes significant success at all levels.

A Vision's Basic Components

One of the most inspiring and memorable visions was contained in Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s "I have a dream" speech. It inspired and captured the imagination of an entire nation and generations that followed. The vision was memorable and easily understood.

In corporate America, we saw Ford Motor Company battle a consumer perception that cars "made in the USA" meant inferior quality. Ford promoted its vision through advertisements and a motto of "Quality is Job 1." The vision was clear and concise, excellence centered and reflected the need to address consumer perception of quality. Based on

tests and consumer satisfaction ratings, Ford's car quality is now second to none.

In 1982, 26-year old Stephen Jobs was attempting to entice a renowned corporate executive, then president of Pepsi, to come work for his small firm. He said, "If you stay at Pepsi all you will be remembered

The leader must share his vision with team members, and they must agree to support it. Without the team's support, the vision will remain only a dream. Team acceptance of the vision promotes understanding and agreement on direction between the leader and subordinates. Direction significantly improves communication and decision making within the organization.

for is increasing sugar water sales to teenagers in America. If you come to us you will change the world."¹¹ John Sculley resigned as Pepsi's corporate president and joined Apple to launch the Graphic User Interface (GUI) revolution to the personal computer. This vision Jobs provided to Sculley was extremely ambitious, clearly stated and made Sculley want to be a part of the team.¹²

There are four components to creating a vision:

- The leader must develop the vision.
- The organization must accept and share the leader's vision.
- The vision must be positive and inspiring.
- The vision must provide detail and focus.¹³

Leader developed. Leaders are responsible for the development of a vision, either alone or with assistance from organization members.¹⁴ Ultimately, it is the leader's responsibility to develop the organization's vision.

Sharing and acceptance. The leader must share his vision with team members, and they must agree to support it.¹⁵ Without the team's support, the vision will remain only a dream.¹⁶ Team acceptance of the vision promotes understanding and agreement on direction between the leader and subordinates. Direction significantly improves communication and decision making within the organization.¹⁷ Additionally, aligning the separate actions of various elements reduces conflict, improves cooperation and increases efficiency.¹⁸ This alignment is critical to large organizations. According to Thomas Huber, "No military force is so great that it cannot be defeated by its own leaders."¹⁹ A vision that is accepted by the team can prevent a great organization

from moving and operating in a disjointed manner, thereby destroying itself.

Positive and inspiring. A vision should be positive and inspiring, driving each person in the organization to grow and expand individual and team skills beyond their ordinary reach.²⁰ Being the best at any activity requires an uncompromising commitment to sweat and hardship. Everybody wants to be

A vision should be positive and inspiring, driving each person in the organization to grow and expand individual and team skills beyond their ordinary reach.

Being the best at any activity requires an uncompromising commitment to sweat and hardship. Everybody wants to be on a winning team, but few people want to pay the price. When the team “buys” the vision, it also buys into the challenges, hard work and endless repetition of basic skills required for top performance.

on a winning team, but few people want to pay the price. When the team “buys” the vision, it also buys into the challenges, hard work and endless repetition of basic skills required for top performance. Every team member will look for ways to improve his own performance and will cooperate enthusiastically with other team members to reach the goal. This ensures the maximum use of available assets.

Detail and focus. A successful vision must be detailed and focused.²¹ According to author Joel Barker, “A vision must explain to everyone in the organization the *what, how* and *why* with enough precision so that each member in the organization can find his significant and important place to contribute and participate in the vision.”²² A vision to have “the best unit in the US Army” is neither detailed nor focused. A vision to “prepare the unit to operate efficiently in darkness and inclement weather because these are the standard conditions on the battlefield” gives the *what* and the *why*. Details such as conducting all training exercises at night or in the rain sketches the *how*. Providing details and focus empowers the team’s members to participate.

Crafting a Great Vision

Vision development is an extremely challenging task. It requires considerable and deep thinking. Some effective tools to consider using when developing your vision follow:

- *Time* is the most difficult but least important factor in planning a vision.²³ Leaders should avoid visions that sound like 24 months of successful major events of “looking good in command.” Soldiers will smell this and translate “the vision” into “the commander’s vision of himself.”²⁴ Such nearsighted visions will appear, at best, as “rah, rah, rah,” whose motivational effects are only short term. A compelling vision is not linked to time and should have effects that are long term and inspirational.²⁵

- *Position* yourself in the future and look backward to today and yesterday. Imagining yourself in the future frees you from today’s constraints, and it avoids the trap that the future is impossible.²⁶ Looking from the future backward allows you to move easily and see the paths that are most important to attaining quantum improvements.²⁷

- In *developing* a vision, you must include all major systems of your organization, resources, personnel, technology and other considerations unique to your organization. All of these processes must be brought together simultaneously.²⁸

- A *briefly worded* vision is easier for everyone to grasp. The commander must provide additional details on the vision and reinforce it through repetitive discussions. Ultimately, the vision must be compelling enough to pull the organization into the future.²⁹ The unit’s training, resources, discipline, rewards and punishments should all be linked to the vision’s accomplishment. This provides a total package to support the vision.

The following battalion-level vision has been developed for an Avenger battalion assigned to a division. This is challenging for several reasons. First, Patriot continues to receive much media attention based on its performance during the Persian Gulf War. Second, with the former Soviet Union’s demise and with no formidable air threat to challenge the US Air Force, many question the need for so many soldiers and so much equipment to defend against a threat that no longer exists. From an air defender’s perspective, there is much to be concerned about. Our example Avenger battalion wants to be professionally trained and ready to fight, becoming the most innovative and tactically proficient air defense artillery (ADA) unit in the Army. Its leaders will be totally dedicated to the battalion’s soldiers and families and the soldiers it protects on the battlefield.

Despite the Berlin Wall’s fall, the danger from the “third dimension” has become infinitely more complex and lethal. For example, inexpensive computer chips, microcameras and small, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) allow any nation or terrorist organiza-



A 1st Cavalry Division operations center security force is briefed during a recent training exercise.

Once the team accepts the "battalion vision," the commander must continually reinforce it. All actions and decisions must focus toward the vision. Each of the commander's decisions and actions will be measured against the team's vision. Reinforcement of the vision builds momentum. The commander must communicate and reinforce the details of the vision to every soldier in the battalion. Such opportunities exist when speaking with soldiers in the motor pool, dining facility or the field.

tion to compete in the third dimension, once restricted to only rich nations. We must continue to provide superior protection to our soldiers and the assets we support while developing the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to counter all future air threats. Years from now, we will not be judged by how well we prepared for today but how well we met future challenges.

Important Vision Aspects

The vision stated above is short and appears somewhat lifeless. This vision will fail unless the battalion commander applies two essential principles—communication and reinforcement. The commander must use every opportunity to *communicate* this vision to all of his subordinates in a means that everyone can understand.³⁰ Ford Motor Company continually reinforced its vision of "Quality is Job 1" through detailed advertisements. One 30-second commercial is not enough to communicate a vision. Continuous repetition builds perception.

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The following discussion is an example of the commander's 4-minute vision pitch to his troops. "History has a habit of repeating itself. Paradigms continue to shift. Unfortunately, we continue to perpetuate the safe habits of yesterday by preparing for the next war based on our last success. The enemy, just like a professional football team, knows from bitter defeat what did not work in the last game and will definitely not work in the next. Therefore, he is unlikely to run the same set of plays (strategy or tactics) when it is time for a rematch. Technology

moves forward, providing new tools and creating new opportunities. The pro football coach studies game films and designs a game plan to offset his opponent's strengths. Our future adversaries are studying replays of the last war, a war they lost. We cannot expect them to fight the next war like they did the last.

"I want to present a lesson from the past that casts a light on our battalion's future. Our future is bright, our day is coming! The age of gunpowder and muskets allowed barefooted peasants without armor or

A commander's philosophy . . . is [his] statement of what he supports and what he will not tolerate. A command philosophy makes it easier for subordinates to understand how the commander operates. Linking a vision to a command philosophy can provide the foundation for a powerfully effective organization.

mounts and only rudimentary training to defeat knights, who were considered invulnerable. Gunpowder caused the paradigm to shift. Armored knights disappeared from the battlefield. Gunpowder caused the cost of warfare to significantly decline. The number of countries capable of effectively waging war grew. We see similar facts at work today. During the 20th century's latter half, as the Gulf War demonstrated, no nation without a world-class air force could hope to prevail on the modern battlefield. Today, combinations of several pieces of relatively inexpensive technology are making nations that cannot afford high-tech combat aircraft competitive.

"UAVs will soon be able to attack targets as effectively as piloted aircraft. Since these 'pilotless' aircraft cost a fraction of what conventional combat aircraft and combat pilots cost, they will have the same sort of impact on 21st-century warfare that gunpowder and muskets had on medieval battlefields. These pilotless airframes will empower any nation or terrorist organization the way gunpowder and musketry empowered medieval serfs, permitting them to compete in airspace once dominated by only the world's most affluent nations.

"UAVs represent a paradigm shift in warfare. Since ADA is the only element trained to counter these evolving threats, we must be ready to meet the future. As I mentioned, the UAV is an extremely attractive weapon for Third World nations and terrorist groups. It is inexpensive and has a small radar cross section and limited infrared emission. UAVs can be

equipped with Global Positioning Systems (GPS), on-board video and a variety of ordnance packages. Adding ordnance takes the UAV out of the observation category and into the attack aircraft realm. At less than \$50,000 per unit, UAVs lend themselves to swarm attacks that can overwhelm conventional defense tactics. Anyone who can play a video game such as *Flight Simulator*™ can operate a UAV with deadly accuracy.

"The future is upon us. Some potential enemy nation or terrorist group will buy or develop UAV technology. Somewhere, this nation or terrorist group is exploring UAV capabilities, perfecting UAV tactics and working out UAV attack options. Such an adversary could hand whoever is in port, on the airfield or on the ground a devastating defeat. The big difference between Pearl Harbor 1941 and 'Seaport XXI' or 'Airport XXI' will be that CNN will be on hand to broadcast the attack live to a stunned worldwide viewing audience.

"Our battalion must be ready to counter the UAV threat. As a minimum, we must develop over-the-horizon target acquisition and identification that will expand our engagement envelope. We must place a heavy emphasis on enemy UAV play in all Battle Command Training Program *WARFIGHTER* exercises, Combat Training Center rotations and field training exercises to develop and hone the TTPs for countering mass UAV attacks. We are no longer the 'Rodney Dangerfield' of combat arms. We must act as ADA 'evangelists' and spread the ADA 'gospel' throughout the division. The UAVs have already taken off—they are headed in our direction. Only our ADA battalion can stop the new air threat and protect our troops. Our future is bright—our day is coming!"

The discussion above highlights and gives life to the basic vision. The background talk provides soldiers and leaders a view of the challenges involved in moving toward the future. This informs soldiers that to continue our success, we must adapt now for the future. Exceptional performance of our present mission is not enough, given the technology's rapid pace. This "future view" compels us to change; otherwise the battalion will suffer disaster along with the units it protects. The slogan "Our Day is Coming!" reinforces the vision.

The leader must link his vision to his other important plans as follows:

Command philosophy—A commander's philosophy provides him an opportunity to describe to subordinates the values, priorities, standards and idiosyncrasies of his leadership style. This is a commander's statement of what he supports and

what he will not tolerate. A command philosophy makes it easier for subordinates to understand how the commander operates. Linking a vision to a command philosophy can provide the foundation for a powerfully effective organization.

Values—Many studies show that a command philosophy should contain a statement of the commander's values. No matter how inspiring or effective a leader's vision, the organization can destroy itself operating without moral guidelines. Consider the following example: Adolf Hitler's powerful and compelling vision of a 1,000-year Reich of world domination by a supreme social order thrust nearly the entire civilized world into war and led the German society down a seven-year path of self-destruction. Hitler's vision was not linked to any values or morals. Visions can become destructive. Values within the commander's philosophy provide the leader and team a means to assess the vision, steering toward the moral high ground.³²

Freedom to fail—An effective link between vision and command philosophy is a statement on acceptance of honest mistakes made in pursuit of the vision. By their very nature, visions create several unidentified team challenges. The team must perceive that the commander rewards risk taking and innovation and forgives honest mistakes made in pursuit of the vision.

Progress through technology—No one can possibly predict the future based on the rapid advances in technology today. Fifteen years ago, who could predict a "laptop" computer could exchange large

Many studies show that a command philosophy should contain a statement of the commander's values. No matter how inspiring or effective a leader's vision, the organization can destroy itself operating without moral guidelines. . . . Values within the commander's philosophy provide the leader and team a means to assess the vision, steering toward the moral high ground.

batches of information and be in every field tactical operations center Armywide? Or 10 years ago, who knew that the Berlin Wall would fall and the Cold War would end? We may not fully understand the future's intricate details, but by focusing on a vision of the future, we can stretch our current capabilities for tomorrow.³³ Inventions and technology do not dictate the future and should not be feared; they are merely tools to assist us in achieving great results. Therefore, the change from inventions that support the organizational vision should be enthusiastically welcomed for assisting us in our journey.

Yes, it is difficult to rise above everyday life and see beyond the present, focusing solely on the problems found in the headlines, merely reacting to change. However, there is a far better, more rewarding way. As the patterns among great nations, great organizations and high-performance individuals illustrate, all have a strong, positive vision of their future. Significant vision precedes significant success. **MR**

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Leadership Doctrine: 1778 to 1995

Lieutenant Colonel Faris R. Kirkland, US Army, Retired

THROUGHOUT the distinguished history of the US Army, the relationship between leaders and those they lead has always played a critical role in determining performance, both on and off the field of combat. With the recent and ongoing downsizing initiatives, few in the Army would question the necessity of fostering mutual respect and trust in all Army units. In discussing the relationships between military leadership doctrine and taking care of soldiers, it seems to me there are three distinct periods. I have labeled 1778 to 1940 the *Paternalism Era*. With respect to leadership doctrine, the period from 1940 to the late 1970s was a *Confusion Era*. The current era, from the late 1970s and continuing into the future, I see as a *Renaissance* in the human dimension.

The Paternalism Era: 1778 to 1940

Three themes dominated the Army's leadership doctrine during its first 162 years. Two of them were in Baron von Steuben's 1778 *Blue Book*: leaders were to build bonds of loyalty with their troops and leaders were to take care of their troops.¹ Today we call this *vertical cohesion*. Additionally, leaders were to treat subordinates with respect. This directive first appeared in the 1821 edition of *Army Regulations*: "[A]ll [officers] shall conduct, direct and protect inferiors . . . with the cares due men from whose patriotism, valor and obedience they are to expect a part of their own reputation and glory . . ."² Based on these themes, leadership's primary purpose was to keep soldiers physically able to participate in combat and psychologically prepared to follow their commanders.

During this time frame, cohesion and respect for subordinates evolved slowly but continuously. In 1841, *Army Regulations* recognized the importance of *horizontal cohesion*—bonding among fellow soldiers—by stating that soldiers should be kept in the same squad unless there were "cogent reasons" for a transfer.³ In 1907, James A. Moss's *Officers Manual* reminded officers that enlisted men "are members of your profession."⁴ In 1918, a military writer asserted

Before, during and for a decade after the Korean War . . . many career officers avoided the technical aspects of their profession and left them to NCOs or lieutenants serving obligated tours. . . . Most commanders resorted to judging subordinates on statistical records, such as the number of delinquency reports, rate of reenlistment and percentage of attendance at the chaplain's lectures, because these were matters their superiors understood and emphasized.

that "consideration, courtesy and respect are . . . parts of our discipline."⁵ In 1930, *The Officers Guide* noted that "Good discipline results from mutual respect among good men."⁶ During World War I, senior leaders argued that the leadership objective should be to create a climate of trust and respect in which discipline was redefined as commitment on the part of every soldier to mission accomplishment. One wrote: "[D]iscipline . . . [in] a successful army . . . endures when every semblance of authority has vanished . . ."⁷

Leaders of the "Old Army" understood many of the thoughts and feelings in their soldiers' minds long before psychological terms for them were coined. This understanding is reflected in the earliest statements of leadership doctrine. The elements recognized in the 1990s as essential to buffer stress—horizontal and vertical cohesion, respect and trust across ranks, concern and care for soldiers and empowerment of subordinates—were all contained in the 1820s' regulations. Some officers understood these principles and used them to make their soldiers efficient, deadly and contented.

The Confusion Era: 1940 to 1979

The Army's expansion from 190,000 to 8.2 million soldiers during World War II wrought major changes in the Army's culture. Officers found themselves promoted to command and staff positions in

which they confronted responsibilities and challenges far beyond their experience levels. Many were anxious about their own ability to cope, and their anxieties were exacerbated by having to rely on subordinates who were relative amateurs. Some officers adopted authoritarian behavior patterns. They were uncritically submissive to superiors, insistent on unquestioning obedience, solicitous of their own prerogatives rather than the welfare of their troops, punitive toward their subordinates and often sought to alleviate their own anxieties by instilling fear in their subordinates. Even seasoned officers sometimes issued orders with comments such as, "If you do not accomplish the mission, you better not come back alive."⁸ This type of behavior was not new, but it became more pervasive. It did not strengthen either military efficiency or resistance to combat stress.

The postwar Army retained five times as many officers as it had before the war.⁹ Between 1945 and 1950, the Army's unit-level culture was defined by officers whose first extended commissioned service took place during World War II. Many of them could never have aspired to commissioned rank before the war, and they were insecure in their positions now. Much evidence suggests that a substantial proportion of officers who had depended on authoritarianism during the war stayed in the Army.¹⁰

By the time the Korean War began, some authoritarian patterns had become institutionalized. Although the regulations had not changed, the advice to officers in semiofficial publications emphasized guidance such as: "Military orders must be obeyed"; and "The leader must obtain compliance."¹¹ The Army established a career management system to ensure that officers had equal opportunities and acquired a common body of experience. To balance their career profiles, the Army assigned some officers with little or no knowledge of combat procedures to command units in battle.¹² The results were often heavy casualties, high stress and the rupture of vertical cohesion.

Before, during and for a decade after the Korean War, the emphasis in many units was on looking good rather than being militarily competent.¹³ Many career officers avoided the technical aspects of their profession and left them to noncommissioned officers (NCOs) or lieutenants serving obligated tours. Many officers conducting annual general inspections were unfamiliar with new technological developments and evaluated units on adherence to picayune details of administrative regulations that had nothing to do with the unit's ability to perform its mission. Most commanders resorted to judging subordinates on statistical records, such as the number of delinquency reports, rate of reenlistment and percentage

of attendance at the chaplain's lectures, because these were matters their superiors understood and emphasized. For a time, the Army's official motto was "zero defects." As the Army downsized by 30 percent in three years, officers became insecure. They

[Prompted by Lieutenant General William F. Peers' memo,] Westmoreland tasked the AWC to look into the Army's leadership climate. . . . [That] study found that serving officers of all ranks perceived that if they were to achieve personal success, they had to please their superiors rather than meet the legitimate needs of their troops or develop mission-relevant competence in their units.

were afraid to exercise initiative or take any chances that could lead to a career-ending error or failure.

Leadership doctrine slipped away from the principles that had guided military leaders for almost two centuries. The 1962 edition of Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, *Personnel-Army Command Policy and Procedure*, stated that the commander had "[T]wo . . . responsibilities in the following priority: accomplishment of his mission; and the care of his personnel and equipment." Nothing exceptionable so far, but then: "Normally, efficient accomplishment of the mission will help to satisfy the responsibility for personnel welfare."¹⁴ The theme "taking care of soldiers," which had endured since 1778, had been supplanted. Soldiers had become a subsidiary consideration.

Confusion over leadership doctrine and principles reached crisis proportions during the Vietnam War's later years. Career development continued to be a major consideration for assignment to combat commands. By 1968, the practice of officers avoiding technical matters during the prewar years left many battalions and some brigades with no one who had any practical knowledge about branch-relevant procedures. Most of the Regular Army NCOs had already served their tours and gone home. Most company grade officers were lieutenants fresh from school. The field grade officers—who should have been repositories of knowledge and wisdom gained from applying that knowledge—had busied themselves during peacetime with matters other than the prosaic technical details of infantry field fortifications or artillery gunnery.¹⁵

In 1970, Lieutenant General William F. Peers sent Army Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland a memo in which he reported that officers were shirking responsibility, lying, turning a blind eye to

improper conduct, commanding from a safe distance, ignoring their men's concerns and failing to enforce measures to protect their troops.¹⁶ The effects of such behavior on soldiers' ability to manage

Empowering subordinates . . . puts additional stress on leaders. . . . The COHORT system succeeded in each platoon, company and battalion to the extent that the leader had the psychological resilience to carry the uncertainties of trusting and granting discretion to his troops. Those who risked trusting their troops had superb units. Those who did not were confused and depressed and often regressed to authoritarian behavior. They failed as commanders and had marginally effective units.

the stresses of combat have been documented in extensive Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) literature and the collapse of discipline in the Army.¹⁷ Some soldiers in the field, exasperated by certain officers' self-seeking behavior and indifference to their subordinates' welfare, tried to kill them (fragging), sometimes successfully. To his credit, Westmoreland tasked the US Army War College (AWC) to look into the Army's leadership climate.

The *Study on Military Professionalism*, conducted by a small group of AWC students in 1970, laid bare the military culture that was the legacy of World War II. The study found that serving officers of all ranks perceived that if they were to achieve personal success, they had to please their superiors rather than meet the legitimate needs of their troops or develop mission-relevant competence in their units. They saw themselves as compelled to attain trivial short-term objectives through dishonest practices that were detrimental to their units' long-term capabilities. The pressure came from field grade and general officers who were: "[M]arginally skilled in the complexities of [their] duties, engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure . . . and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports."¹⁸

Westmoreland was shocked, as were most senior officers to which the report was briefed. Westmoreland ordered that the report be "close-held." While never classified, it was not released for 13 years.

The *Study on Military Professionalism* did not change the Army. It is unlikely that Westmoreland could have done much to change an institution dominated by officers who had been socialized in an authoritarian culture, and who were psychologically

dependent on it. The Army had to endure a decade of failed leadership during which many officers were afraid to go into the barracks at night—drug commerce flourished and racially based gangs fought each other, on post and off. Some critics ascribed the Army's malaise to the antimilitary sentiment in the civilian sector or to initiatives imposed on the Army by political sponsors of the All-Volunteer Force. But Captains Larry Ingraham and Rick Manning of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, in their book *The Boys in the Barracks*, accurately described the social conditions in the Army, explained how confusion among leaders had brought on the chaos and demonstrated that a return to the principles of leadership could restore discipline and morale.¹⁹

The Renaissance: 1979–?

During the 1970s, many middle-rank officers chafed under a military culture that rewarded "looking good" but discouraged the development of combat efficiency. As they reached high rank, they sought to change the ways in which the Army did its business. Just when change began is open to debate. I have selected 1979, the year Major General Maxwell Thurman took over the US Army Recruiting Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois, and reorganized the recruiting process to bring intelligent, well-educated men and women into the Army.²⁰ Smart soldiers were the one inescapable prerequisite for the success of innovations such as self-paced training, performance-based training and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. Also in 1979, discussion began that led to the cohesion, operational readiness and training (COHORT) experiments of the mid to late 1980s. The COHORT system, which kept soldiers together in the same company or battalion for three years, was designed to support the development of vertical and horizontal cohesion and to permit extended training in progressively more advanced skills.

Both of these processes strengthened resistance to the psychological pressures of combat. But, paradoxically, COHORT put exceptionally heavy stress on leaders. Soldiers in COHORT units were intelligent, learned fast and were continually demanding more information, more ideas and more challenges from their leaders. Many officers and NCOs were unable to keep ahead of their troops. Further, leaders lived in a goldfish bowl. Any mistake (or success) was instantly known throughout the unit. Privates considered themselves to be their leaders' junior colleagues; they expected access, they expected to be heard and they expected to participate in decisions and be given responsibility as their proficiency grew.

Empowering subordinates is essential to strengthening vertical cohesion and building a unit's proficiency, but it puts additional stress on leaders who are still responsible for everything their unit does or fails to do. The COHORT system succeeded in each platoon, company and battalion to the extent that the leader had the psychological resilience to carry the uncertainties of trusting and granting discretion to his troops. Those who risked trusting their troops had superb units. Those who did not were confused and depressed and often regressed to authoritarian behavior. They failed as commanders and had marginally effective units.²¹

Any additional burdens COHORT placed on leaders at squad, platoon, company and battalion levels were almost totally unnoticed. This is not surprising—nowhere in Army doctrine from 1778 to the present does it mention “taking care of leaders.” Some officers have written in professional journals about the socio-professional relations among German army officers—*Auftragstaktik*—as a social process in which each officer mentors his immediate subordinates with respect and tolerance to develop their readiness and competence to exercise initiative.²² It is often described as the combat multiplier that enabled the German army to defeat more numerous and better-equipped opponents through 130 years of warfare.²³ The US Army has not yet embraced *Auftragstaktik*, though some enlightened officers practice its principles.

There was, however, rapid progress in other aspects of leadership doctrine. The 1980 AR 600–20 expanded the concept of respect for subordinates: “Commanders should not rely on coercion when persuasive methods can effect the desired end.” Additionally, “Discipline can be seen in . . . mutual respect between senior and subordinate personnel.”²⁴ The language is pallid and tentative, but at least it is there. In 1981, a “leadership goal” was promulgated that enjoined leaders to be “committed to mission accomplishment and the well-being of subordinates.”²⁵ After 19 years, the troops were brought back from subsidiary status. In the 1983 Field Manual (FM) 22–100, *Military Leadership*, rich historical examples reconfirmed 19th-century leadership principles and put new emphasis on *respect* and *trust* across the ranks.²⁶ The Army chief of staff’s 1985 White Paper, *Leadership Makes the Difference*, was a concise statement of policy that established competence, caring, communication and candor as the foundations of leadership.²⁷ This doctrine built on, but went beyond, pre-World War II regulations and directly strengthened resistance to combat stress. The 1987 FM 22–102, *Soldier Team Development*,

emphasized trust and respect up and down the hierarchy and the progressive empowerment of subordinates. It operationalized “discipline’s” definition as the ability and readiness of junior personnel to use initiative and take appropriate action in the absence of orders or supervision.²⁸ By reposing confidence in the subordinate and granting him ownership of the mission, discipline based on respect for the soldier

Research on the attitudes and perceptions of soldiers during Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm revealed [that] . . . on matters that were fundamental to the operation’s purpose, such as rules of engagement, treatment of the enemy and indigenous civilians and adapting to changing missions, there was an understood and accepted consensus about “what was right.” . . . Conversely, in operations where the mission was ambiguous, such as the interventions in Somalia and Haiti, some soldiers felt their leaders had let them down.

makes vertical cohesion indissoluble and is a powerful antidote to stress. The concept of self-discipline grew from the theme of respect for subordinates, and it was stated explicitly during World War I. During the Confusion Era, few leaders believed in it. Finally, FM 22–102 made it a doctrinal cornerstone.

Leadership doctrine has not addressed betrayal of “what’s right,” and indeed, the phenomenon had not been described in connection with military leadership until 1994.²⁹ Research on the attitudes and perceptions of soldiers during Operations *Just Cause* in 1989 and *Desert Storm* in 1991 revealed few instances in which soldiers felt betrayal by their leaders, and none of these involved serious issues.³⁰ On matters that were fundamental to the operation’s purpose, such as rules of engagement, treatment of the enemy and indigenous civilians and adapting to changing missions, there was an understood and accepted consensus about “what was right.” The evidence from these post-Cold War “shooting wars” suggests that leaders who follow the precepts of caring, competence, communication and candor will not betray “what’s right.”

Conversely, in operations where the mission was ambiguous, such as the interventions in Somalia and Haiti, some soldiers felt their leaders had let them down.³¹ It is difficult enough to define “what’s right” when the mission is clear. When it is not, misunderstandings can increase the level of stress in a

unit at the same time that erosion of trust and confidence are reducing resistance to stress. Irrespective of the ambiguity of the mission assigned by the National Command Authority, soldiers and unit leaders must have a clear statement of purpose for each intervention as a point of departure for them to work out "what's right."³²

During the many armed interventions the Army has carried out since the Cold War's end, NCOs and privates have behaved independently and adaptively in pursuing mission objectives. Soldiers of all ranks have behaved with restraint and compassion toward their adversaries, and they have shifted rapidly from training to combat to constabulary to humanitarian missions. They have coped with as many deployments in a single enlistment as previous soldiers encountered in an entire career. They stay in the service after an intervention, and it is the responsibility of the Army, not the civil sector, to manage any stress reac-

tions that develop. Soldiers, leaders and military mental health professionals know how to manage most forms of stress and see that units are psychologically ready for the next deployment.

The missing element in leadership doctrine is support for leaders. Support for a leader can only come from the confidence, trust, support and respect of his boss. This support is the essence of *Auftragstaktik*. Until recently, except in isolated units in special circumstances, soldiers, leaders and units had not developed the professionalism necessary to sustain a leadership doctrine founded on mutual trust and respect. Although our Army is smaller, it is competent, powerful and ready for a supportive social system for leaders as the culminating component of its leadership doctrine. With psychological support for leaders as well as junior soldiers, the Army will be fit to manage stress with optimal efficiency in a dangerous and rapidly changing world. **MR**

NOTES

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Assessing Self-Development

Lieutenant Colonel John L. Rovero, US Army, and
Major R. Craig Bullis, US Army

PUZZLING OVER your commander's remark that your communication skills need improvement, you went to a friend to ask for advice. "I could have told you that. There are quite a few times when you don't listen to anyone." "Well, why didn't you tell me?" "You never asked." "Well, what else haven't you mentioned?" "Well, now that you ask. . . ."

The US Army has long recognized that its quality in performance of mission is dependent upon the quality of its soldiers and leaders. To continuously improve soldier and leader quality requires a comprehensive means to provide both developmental and performance assessment and feedback on how well we do our jobs.

Accordingly, *leader development* is best defined as "the preparation of military and civilian leaders, through a progressive and sequential system of institutional training, operational assignments and self-development, to assume leader positions and exploit the full potential of present and future doctrine."¹ US Army leaders have historically relied on the assessments from their superiors, not only as the primary gauge of job success and mission accomplishment, but also as the means to identify developmental needs. If the boss was happy, all must be right with the world. Today, in a time of growing interest in Total Quality Management, both the public and private sectors are moving toward other sources of feedback to measure success and to assess and develop leaders.

Recent initiatives have pushed the Army to examine itself more closely with the intention of developing better leaders. One method of improving leadership is the concept of multirater assessment.² As the Army considers multirater assessment potential, it is examining tools that may significantly enhance our personal development. Multirater assessments provide a means to construct developmental

Self-development generally occurs in a series of phases and begins with an accurate self-assessment that identifies the individual's developmental needs. This assessment is followed by discussion with trusted others to identify the causes of identified strengths and weaknesses. Then an "action plan" is developed to highlight and prioritize the specific actions that should be taken by the individual to achieve his/her self-developmental goals. Commanders are responsible for providing "advice, assistance and support as individual leaders prepare and execute their developmental action plans."

action plans to improve our own leadership skills, given direct feedback from our peers, subordinates and superiors.

The Self-Development Process

Army leader development is founded on two principles:

- All development, such as institutional training, operational assignments and self-development, must be properly sequenced.
- The Army must maintain life-cycle models—which describe critical tasks and responsibilities—for all leaders in their respective areas.³

Department of the Army doctrinal literature maintains that "*Self-development* is a planned, competency-based, progressive and sequential process individual leaders use to enhance previously acquired skills, knowledge, behaviors and experience, and to enhance readiness and potential for progressively more complex and higher-level assignments. Self-development focuses on maximizing leader strengths, minimizing weaknesses and achieving individual

leader development goals.”⁴

Two imperatives are tied to the self-development pillar:

- Stress the individual responsibility for leader development.
- Identify, specify and refine self-development requirements.⁵

Further, self-development involves “a continuous process that takes place during institutional training, education and operational assignments.”⁶ In other

Multirater assessments have been linked to skill and performance improvement in those areas where the assessments have been tied to performance objectives. The multirater assessment concept fits well with the system of management by objectives (MBO) that we use daily in the Army. Specifically, MBO takes the form of the OER support form, where specific goals and objectives are outlined and agreed to by the officer's supervisor.

words, self-development occurs wherever the soldier is, no matter what the soldier is doing. The self-development program should “stretch and broaden the individual beyond the [current] job or training.”⁷

Self-development generally occurs in a series of phases and begins with an accurate self-assessment that identifies the individual’s developmental needs.⁸ This assessment is followed by discussion with trusted others to identify the causes of identified strengths and weaknesses. Then an “action plan” is developed to highlight and prioritize the specific actions that should be taken by the individual to achieve his/her self-developmental goals. Commanders are responsible for providing “advice, assistance and support as individual leaders prepare and execute their developmental action plans.”⁹ This implies that the action plan development process is a joint activity between the leader and the subordinate. Commanders, leaders and supervisors are responsible for ensuring that their subordinates develop and execute a self-developmental action plan.

Assessing leader strengths and weaknesses is clearly the most important step in the process. Just as having an accurate understanding of friendly and enemy unit strengths and weaknesses is paramount to successful military operations, having an accurate understanding of individual strengths and weaknesses is paramount to the development of an effec-

tive self-development action plan. “Great answer—wrong question” results in no credit given on an academic test. Similarly, developing an action plan that answers the “wrong question” does not provide an efficient opportunity for individual leader self-development. Given today’s operations tempo, most leaders find themselves planning for a wide variety of missions, including missions that we have no tactics, techniques or procedures for. Because planning and practice take time, it is critical that commanders carve out time in their training schedules for self-development activities to focus on the critical skills development that will make them better leaders.

Action plans should focus on three sets of activities which are distinguished by how far in the future self-development is focused:

- *Immediate goals* focus on accomplishing tasks related to the current job and are therefore very specific.
- *Near-term goals* are somewhat broader in scope and develop leaders for their responsibilities at the next operational assignment.
- *Long-term goals* are the activities that have the broadest scope, focusing on tasks that prepare leaders for their duties and responsibilities beyond their next operational assignment.¹⁰

The scope of activities that can be employed for self-development is limited only by one’s imagination and includes: attending education courses, participating in professional organizations, reading professional materials, seeking challenging assignments, practicing critical leader technical and tactical tasks and participating in leadership activities in both the military and civilian communities. However, a problem emerges when we look at the self-development activities associated with each rank category. For officers, leader self-development emphasizes “on-the-job training coupled with an extensive reading program.” Warrant officer activities focus primarily on attending civilian education courses toward attaining college degrees. Noncommissioned officer self-development activities are the broadest in nature and include professional reading and writing, formal military education (Self-development Test and Army Correspondence Course Programs) and civilian education through the Army Continuing Education System (ACES). For civilians, self-development opportunity spans the spectrum of opportunities listed above. Because of their position stability, civilian self-development activities can have a potentially greater impact.

Commanders, leaders and supervisors provide feedback that helps the individual identify strengths

and weaknesses. What is generally not addressed is the "value added" to that self-assessment when peers and subordinates also provide input to the person's assessment of developmental needs. Leadership research has clearly identified that the roles required of leaders are different dependent on whether they are the individual's superior, peer or subordinate.

Multirater Assessments

Relying on feedback from superiors, we have traditionally concentrated on those personal development areas that we perceived were important to the commander. While this approach led to success for us as individuals, it did not necessarily help us attain maximum self-development or create a better organization. Every day, we have routine contact with others who have formed an opinion of our abilities, and who, if we listen, can provide valuable insights into our own self-development needs. This feedback is important because it comes from those who have far more contact with us than our raters or senior raters.

The multirater assessment concept, often called 360-degree assessment, is not new to the Army. For many years, we have used feedback from others in evaluation processes, including peer ratings at Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) Advanced Camp, the US Military Academy, Ranger school, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³), the Warrant Officer Staff Course and peer/subordinate ratings at the Army Management Staff College. While sometimes used in an evaluation role, assessment results often lead to behavior modification. This change is inspired not by the direction of a leader, but by our concern for how our actions may be affecting others who work *with* or perhaps *for* us.

A multirater assessment is any assessment that takes into account more than just a superior's feedback. Sources of feedback include peers, subordinates and external customers. Customer relationships are often overlooked in the military, but most units do indeed serve external customers. Recently, greater emphasis has been placed on our relationships with external customers and the support we provide. Customers can include higher headquarters staffs or subordinate units dependent on us for information. Feedback sources are as varied as our daily personal contacts. Measuring feedback from multiple sources using a common instrument is the methodology used in multirater assessment.

Scientific study indicates that the accuracy of our assessments increases as the number of raters increases.¹¹ This same multiple-source concept increases the likelihood that an individual will take



Use of multirater assessments at the unit level can foster teamwork. When team members believe that their input counts and is recognized, their productivity increases. Communication is fostered, because there is less tendency to hide the truth. Team members often have more opportunity to view the leadership of their leader than his superior. . . . There is no formal method for leaders to obtain feedback from subordinates or peers on their leadership effectiveness.

feedback "ownership," particularly as they see the results reinforced by feedback from others. Multirater assessments have been linked to skill and performance improvement in those areas where the assessments have been tied to performance objectives. The multirater assessment concept fits well with the system of management by objectives (MBO) that we use daily in the Army. Specifically, MBO takes the form of the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) support form, where specific goals and objectives are outlined and agreed to by the officer's supervisor.

When used for individual development purposes, a multirater assessment may be best used in comparison with our own self-assessment. In first identifying what we perceive as our personal strengths, weaknesses and developmental needs, we provide a baseline to measure our other assessments against. We then use the other assessments to validate our self-assessment, to reexamine our assessment in divergent areas or to identify and investigate areas where we did not recognize a need. This comparison allows us to locate areas where we may act differently with different groups of people. For example, we

The more valid the feedback an individual receives, the greater the potential for improvement. The Army intent in developing a multirater feedback mechanism is to provide individuals with more feedback on their leadership skills from which to build their own self-development program. Rater and senior rater feedback provides only an occasional and very limited view of an individual's daily leadership.

may communicate well with our superiors but have difficulty passing information down to subordinates, or vice versa. The first step is to honestly assess one's own leadership and recognize those areas where improvement can and should occur.

The Leader Azimuth Check

The primary goal of any feedback system is development. The more valid the feedback an individual receives, the greater the potential for improvement. The Army intent in developing a multirater feedback mechanism is to provide individuals with more feedback on their leadership skills from which to build their own self-development program. Rater and senior rater feedback provides only an occasional and very limited view of an individual's daily leadership.

With this intent in mind, pilot programs for multirater assessment have been initiated by the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at CAS³ and the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Individuals are given the opportunity to obtain feedback from superiors, peers and subordinates at their duty station prior to attending these courses. This feedback is tied to a self-assessment and the results are provided to the students for their use in creating a Developmental Action Plan. This plan allows the individuals to chart near-, intermediate- and long-term goals in their personal leadership development.

The current survey instrument is called the *Leader Azimuth Check*. Developed by the Army Research Institute (ARI) in conjunction with CAL, the survey asks for feedback in 14 areas. The latest survey is related to emerging leadership doctrine and directly reflects the leadership concepts listed on the front of the new OER.¹² Feedback is provided through a 6-point scale representing how closely an individual is described by each instrument statement. Questions reflecting effective leadership dimensions are shown in the figure.¹³ The scores from these individual questions are averaged to obtain overall scores in selected

leader dimensions. Comparison scores are given for each of four rating sources: self, peer, subordinate and superior. Individuals may then assess how they rate themselves versus these other sources. Information is also provided to individuals on their comparison group, a set of individuals with the same background, experience or perhaps grade. Each individual analyzes his results before establishing action plan goals.

Army experience with multirater assessment has shown promise. People involved with the process generally believe the process benefits them and the Army. Assessment subjects have expressed a motivation to change their behavior based on at least some assessment dimension. Any motivation to improve behavior could be considered a success for this program. Many individuals continue to put sincere thought into ways to improve their personal leadership abilities.¹⁴

Since the primary goal of multirater assessment is self-development, the feedback provided to the focal leader is anonymous. This confidentiality permits the assessor to be more candid in evaluating an individual's leadership abilities. Unfortunately, an evaluation report rarely gives an individual a true picture of his or her abilities. Unless "for cause," an evaluation report is even less likely to point out a specific weakness or developmental need. The candid snapshot of an individual provided through multirater assessment is intended to identify those areas where an individual may wish to focus self-development.

To maintain rater response confidentiality, individuals do not receive reports from peers and subordinates unless at least two assessments are received in each category. The final output averages cannot then be tied to any individual. This confidentiality must be maintained so individuals can trust that their feedback will not cause some form of retaliation. Occasionally, the truth hurts. This same confidentiality is not applied to superiors because they are expected to provide truthful, accurate assessments of subordinates.

Developmental Action Plans

The multirater assessment's desired outcome is development of individual action plans for self-development. Action plans must be tied to identified developmental needs and to personal, as well as unit goals and objectives. The best developmental actions are those that can be done on the job while accomplishing the mission. Short-term action plan goals may be accomplished simply by practice and repetition in those areas where needs are greatest. For example, knowing that you have a problem motivating subordinates may lead to actions that should improve your methods of dealing with those subor-

dinates by setting clear expectations or properly rewarding good performance. Long-term goals should fit in the more structured environment of the Leader Development Model contained in Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army: The Enduring Legacy*. Developmental Action Plans must consider the various leader dimensions compared to both the individual's personal goals and to the Army's need for leaders with specific leadership abilities.

Although currently focused primarily at Army "schoolhouses," the concept and implementation of multirater assessment has great potential for use in regular units. With its focus on self-development, multirater assessment can provide anyone with a check against personal needs and goals. Assessments can provide leaders with immediate climate checks on how their leadership is affecting their units. The multirater concept has been piloted at several operational units with good results.

Use of multirater assessments at the unit level can foster teamwork. When team members believe that their input counts and is recognized, their productivity increases. Communication is fostered, because there is less tendency to hide the truth. Team members often have more opportunity to view the leadership of their leader than his superior. Currently, there is no formal method for leaders to obtain feedback from subordinates or peers on their leadership effectiveness. When the assessments are used properly, leaders will develop confidence that their subordinates can provide valid and useful feedback that has been missing in the current system.

At the unit level, response confidentiality is the key to success. If individuals know that their responses

About 75 percent of participating students had good results to serve as a base for their action plans. The remainder were asked to make a plan based only on a self-assessment. Many of the action plans based on the full assessment showed sincere effort and, if implemented, will lead to improvement. Resistance . . . was expressed primarily by those who failed to complete the entire 360-degree process. Senior leaders are often those who are most difficult to convince that they have room for improvement.

are kept confidential, they will provide valid feedback. Fear of retribution based on a less-than-successful assessment would rapidly cause multirater assessment to fail.

Multirater assessment falls outside the normal chain of command. Since feedback comes from all sources, there is a possibility that the feedback will be discounted as unimportant. This is overcome if there is a willingness to seek self-improvement. It has worked well in cases where the commander requested the assessments for his unit. Multirater assessment is available on request through CAL and ARI.

Multirater assessment is not without problems. The process of obtaining feedback, consolidating that feedback into meaningful reports and returning it to an individual is a time-consuming process. Valid feedback survey instruments contain 50 to 75 questions or statements that must be answered. The feedback must be processed using statistical

The Core Dimensions of Leadership

The leader of character and competence . . .

acts to achieve excellence by providing purpose, direction and motivation.

| Values "Be" | Attributes "Be" | Skills "Know" | Actions "Do" | | |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------|------------|
| Loyalty | | Tactical | Influencing | Operating | Improving |
| Duty | | Technical | Communicating | Planning | Developing |
| Respect | Emotional | Interpersonal | Decision Making | Executing | Building |
| Selfless Service | Mental | Conceptual | Motivating | Assessing | Learning |
| Honor | | | | | |
| Integrity | | | | | |
| Personal Courage | Physical | | | | |

1. The emotional attributes are self-control, balance and stability.
 2. The mental attributes are will, self-discipline, initiative, judgment, confidence, intelligence and cultural awareness.
 3. The physical attributes are health fitness, physical fitness, military bearing and professional bearing.
 4. The required interpersonal, conceptual, technical skills and resulting tactical skill are different for the junior, senior and strategic leader.
 A detailed account of these skills can be found in the skills chapters for the different levels of leadership.

software and a report produced. Time and computer hardware are scarce commodities in operational environments. Currently all processing is done through ARI at Fort Leavenworth. Work is under way to upgrade this software and have it resident with both ARI and CAL.

Gaps in information are common. Individuals sometimes fail to submit or correctly complete the feedback instruments. This lost data can and often does affect the assessment process outcome. When individuals do not receive feedback they desire, they tend to blame the entire process. Great effort must be expended to obtain the most accurate data possible. Within CGSC, this problem was common to about 25 percent of those involved in the pilot program.

Some individuals feel threatened by honest feedback. They do not like to be told the truth, or do not like less than good news. Others are often surprised to receive candid feedback that differs from what they had received through our inflated evaluation system. Raters cannot, because of our system, tell it like it is. Time must be spent searching inside and admitting that we have weaknesses and developmental needs. It is easiest to simply ignore or discount feedback that does not conform to our "self-picture." The value of multirater assessments is also discounted by those who do not fully embrace self-development's value. However, these difficulties can be overcome, and it is our belief that self-development benefits easily outweigh its costs.

Within the CGSC pilot, all Active Duty Army officers were prompted to create a Developmental Action Plan based on the results from their 360-degree

assessment. About 75 percent of participating students had good results to serve as a base for their action plans. The remainder were asked to make a plan based only on a self-assessment. Many of the action plans based on the full assessment showed sincere effort and, if implemented, will lead to improvement. Resistance to the concept of developmental action plans was expressed primarily by those who failed to complete the entire 360-degree process. Senior leaders are often those who are most difficult to convince that they have room for improvement.

Army publications have clearly communicated the importance of leadership to successful mission accomplishment. The Army's emphasis on leader development accentuates the responsibility of all soldiers to develop themselves as leaders for the Army's future. Moreover, given the unstructured nature and increasing complexity of future missions, Army leaders must be more prepared to solicit and receive feedback from more individuals than those included in existing formal feedback channels. The concepts contained in multirater assessment programs are consistent with the multiple roles Army leaders play now and will continue to play in the future.

Multirater assessment programs have swept corporate America and are being used successfully within the Departments of Defense and Energy. As a self-development tool, its value has been proved. The Army has taken on the concept as an initiative to improve the leaders of tomorrow. Through aggressive evaluation and instrument improvement, we can fully develop a program that will aid in leadership skill development for all Army leaders. **MR**

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Breaking the Counseling Mold

Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Phillips, US Army

THE ARRIVAL of *Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI* has generated a lot of discussion among senior US Army leaders about counseling and possible ways to improve it. This article discusses several issues surrounding the topic, including a discussion of the definition, purpose and skills associated with counseling and the counseling process. It proposes that subordinates take a more active role in the counseling process, including the development of their own "plan of action." *OPMS XXI* posits that leaders must emphasize and subordinates must assume *shared* responsibility for effective counseling.

Let us put the counseling process in perspective. Do your subordinates look forward to "counseling" sessions with you? The answer for most supervisors is probably "No." Most subordinates do in fact want regular and sincere feedback on their performance. They also want focused discussions about their future. Subordinates also want assistance and guidance to develop as leaders and accomplish individual and organizational goals. Now here comes the kicker—how many of your subordinates receive effective counseling on a regular basis and how would they rate your counseling skills? Moreover, have you seen tangible results of your counseling efforts in their behavior, work patterns or quality of performance?

Consider your own answers to these questions. Now switch roles and evaluate your experiences as a counseling session recipient throughout your military or civilian time in the Army. How many times have you been "counseled" and, after leaving, been confused over what exactly was accomplished? Did you feel good about the session or did it raise more questions or issues than it actually answered or addressed? If this has become the Army's status quo, then *OPMS XXI* has several challenges ahead of it.

Regular, *effective* counseling is an essential leader development element, and responsibility for this

problem must be equally shared by the institution, its leaders and subordinates. To date, the Army has failed to provide progressive, sequential training in this area. Therefore, leaders lack the skills necessary

FM 22-100, Army Leadership (Draft 1997) defines counseling as "Subordinate-centered communication which outlines actions necessary for subordinates to achieve individual and unit goals." . . . The dialogue between the leader and subordinate [must] be two-way and nondirective. It is a process where the subordinate is actively involved and not merely a passive listener. An easy measure of this is to compare how much time the leader spends talking versus listening. If a leader is doing more talking than listening, he is probably doing direct communicating, not counseling.

to effectively counsel. The Army, as part of its culture, has a strong negative bias against counseling and puts too much responsibility for effective counseling on the leader and too little on subordinates. As a general rule, subordinates either are not offered the opportunity or choose not to take an active part in the counseling process.

Effective counseling begins by setting the framework for Army counseling. To be effective, Army leadership doctrine must define counseling's purpose and state specifically what counseling is to accomplish. It must discuss the essential qualities and skills that leaders must have to effectively counsel and distinguish what leaders *and* subordinates are responsible for in the counseling process. Finally, doctrine must establish how counseling fits into the leader development process within the Army.

A 2d Armored Division warrant officer discusses a maintenance issue with a Bradley crewman at Fort Hood, Texas.

US Army



Leaders are seen by subordinates first and foremost as leaders, not counselors.

To effectively counsel, supervisors must first be respected as leaders. This issue concerns the relationship between the superior and subordinate and provides the context for any counseling session. . . Leaders set the stage for effective counseling more by their day-to-day example than by any other factor. Leaders must be credible—they must “walk” their “talk.”

The Army's Counseling "Climate"

The very mention of "counseling" is likely to provoke a negative reaction from soldiers. Think back to the last time you were counseled or counseled someone. The reason was likely negative, often resulting in a negative experience. "Getting counseled" is not something soldiers seek out. Many officers only receive "counseling" when their officer evaluation reports (OERs) are due, and that may be limited to "Here's your OER. . . Do you have any questions?"

Typically, soldiers operate under a "no news is good news" philosophy. In other words, the less they are counseled, the better. Another common example is when a soldier receives a chewing out and the leader, usually at the end of the session, says "Consider yourself counseled." Leaders today are faced with more and more requirements, and counseling can quickly be relegated to a "check-the-block" mentality.

Considering these factors and resulting experiences, the fact that counseling has a negative connotation is hardly surprising. Adding to these perceptions is the stigma associated with mandatory counseling required in unfavorable personnel actions such as separation, weight control or drug and alcohol abuse. Documenting counseling is perceived as "bad news" and writing things down during a counseling session is perceived as negative. This is especially true if there is a perceived "zero defects" environment.

Coaching Versus Counseling

A major challenge is defining "counseling." For some, it is anytime they talk one-on-one with a subordinate. For others, it includes company, platoon or squad sensing sessions. Leaders need to understand what effective counseling is and how it differs from other types of communication such as providing feedback or coaching. Leaders need to be absolutely

clear, in their own minds, when they are counseling and when they are providing straight feedback or “just having a conversation.” Handing someone his OER and asking him if he has any questions about it is not counseling. Likewise, chewing soldiers out for poor duty performance is not counseling. Many times this communication or feedback may be appropriate and necessary. The point is to call it what it is—feedback, or a chewing out, but not counseling.

As a general rule, counseling requires preparation, a plan and follow-up. US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Draft 1997) defines counseling as “Subordinate-centered communication which outlines actions necessary for subordinates to achieve individual and unit goals.” This definition allows leaders to differentiate between more general feedback and counseling. First and foremost, is the communication “subordinate centered?” The main focus of subordinate-centered communication is that the dialogue between the leader and subordinate be two-way and nondirective. It is a process where the subordinate is *actively involved* and not merely a passive listener. An easy measure of this is to compare how much time the leader spends talking versus listening. If a leader is doing more talking than listening, he is probably doing direct communicating, not counseling. Second, does the communication outline subordinate actions focused on the achievement of individual or unit goals? This almost always requires some sort of written plan or steps that are agreed upon by the leader and subordinate.

Implied in these “actions” are resources, including possibly time or training. Leaders must determine, based on a number of situation factors, such as time available, subordinate motivation, standards and/or requirements, if they intend to just communicate (a simpler task) or counsel (a more difficult task). Conscientiously making that decision then sets the leader on two related but very different paths:

Certainly there is overlap between coaching, feedback and counseling. The key is not how they are similar, but what makes them distinct. Coaching and providing feedback are similar methods that usually follow a set pattern:

- The leader talks/tells the subordinate what to do or offers advice.
- The subordinate listens, asks questions and then follows the leader’s instructions.
- The leader and subordinate evaluate the results and start the process over again.

The focus becomes the coach instructing and the subordinate listening/obeying. Coaching is usually more directive than counseling, as the senior (tea-

cher) instructs the subordinate (pupil) in a particular activity or event. Coaching is valuable, needed and

Regular, effective counseling is an essential leader development element, and responsibility for this problem must be equally shared by the institution, its leaders and subordinates. To date, the Army has failed to provide progressive, sequential training in this area. Therefore, leaders lack the skill necessary to effectively counsel. The Army, as part of its culture, has a strong negative bias against counseling and puts too much responsibility for effective counseling on the leader and too little on subordinates.

necessary, but it is not counseling. As leaders understand the difference between these two tasks, they will apply them separately as required without confusing themselves or their subordinates. Conversely, subordinates will have a better understanding of their roles and responsibilities in these two very different situations.

Counseling's Purpose

Counseling has only one purpose—the development of soldiers to accomplish individual and organizational goals. This single purpose provides focus to all actions prior to, during and after counseling. Leaders may “counsel” because it is required by Army regulations and/or local policy, but counseling’s *purpose* is first and always the development of the subordinate. The end result of that development is the accomplishment of individual and unit goals. Counseling in the Army is a process for individual development only in the context that it is directed toward individual and unit goals. With this in mind, leaders should consider the following questions before any counseling session:

- How does counseling focus on the individual’s development as a soldier?
- What individual or unit goal is this counseling directed toward?
- What key area(s) am I willing to dedicate my time and energy toward, and are the resources required commensurate with the cost?

All soldiers deserve counseling that equips them to attain specific goals. If that is not the focus of counseling, then a leader is most likely providing “feedback.” This personal mind-set or frame of reference sets the tone for any counseling session.

Leader Qualities

Leaders are seen by subordinates first and foremost as leaders, not counselors. To effectively counsel, supervisors must first be respected as leaders. This issue concerns the relationship between the superior and subordinate and provides the context for any counseling session. Subordinates are unlikely

Subordinates should also prepare for counseling by assessing their performance and being prepared to substantiate that assessment with specific behavioral examples—both good and bad. Subordinates then use that assessment, and previous ones, to assess their strengths and weaknesses and prepare a plan to address those areas they want to work on.

to seriously listen to leaders who lack credibility, respect or empathy. Subordinates may “go through the motions,” but the process is likely to produce little subordinate motivation and meager results. Leaders set the stage for effective counseling more by their day-to-day example than by any other factor. Leaders must be credible—they must “walk” their “talk.”

Leaders must consistently display respect for their subordinates and be able to see the world from their perspective. Seeing the world from another’s perspective is a daunting task. Imagine an individual who was raised in a small community in the Midwest counseling a soldier who grew up in a large urban city. They are likely to have very different perspectives. This is also true for junior officers counseling senior noncommissioned officers. Their perspectives, based on different backgrounds and experiences, can be very different.

Finally, leaders must have an accurate assessment of their own psychological “baggage.” This would include an understanding of their own strengths and weaknesses but, more important, their own prejudices and biases. All individuals have these. Leaders must be aware of how their own history—including family, school, community and spiritual aspects—has shaped their world view and how other views may be radically different from their own. This might include issues such as individual responsibility, the senior–subordinate relationship and the role of fate or chance.

When preparing for counseling, leaders should focus on two tasks:

- Assess the duty performance of the individual and review the basis for that assessment. Is it based

on specific, observed behavior or on secondhand information? Obviously, if an assessment is secondhand, then the validity of the assessment may be suspect.

- Leaders should prepare specific open-ended questions for the counseling session. These may include requesting a self-assessment from the subordinate, what they feel was their most significant accomplishment and areas they want to work on. Preparing questions is critical in that they can, if used properly, open the counseling session up to areas which might normally remain undisclosed.

Subordinates should also prepare for counseling by assessing their performance and being prepared to substantiate that assessment with specific behavioral examples—both good and bad. Subordinates then use that assessment, and previous ones, to assess their strengths and weaknesses and prepare a plan to address those areas they want to work on.

Executing Counseling

Leaders must be aware of and actively guard against two powerful forces at work during any counseling session.

The subordinate desires to say the least amount possible while still getting two questions answered: where do I stand in relationship to my peers; and what do I need to do to improve? Counseling can easily fall into a process where the leader answers these questions, the subordinate nods approval and the counseling session abruptly ends. This feedback may be accurate and appropriate, but it constitutes only part of the counseling process. Leaders must determine how providing these assessments is instrumental to soldier development and mission accomplishment. It might be entirely appropriate to completely separate the two sessions:

- Session One: the leader provides a performance assessment (focus is on the past).
- Session Two: the leader and subordinate discuss appropriate goals and a plan of action that addresses agreed-upon strengths and weaknesses (focus is on the future).

The second force is the leader’s natural tendency to dominate the counseling session. Leaders usually believe they have the solution to an individual’s “problem” or professional growth requirements. This belief may be reinforced by their personal experience in similar situations. If the subordinate would just do what the leader tells him, everything would work out fine. Again, this “communication” may be appropriate and necessary, but it is more in line with coaching, not counseling. When counseling, leaders must conscientiously talk less and listen more to the subordinate’s problem identification and recommended



Leader and Subordinate Counseling Process Responsibilities Checklist

Leader Responsibilities

Before:

- Determine the purpose of the counseling.
- Schedule the counseling (appropriate place and time).
- Review previous counseling/plan of action if available.
- Prepare an accurate assessment of subordinate strengths and weakness that considers:
 - The validity of the source (observations) which substantiate that assessment.
 - A recognition of personal bias which influences that assessment.
- Determine if the subordinate is meeting standards in all areas and, if not, your recommendations for actions required to meet those standards.
- Prepare open-ended questions.

During:

- Establish two-way communication.
- Ask open-ended questions.
- Listen effectively (both verbally and nonverbally).
- Ask for the subordinate's self-assessment.
- Provide assessment of subordinate strengths and weaknesses.
- Avoid generalities.
- Focus on the behavior not the person.
(Do not attack the person—"You're lazy.")
- Reach agreement on areas to work on.
- Ask for subordinate's plan.
(What would you like to work on, and how?)
- Review and provide input to the subordinate's proposed plan of action.
- Determine what resources you can provide to the subordinate.
- Establish and agree to milestones.

After:

- Review and complete milestones.
- Provide resources to implement the plan of action.
- Maintain commitment to subordinate development.

Common Errors:

- Dominate the session (I talk, you listen).
- Poor listening skills.
- Argumentative.
- Gives unsolicited advice.
- Focuses on weaknesses.

Subordinate Responsibilities

Before:

- Review previous counseling/plan of action if available.
- Prepare an accurate assessment of your strengths and weakness that considers:
 - Your previous self-assessments.
 - A recognition of personal bias which influences that assessment.
- Develop a plan of action that addresses those areas you want to work on.

During:

- Remain an active participant in the counseling by asking questions and choosing to agree/disagree.
- Listen effectively (both verbally and nonverbally).
- Provide your assessment of your strengths and weaknesses.
- Provide and discuss your developmental plan of action.
- Establish and agree to milestones.

After:

- Execute the plan of action.

Common Errors:

- Not saying anything (Passive listening).
- Defensive.
- Not prepared to discuss strengths/weaknesses.
- Not committed to improving.

Expectations

From Leader:

- A genuine interest and motivation toward being a better soldier.
- Subordinate commitment to their plan.

Subordinate:

- Where I stand: If I am not meeting the leader's standards, what do I need to improve on?

solutions. Leaders must require subordinate preparation and active involvement in the counseling process. Conversely, subordinates must assume the re-

Typically, soldiers operate under a "no news is good news" philosophy. In other words, the less they are counseled, the better. Another common example is when a soldier receives a chewing out and the leader, usually at the end of the session, says "Consider yourself counseled." Leaders today are faced with more and more requirements, and counseling can quickly be relegated to a "check-the-block" mentality.

sponsibility to be a full participant in the counseling process. The checklist on the previous page highlights leader and subordinate responsibilities.

Four essential skills leaders must develop include: asking open-ended questions, effective listening, developing a plan of action and developing subordinate commitment and motivation. Preparing open-ended questions was discussed as part of preparing for counseling.

Effective listening. Listening is an art. Great listeners actively seek to understand the frame of reference of the other person. Listeners work hard to hear *what* is said, *how* it is said and what is *not* said. Likewise, they actively pick up nonverbal cues, trying to actually understand what a person is saying before judging it. A common mistake leaders make is to rush ahead, thinking of how they are going to respond long before a person has even finished talking. One obvious indicator of this is when the subordinate is interrupted often.

Seeing the situation from a subordinate's frame of reference is hard work and involves some understanding of the subordinate's background and situation. Leaders can check their understanding by paraphrasing or summarizing for the individual what they "thought" was said. This is especially powerful if the leader is able to accurately understand the "facts" as they interpret them, but also the emotional reaction to them such as anger or frustration.

Developing a plan of action. Developing a plan of action is not intended to be difficult or require a long, written product. The plan of action should outline agreed-upon actions or steps that are intended to meet individual or unit goals. Putting things in writing helps clarify expectations and responsibilities and serves as a reference point during follow-up

counseling sessions. The plan of action specifies what the subordinate agrees to do after the session to reach his or her goal(s).

Developing subordinate commitment and motivation. People are very resistant to change and are unlikely to change unless there is strong internal or external motivation. In this regard, leaders should first determine if the individual is meeting standards in all areas. If not, the leader is obligated to state this and work with the individual to improve in the area(s) found insufficient. This would include a two-way discussion of skills and motivation required to meet standards.

What is the leader's responsibility when the subordinate is meeting or exceeding performance standards in all areas? In this case, the leader should allow the subordinate to work on areas that the subordinate wants to work on to achieve goals that he has set. This does not mean that the leader has to agree with a subordinate's assessment. There may be areas the leader feels are more appropriate for the subordinate to work on, and the leader should say so. But again, as long as the subordinate is meeting the standard in all areas, the leader should allow the subordinate to work on areas that the subordinate wants to work on. In this situation, the responsibility for the development and execution of an improvement plan is most directly on the subordinate, with the leader providing resources and assessments as requested by the subordinate.

Follow-Up. Effective leaders recognize that counseling requires follow-up. They realize that they must commit resources (time and training) to "set subordinates up for success." This involves setting the conditions that maximize a subordinate's chances to succeed. At a minimum, leaders must check on a subordinate's progress and modify the original plan of action as required.

In the follow-up, subordinates execute the agreed-upon plan. The responsibility for execution is squarely on the subordinate. The subordinate assesses the results of his actions and, when necessary, modifies the plan. The bottom line: This is the subordinate's plan to execute—supported, as required, by the leader.

The Army maxim which holds the leader responsible for everything is dysfunctional from an effective counseling standpoint. Currently, the responsibility for effective counseling is completely on the leader, with the subordinate a passive recipient or listener. Leaders often see counseling as a "command" program that they are personally responsible

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Confronting Psychological Trauma

Lieutenant Colonel Faris R. Kirkland, US Army, Retired

Stress has always been a part of military life. Since the US Civil War, American military leaders and medical officers have sought to understand its effects and take measures to preserve the psychological strength of their soldiers. For decades, psychological breakdown was viewed as a "defective character" manifestation. During World War I, psychiatry had progressed to the point where French and British medical officers grasped the emotional stress dynamics of combat and had developed effective measures to alleviate the symptoms and return most soldiers to their units. However, soldiers still carried the shame of moral failure with them.

During the interwar years, confidence in psychological testing grew. This confidence led to a massive attempt to screen out potential stress casualties when World War II began. The effort failed completely and gradually commanders and psychiatrists recognized that every soldier has a point at which he will become a psychiatric casualty. The treatment program devised in World War I was reinstated to return most such casualties to their units. Some were obviously too seriously traumatized to return to duty and were removed from combat or discharged. The *latent effects* on the characters of those who apparently recovered were not a matter of interest to the Armed Forces because most were discharged to the civilian sector.

The Vietnam War called attention to latent combat stress effects. Conditions peculiar to that conflict gave rise to an unusually large number of delayed psychiatric symptoms now called Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). To date, no definitive treatment for PTSD has been devised.¹

Since 1989, the US Army has been called upon to conduct frequent military interventions that vary in purpose, size, type and cultural context.² As a consequence—in addition to the relatively well-understood combat stress disorders (CSDs) and the elusive PTSD—soldiers and leaders now have to cope with new sources of stress arising from repeated deployments to foreign lands to perform unfamiliar and frequently changing missions, some of which have seemingly ambiguous purposes.³ The soldiers who perform these missions are career professionals who stay in the Army. The subsequent stress reactions they suffer can have a substantial impact on their units' operational readiness.

Recent research suggests that leader behavior plays an important role in forestalling CSD, preventing PTSD and managing the new kinds of stress produced by the frequent armed interventions that characterize the post-Cold War period. This article analyzes the sources of stress and the effects of leadership doctrine on the ability of soldiers and leaders to manage stress throughout the Army's 222-year history.

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Stress: causes and management. The principal cause of stress, and the most severe challenge to soldiers' humanity, is killing other human beings.⁴ Often, soldiers who kill live with guilt and horror; those who avoid killing may live with the belief that they failed in their duty and endangered their comrades. Other stressors include fear, grief, betrayal and misery. Soldiers' two worst fears are having to kill and letting their comrades down. Fear of death or injury is important, but secondary.⁵ Grief over the death or maiming



A 24th Infantry Division soldier reacts to reading the dog tags of a slain comrade during the *Desert Storm* ground campaign. Grief over the death or maiming of friends is particularly hard to bear.

of comrades is particularly hard to bear. Soldiers usually feel guilt, horror, sadness and intolerable feelings of helplessness.⁶ Their sense of invulnerability is compromised when they lose a member of their own squad. Researcher Jonathan Shay recently described a powerful moral source of stress—betrayal by one's own leaders of "what's right," the often-unspoken consensus about what behavior and attitudes are acceptable in combat. Shay posits that soldiers require the psychological support of a coherent moral context if they are to escape serious psychological injury during combat.⁷ Combat usually entails prolonged and inescapable exhaustion, hunger, thirst, filth, illness and exposure to the elements and vermin. Misery is stressful in itself, often exacerbating stress originating from other sources.

Managing stress requires action by individual soldiers, leaders, commanders and mental health professionals. For soldiers who inevitably experience traumatic situations while performing their missions, some processes are conscious while others are unconscious. They must endure stress and do their jobs while preserving their humanity and holding on to *compassion* and *values*. Then they must integrate often brutal emotions and combat memories into their lives and histories.⁸ To do this, soldiers need help from others. Their primary source of help is the social supports in their units—the web of relationships and interactions between peers, leaders and subordinates who trust, depend on and often love one another.⁹ Agreement about, and adherence to, "what's right" throughout the force is essential to validate soldiers' actions and feelings.¹⁰

Leaders can mitigate stress most effectively by fostering the development of unit social supports.¹¹ In cohesive units, soldiers know, trust, respect and take care of one another. The training experiences commanders organize can build their soldiers' confidence in themselves, their weapons and one another. Leaders' behavior in combat strengthens—or weakens—their soldiers' confidence in them and helps soldiers define for themselves "what's right" in the midst of moral chaos. By attending to logistics, commanders can minimize their troops' exposure to misery, provide them a modicum of creature comforts and assure them that they will be treated quickly and skillfully if wounded. Commanders can make the process of killing less traumatic by equipping their troops with weapons and vehicles that increase the soldiers' distance from the enemy. *Conditioning*, an aspect of training that works at an unconscious level, can bypass the aversion to killing and thereby enhance the combat value of soldiers, but it cannot ward off the resulting guilt.¹²

Military mental health professionals' roles have evolved dramatically in the past 20 years. From its beginning, military psychiatry's purpose was to return traumatized soldiers to their units. In the two world wars, Korea and Vietnam, US Armed Forces had an abundance of low-cost conscripted manpower. The Army Medical Department's (AMEDD's) motto—*to conserve the fighting strength*—describes its mission to keep men in combat. Individual soldier welfare was only an incidental concern.

In today's professional Army, military medicine's purpose remains the same, but the individual's value to the institution is of greater magnitude for several reasons:

- Soldiers are expensive and difficult to recruit and train. Recruits are extensively trained using costly equipment and exercises, providing valuable experience for subsequent combat or other operations.
- Soldiers are integral functioning members of their primary group. The loss of fellow troops to physical or psychological injury can compromise the entire group's operational efficiency.
- Soldiers are part of an emotional network of peers, superiors and subordinates. The breakdown of one member could have unpredictable effects on the psychological integrity of others in the unit.

Soldiers' mental health has become central to the operational readiness of units and a matter of urgent concern to command. AMEDD has responded by discarding the traditional clinical approach in favor of treating psychiatric casualties through an intimate collaboration with command in forward battle-zone areas to prevent CSD and PTSD. With respect to mental health, *medical doctrine has become an integral part of leadership doctrine*.

Accordingly, PTSD was rare during the *Paternalism Era—1778 to 1940* (see my *Leadership Doctrine* article beginning on page 30), because the men of a regiment were together before and during the battle, and for the long trip home by ship, train, wagon or foot, afterward. They could detoxify the fear, horror, guilt and shame they were feeling by talking their experiences through with the most effective source of validation—the men who had shared those experiences. During World War I, the adoption of a policy of replacing casualties with individuals drawn from a central

pool was the first of a series of steps that weakened these social supports. The new men were especially vulnerable to CSD and PTSD.

Recognition by AMEDD—and acceptance by commanders—that every man would break psychologically at some point under prolonged combat stress changed the way CSD was perceived and handled.¹³ CSD was not a moral failure that posed a threat to discipline but rather a human characteristic that could be managed. The Army then adopted rotation policies designed to send individuals home from combat zones before they reached the breaking point. This humane program had unintended consequences. It was the second policy that fragmented the soldier's social supports. Going home alone, without his comrades, left him no one with whom to work through his combat experiences.¹⁴

The Army sought to minimize CSD during the Korean War by using fixed-length tours. Soldiers arrived in their units as individual replacements, and they left as individuals when their tours were up. Military proficiency and social cohesion in units were in perpetual flux. This was the third policy that weakened social supports. Some credited it with sharply reducing the number of combat stress casualties, but there was also comparatively little combat after the first year.¹⁵

AMEDD has entered the leadership doctrine "sphere" with a major recasting of its mission, organization and approach to mental health. Following a Medical Mission Area Analysis in 1982 and an Army Medical Systems Program Review conducted under Vice Chief of Staff General Maxwell Thurman in 1984 and 1985, combat stress control became an autonomous functional area within AMEDD. The focus of combat stress control is on CSD and PTSD prevention by close collaboration among mental health professionals, commanders and chaplains. Formerly working in largely isolated domains, these three groups are learning to cooperate to strengthen the socio-psychological bonds within units. Their collective efforts help leaders assure that their soldiers feel they belong and have the support of their primary group and the Army. Command after-action reviews, spiritual counseling by chaplains and critical incident debriefings by mental health professionals are typical complementary actions by the three disciplines in strengthening the psychological integrity of soldiers. AMEDD is reorganizing its assets to get mental health teams forward into brigade support areas, where they can provide consultative services to commanders and help soldiers manage stress before, during and immediately after traumatic events.¹⁶ The involvement of mental health professionals with leaders is in sharp contrast to their former isolation in medical treatment facilities far from life in line units. It marks a significant change in leadership doctrine, but one that has yet to appear in leadership manuals.

Generally speaking, soldiers are averse to killing, yet are capable of killing if the social, moral and military context is supportive. Those soldiers whose duties place them in a position where they are expected to kill pay an emotional price whether they kill or not. If they do kill, their humanity is at risk. If they do not, they often feel that they have betrayed their comrades. In the post-Cold War world, many missions are best served by soldiers who can be com-

passionate human beings as well as efficient fighters. Therefore, preserving soldiers' humanity has become a mission-essential process. Leadership doctrine has had to scramble to provide guidance for leaders who carry out these tasks, and it has done well so far. Hence, the leadership tasks are to help soldiers:

- Kill when they must.
- Manage the psychological storms that result.
- Preserve and make use of their humanity.

Although our Army is smaller, it is competent, powerful and ready for a supportive social system for leaders as the culminating component of its leadership doctrine. With psychological support for leaders as well as junior soldiers, the Army will be fit to manage stress with optimal efficiency in a dangerous and rapidly changing world.

NOTES

1. Franklin D. Jones, "Traditional Warfare Combat Stress Casualties" in *War Psychiatry, Textbook of Military Medicine*, part I, vol. 6 ed. Franklin D. Jones, Linette R. Sparacino, Victoria L. Wilcox, Joseph M. Rothberg and James W. Stokes (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, US Army and the Borden Institute, 1995), 35-61.

2. Between 1989 and 1997, the US Army invaded Panama to overthrow the political regime; ousted Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait; conducted an ostensibly humanitarian relief operation in Somalia that entailed extensive combat and should have been organized as a combat operation; and provided medical support for UN forces in

Croatia and peacekeeping operations in Macedonia, Rwanda, Bosnia and the Sinai; conducted deterrent operations in Kuwait and Kurdistan; and provided governmental support in Haiti.

3. Clarence E. Briggs, *Operation Just Cause: Panama, December 1989* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1990); Robert K. Gifford, James N. Jackson and Kathleen B. DeShazo, *Field Research in Somalia During Operations Restores Hope and Continue Hope* (paper presented at the 35th Annual Conference of the Military Testing Association, Williamsburg, Virginia, 15 to 18 November 1993); Ronald R. Halverson, Paul D. Bliese and Leonard Wong, *Belief in Mission, Leadership Climate and Well-being: A Field Study of Soldiers Deployed to Haiti* (paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Maryland, 20 to 22 October 1995).

4. David A. Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), 29-36.

5. S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1947, reprint 1978), 78; Grossman, 51-66.

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10. Faris R. Kirkland, Ronald R. Halverson and Paul D. Bliese, "Stress and Psychological Readiness in Post-Cold War Operations," *Parameters* (Summer 1996).

11. Faris R. Kirkland, *Leading in COHORT Companies*, WRAIR Report NP-88-13 (ADA 192886) (Washington, DC: Division of Neuropsychiatry, WRAIR, 1987), 4-13.

12. Grossman, 177-79, 233, 283-84, 291.

13. Franklin D. Jones, "Psychiatric Lessons of War" in *War Psychiatry, Textbook of Military Medicine*, part I, vol. 6, 14-15.

14. Jonathan F. Borus, "The Reentry Transition of the Vietnam Veteran," *Armed Forces and Society* (Fall 1975), 97-114; Linda M. Van Devanter, *Home Before Morning: The Story of an Army Nurse in Vietnam* (New York: Beaufort Books, 1983).

15. Franklin D. Jones, "Disorders of Frustration and Loneliness" in *War Psychiatry, Textbook of Military Medicine*, part I, vol. 6, 69.

16. James A. Martin, Linette R. Sparacino and Gregory L. Belenky, *Gulf War Mental Health: A Comprehensive Guide* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996).

Breaking the Counseling Mold

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for. The responsibility for effective counseling needs to be redirected from a leader-centered process to a subordinate-centered process. Both leaders and subordinates must realize that the responsibility for effective counseling is *mutually* shared. Certainly, leaders share in that responsibility, but fundamentally, it is a *shared* responsibility.

The Army has three leader development "pillars": institutional, operational and self-development. We need to shift counseling's focus from an operational "requirement" to an individual tool for self-development. For counseling to be effective, leaders need to view it as a tool for soldiers to use to develop themselves. The leader facilitates, helps, provides guidance and, when performance is below standard, directs. The subordinate is responsible for developing and executing the plan. As an Army, we need to see counseling as a self-development tool, not as a command-directed program.


Leaders recognize that subordinate development is one of the most important things they are responsible for. Certainly a part of subordinate develop-

Currently, the responsibility for effective counseling is completely on the leader, with the subordinate a passive recipient or listener. Leaders often see counseling as a "command" program that they are personally responsible for. . . . Both leaders and subordinates must realize that the responsibility for effective counseling is mutually shared.

ment includes regular, effective counseling. If the negative perception of counseling in the Army is ever going to change, it will only be through the conscientious efforts of all leaders to apply effective counseling skills each and every time they counsel. We will know we have reached success when soldiers look forward to counseling sessions because they have accepted responsibility for their own development and see counseling as an integral aid to it. **MR**

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Leadership Values and Ethics



On 30 December 1985, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. and Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham proclaimed Values as the Army theme for 1986. They stated that "Values are the heart and soul of a great Army. . . . From values we draw purpose, direction, vitality and character—the bedrock of all that we do in the Total Army." Further, they declared "The values to which we subscribe spring from, and even transcend, those of the society we serve. They become the framework for the lifelong professional and personal development of our soldiers, leaders and civilians."

Those words are just as important today. As Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer states, "Undergirding the constants that make our Army what it is are Army Values. We must never be complacent about the role of values in our Army. That is why we have made a concerted effort to specify and define the Army values depicted in this special edition of Military Review. The Army is a values-based organization that stresses the importance of the team over the individual. Army values build strong, cohesive organizations that, in turn, become the source of strength and solidarity for their members in difficult and turbulent times."

"Values-based leadership means setting the example," Reimer continues, "and then creating a command climate where soldiers can put values into practice. . . . Leaders must not only exemplify Army values in their words and deeds, they must create the opportunity for every soldier in their command to live them as well. To do anything less is to be less than a leader."

As this section's authors tell us, many in our profession cannot "walk the talk." We strongly urge you to read and process what they have to say, and then apply it to your own personal and professional life. Your soldiers, Army and nation are counting on you. This is something we have to get right, right now!

The Evolution of American Military Ideals

Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, US Army, Retired

*Military ideals . . . are all founded in hard military experience; they did not find expression because some admiral got it in his head one day to set an unattainable goal for his men, or because some general wished to turn a pious face toward the public.*¹

—S.L.A. Marshall

THREE IS A LOT going on in the military ideals arena today. Not within recent memory has there been such a frenzy of workshops, conferences and study sessions within the services aimed at redefining core values.² This process is intended to remedy recent ethical lapses in the services, head off future ones and put character development on a firmer footing. Nor is the ferment confined just to ethics. If the post-Cold War era forced a radical reappraisal of the nation's grand strategic position, the information age is revolutionizing the nature of war itself. Revised Army principles and guidelines to accommodate these new strategic and warfighting realities are hot topics in today's military journals.³ The current "value updating" or "value reaffirmation period" is absolutely essential so we as a profession can ensure that our operative values—our military ideals—continue to provide for the nation's security.

This article assesses where the services stand today along the broad spectrum of military values and ideals. On the theory that we can better determine where we ought to go if we know where we have been, I will trace a few defining historical precedents along the path of US military value evolution. With the continuities from past to present thus established, we should gain a clearer picture of where it is wise to cling to the old and where we may venture to take up the new.

There is no single authoritative document setting forth US military ideals, nor is there even an acknowledged corpus of such documents.⁴ Nor, for that matter, is there an authoritative statement of

what constitutes military ideals. For clarity's sake, there are several groupings that appear to be valid subsets of military ideals, recognizing that meaningful discussion will not always accommodate rigid compartmentalization along such analytic lines. Military ethics certainly fall under the broad umbrella term and we should also include ideals in operational matters, such as the conduct of war itself.⁵ Ideals of military leadership are also relevant, applying in peacetime and bureaucratic settings as well as in war. Certain macro ideals derive from American society values—freedom, equality, individualism and democracy.⁶ These are obviously inappropriate as actual operative ideals for armed forces. Nonetheless, they condition the operative ideals in important ways, thus distinctly differentiating the ethos of American Armed Forces from those of autocratically governed nations.⁷

A good case can be made for including certain normative imperatives peculiar to individual armed services—ideals emanating from distinct roles, missions, styles, cultures and the different war realms of land, sea, air and space.⁸ An example is the centralized control principle of all theater aerospace assets the Air Force refers to as its doctrinal "master tenet," and has embraced this tenet with near-religious fervor.⁹ As author Carl Builder has conclusively demonstrated, similar reverentially embraced ideals exist in the other services.¹⁰ I will confine my discussion to those broad generic ideals growing with minor variation from the historical experience of peace and war common to all US Armed Forces.

Ethical Ideals

The early provenance of US military ideals lies in the history of war itself, predating the emergence of American military professionalism in the 19th century. The latter 18th-century British military honor code, distinctly aristocratic in tone, served as a model for George Washington's Revolutionary forces,

though it was substantially revised to fit social and political conditions in America. The British code, an evolved adaptation of the chivalry code from feudal times, was in fact an amorphous array of principles, values and traditions that encompassed the British officer's concept of honor. Morris Janowitz

George Washington . . . professed that gentility was a prerequisite for good officership, since gentility suggested "men of character . . . activated by principles of honour and a spirit of enterprise." Washington's embrace of this traditional view, combined with the fact that he became and remains the ideal of the American officer-gentleman to this day, has been the greatest factor in the persistent notion that officers are, first of all, gentlemen. Conduct "unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman" was grounds for dismissal from the service in the earliest version of US military law.

abstracted the four basic elements of the code, as follows: officers fought for traditional military glory, they were gentlemen, they owed personal loyalty to their commander and they were members of a cohesive, self-regulating brotherhood.¹¹

It is difficult to read of honor here, noting its explicit endorsement of pursuing martial glory, without seeing it as a lineal, if distant, descendant of the heroic Homeric code—the soldier's highest ideal was martial prowess as attended by unflagging valor, a fierce regard for honor and reputation and the shameless pursuit of fame.¹² Of course, "military honor" is an extraordinarily protean term, but regardless of whose period we examine—that of Homer, the chivalric knight, the 18th-century cult-of-honor duelist or the late 20th-century US Armed Forces officer—we find the constants of "sought—for glory and reputation based on demonstrated courage under arms."¹³

As agents of a peace-bent and enlightened Western democracy, US officers today are acculturated to mute overt declarations of this element in their conception of honor, sublimating it most often as patriotism or professional pride, which are real and essential values.¹⁴ But many modern vestiges of chivalric forms—medals and ribbons for heroism, unit patches on uniforms, unit mottoes and histories and the celebration of individual and unit heroics in service lore—bespeak a fundamental preoccupation with courage under fire and the justified pride and reputation that attend such courage. Far from being

a cause for reproach, however, the celebration of such qualities is a positive, indeed essential, motivational principle for the military. Consider the generations of sailors who have taken heart from Admiral David Farragut's stirring words—"Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!"¹⁵ Without this one sustaining value—the determination to carry out an assigned duty in the face of an enemy bent upon destroying you—a military force loses sight of its purpose and forfeits its defining character.¹⁶

The chivalric knight was redubbed the gentleman during the Renaissance, and officers—who derived from the knights—generally inherited this new title of distinction *ex officio*.¹⁷ The word "gentleman" has proved as slippery as the word "honor." In describing the ideal naval officer in 1775, John Paul Jones, after laying down the *pro forma* requirement that he be a capable mariner, went on to say that "he should be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy and the nicest sense of personal honor." Jones's prescription for an officer and a gentleman is still commended to Naval Academy plebes to this day.¹⁸ In close accord with that view, Edwin Cady isolated three persisting traits of the American gentleman that pertain to the realm of ideals: character, courtesy and cultivation.¹⁹ Out of such a mix emerged the principle that comes close to defining the ethical nucleus of the officer's code of honor—"A gentleman's word is his bond."²⁰

George Washington, an agrarian aristocrat himself, and first among the fledgling country's gentlemen, professed that gentility was a prerequisite for good officership, since gentility suggested "men of character . . . activated by principles of honour and a spirit of enterprise."²¹ Washington's embrace of this traditional view, combined with the fact that he became and remains the ideal of the American officer-gentleman to this day, has been the greatest factor in the persistent notion that officers are, first of all, gentlemen.²² Conduct "unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman" was grounds for dismissal from the service in the earliest version of US military law, and this formulation survives today in Article 133 of the *Uniform Code of Military Justice*. "Any officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."²³ As recent cases make clear, Article 133 applies to female officers as well.²⁴

There is some indication, however, that the *officer-as-gentleman* ideal is weakening within the services, probably because its seeming imputation of officers' class superiority is at odds with the present egalitarian spirit.²⁵ The issue involves more than class pride or professional ego. Officers hold a professional mo-



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nopoly on the instruments of military force, and they alone embody the martial spirit and technical expertise essential for the successful employment of such instruments. Society can afford to entrust such awesome responsibility and capability only to its most civilized and enlightened members. As long as Armed Forces officers retain the meaning, force and relevance characteristic of a gentleman during military service, they will be recognized as such.²⁶

Another early British military honor concept as traced by Janowitz is the officer's personal loyalty obligation to his commander. In the British tradition, the officer owed primary allegiance to the person who recruited and paid him, raised and organized his unit and, at times, acted as father as well as superior officer. This system underwent radical transformation in the US military owing to constitutional strictures.²⁷ Loyalty to one's immediate superiors in the military chain of command remains a strongly felt ideal—indeed, loyalty and obedience are the supreme military virtues.²⁸ However, it is always understood, both legally and professionally, that the

loyalty owed is to the office and not to individuals. This principle extends to the president, who is constitutionally designated as commander in chief of the US armed services.²⁹ Under the US constitutional system, the loyalty, allegiance and obedience owed by officers to the military chain of command, including the commander in chief, are subordinated to their allegiance to the Constitution and to the laws that flow therefrom. The primacy of the Constitution in establishing the officer's loyalties derives from the officer's oath of office, the current version having been set down by Congress in 1884:

I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; . . . and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.³⁰

For orders issued by officers to be legally enforceable, including those issued by the commander in chief, *they must be lawful*. This requirement is

spelled out in the officer's commission: "this officer is to observe and follow such orders and directions . . . as may be given by the President of the United States of America or other superior officers, acting in accordance with the laws of the United States of

There is no consistency within the burgeoning ethical canons of the individual services' core value. . . . We should emphasize again that this type of ethic—consisting merely of a brief set of one-word values, virtues and traits—does not attempt to set forth explicit ethical principles tailored to address questions of right and wrong within the broad professional milieus as do the conventional codes of conduct governing the other professions.

America."³¹ Legal support is found in Articles 90 and 92 of the *Uniform Code of Military Justice*.³²

As a working principle, members of the Armed Forces, particularly among the junior ranks, have traditionally been conditioned to accept the orders of their superior officers as inviolate. But as a result of such developments as the war crimes tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II, the courts-martial following the 1968 My Lai incident in Vietnam and the civil prosecutions of uniformed officers involved in the Iran-Contra affair of the mid-1980s, the legality of orders as a condition for compliance has become an essential factor in the officer's professional deliberations. Although obedience to orders remains the acknowledged glue that binds a military force together, officers today are sensitive to those areas where ethical and legal deliberation must precede issuance of and adherence to military orders.

The primacy of an impersonal Constitution in the officer's hierarchy of allegiances, and the fact that within the chain of command, even at the topmost rung, loyalty extended to the office instead of the occupant, were factors before the turn of the century leading to the grand ideal that officers were "above politics."³³ Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman, who headed the Army from 1869 to 1883, was disillusioned by what he saw as the undermining of military professionalism by partisan political involvement on the part of earlier generals and he lent his strong voice to the movement to divorce the military from political activity.³⁴

The ideal of remaining above politics embraced the notion that regulars should refrain from affiliating with particular political parties and refrain from

voting. The rationale was that the professional military must loyally serve the nation, regardless of whom the political vicissitudes bring to the presidency or Congress, and that political involvement could be seen as compromising the impartiality of professional military advice.³⁵ Prior to America's entry into World War I, it was estimated that less than one-fifth of one percent of officers had ever voted in an election.³⁶ Though never an official imperative, the ideal of refraining from the ballot remained strong among the professional officer corps at least throughout the 1950s, with such respected officers as Generals George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Omar Bradley never having voted as a matter of principle.³⁷ Since the 1960s, the ideal's strength has waned, with the services now actively promoting voting by members through voter registration assistance and absentee ballots.³⁸ However, the ideal of the "apolitical" officer who serves loyally and impartially, regardless of the party in power, remains.

A corollary to the officer's allegiance to the Constitution, and closely related to his aim to remain aloof from politics, is the ideal of civilian control of the military. Samuel Huntington demonstrated that the concept of civilian control is far more complex than it appears, meaning different things to different constituencies.³⁹ As used here, however, it means simply that the corporate military is not an independent authority, but rather is always subject to constitutionally designated government control outside the military itself. Judging from the frequency with which alleged threats to civilian control are fretted over in political science textbooks, it remains a source of anxiety in some quarters. The fact is, however, that the professional military accepts the ideal of civilian control absolutely without question. Such rare aberrations as General George B. McClellan's blatant discourtesies to President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War and General Douglas MacArthur's insubordination toward President Harry Truman during the Korean War should not be allowed to obscure this enduring reality.⁴⁰

Where control issues are concerned, friction between military officers and their civilian leaders develop when civilians transgress the military's professional domain—when they go beyond setting strategic policy and begin dictating tactical and operational matters that lie solely within the military's area of professional competency. A good example is President John F. Kennedy's detailed involvement in executing the US naval blockade of Cuba during the missile crisis of 1962.⁴¹ Even here, however, the issue was never whether the president as commander in chief had the legal authority to intercede—he obviously did. The issue was whether it was advisable


for him to exercise that authority. The military takes the position that military operations are most likely to succeed if they are executed by military professionals, but it does not question the constitutional authority of the commander in chief or his assistants to intervene, however imprudent it may prove to be in practice.

The final element in the old British honor concept is the notion that officers were members of a cohesive and exclusive brotherhood. The connection between brotherhood and honor becomes clearer when we consider that soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen—enlisted and officers—successfully confront the rigors of war only as members of teams and not as individuals. It is the team that one looks to for survival. It is only through the team that the mission is accomplished. To show cowardice and let one's comrades down is thus the ultimate martial sin, the worst form of dishonor. Successful commanders capitalize upon this psychological reality by cultivating to the fullest such qualities as unit esprit, loyalty, pride and solidarity. The officer's identification with his unit, with his parent units, with his service and even with the brotherhood of arms itself forms a complex of loyalties—an important code of honor element.

The US Army made efforts to emulate the British regimental system but, owing to fluctuating force structure and diversity within individual assignment patterns, has never been able to achieve the continuity of unit affiliation enjoyed by the British—nor have other US services. However, the brotherhood of arms can be fostered in other ways. The greater danger to brotherhood and cohesion lies in gradual erosion among military members of their sense of professional identification and calling. Professor Charles C. Moskos points to "incipient attitudinal tendencies" within the Armed Forces that, if unchecked, could lead to a self-conception by members as mere occupational timeservers rather than bona fide professionals.⁴²

The American officer's "code of honor," as abstracted and construed by Janowitz but never codified, is not to be confused with the widely remarked cadet honor codes of the US service academies. For example, the US Air Force Academy honor code: "We will not lie, steal or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does." Such cadet codes—and the same applies to the Reserve Officers' Training Corps Cadet Creed—neither pretend nor intend to be a complete description of honorable behavior by military professionals. Rather, they are narrowly drawn, functionally derived principle statements conceived to meet the less complex ethical demands of cadets living in the unique garrison/baccalaureate environment of a Spartan society. For cadets who graduate

Wide World Photos



Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North testifying before the joint House-Senate committee investigating the Iran-Contra affair.

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and are commissioned in the officer corps, while maintaining their academy honor codes as normative forces in their professional lives, must accommodate to the professional military ethic itself, which subsumes the codes and extends them so as to confront the ever-growing ethical complexities of today's professional military careers.⁴³

No armed service has elected to codify and officially promulgate a comprehensive prescription for ethical behavior along the lines of the American Bar Association's *Model Rules of Professional Conduct* or the American Medical Association's *Principles of Medical Ethics*.⁴⁴ True, one finds frequent official allusions to the "ethic" or "ethos" or "core values" of various services. The Navy and Marine Corps' core

values are honor, courage and commitment.⁴⁵ The Army ethos promotes a single central value—duty—described as subsuming integrity and selfless service.⁴⁶ The Air Force's core values are integrity, service and excellence.⁴⁷ Hence, there is no consistency within the burgeoning ethical canons of the individual services' core values.⁴⁸ Finally we should

The impetus for [the services'] recent ethical convergence has come from the National Security Act of 1947 as amended in 1949—the unification acts—and the Goldwater–Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 which, though failing to achieve true service unification, have collectively generated a climate conducive to joint approaches in numerous areas.

emphasize again that this type of ethic—consisting merely of a brief set of one-word values, virtues and traits—does not attempt to set forth explicit ethical principles tailored to address questions of right and wrong within the broad professional milieus as do the conventional codes of conduct governing the other professions.⁴⁹

Eschewal of a professional ethic conventional code by the services is not without its defenders. As late as 1977, the Army's chief of staff, disavowing the need for an officers' code of professional ethics, declared that the only ethical guidance required by Army officers was contained in the officer's oath of office, in the officer's commission, in the officer's traditions and in the West Point honor code.⁵⁰ In practice, however, neither Congress, the president nor the services themselves has deemed these four elements sufficient, and they have supplemented this nucleus with a broad range of laws, executive orders and regulations regarded as necessary to fill serious ethical gaps.

We may close discussion of the US military's ethical ideals by drawing two fundamental conclusions. First, the Armed Forces' broad ethical ideals have remained relatively constant since the rise of military professionalism at the beginning of the 19th century.⁵¹ However, the literature encapsulating those ideals and their associated values has greatly proliferated and continues to do so. The officer's total ethical canon now numbers several hundred pages, depending on how broadly the canon is construed.⁵² A major task awaits any officer who would seriously attempt to distill that core of ethical principles having the strongest claim upon his professional conscience. We can record here only the

most salient elements of such an ethical core:

- The West Point motto, adjuring all service members to accept as their highest values "duty, honor, country."⁵³
- The tradition implicit in the West Point motto of always accomplishing the assigned mission, regardless of obstacles.
- The preeminence of the Constitution in the officer's hierarchy of allegiances.
- Loyalty and obedience as the supreme military virtues, with the precondition that orders be lawful.
- The imperative that officers be and act as gentleman, the essential trait of which is strong character.
- The precept that an officer's word is his bond.
- Patriotism, valor, fidelity and professional competence, as enjoined by the officer's commission.
- The injunction to remain above domestic politics in all professional activity.
- The military–civilian control principle.
- The principle that one's acts in war itself are subject to constraints laid down in law and that one remains no less an ethical agent in the most desperate straits of battle.
- The principle that law and ethical obligation follow the service member even after capture by the enemy.
- The principle that officers must avoid conflicts between their private interests and official duties, and that this obligation continues after retirement or separation.⁵⁴

Second, with respect to ethical ideals, the broad canons among the individual Armed Forces are themselves rapidly converging. As we have seen, such venerable official sources as the *Constitution* and the officer's oath and commission, as well as common features from the British inheritance, account for most historical resemblances.⁵⁵ While such differences as the relatively greater strength of the officer-as-gentleman ideal among Naval officers and the brotherhood ideal among Air Force officers are worth noting, these are minor eddies in the stream of commonality now surging through the services' ethical landscape.⁵⁶ The impetus for such recent ethical convergence has come from the *National Security Act of 1947* as amended in 1949—the unification acts—and the *Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* which, though failing to achieve true service unification, have collectively generated a climate conducive to joint approaches in numerous areas. Important examples touching service ethics are:

- *The Armed Forces Officer*, which addresses important requisite officers values published by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 1950 and revised in 1975 and 1988.

Generals Norman Schwarzkopf, William Pagonis and Frederick Franks arriving at Safwan, Iraq, to discuss formal cease-fire arrangements with Iraqi commanders, 3 March 1991.



US Army

US forces are imbued with the spirit of the offensive, characterized by an indomitable will to win and an aggressive determination to carry the battle to the enemy. Their aim is to inflict on the enemy an early and decisive defeat. This spirit, while likely to produce a battlefield success, is often at odds with the instincts of political leaders, who may prefer a more graduated force application concurrent with diplomatic and other pressures. Paradoxically, once diplomacy fails and the Armed Forces are given their head, they may have to move at a pace even faster than their own doctrine would dictate. Political realities militate against protracted hostilities, so campaigns must be concluded in the shortest time possible.

- *Uniform Code of Military Justice*, subjecting the Army and Navy for the first time in history to the same code of legal behavior, enacted by Congress in 1950 and implemented in 1951.⁵⁷
- *Code of Conduct*, covering all service members in the context of surrender and capture in combat and behavior while a prisoner of war, issued as a presidential executive order in 1955 and amended in 1977 and 1988.⁵⁸
- DOD Law of War Program, making the international laws of war binding upon all members of the US Armed Forces, implemented by DOD directive in 1974.⁵⁹
- Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, facilitating the development of professional ethics programs in the various services, established informally by interested officers in 1979.⁶⁰
- *Joint Ethics Regulation*, covering conflicts of interest, issued by DOD in 1993.⁶¹

Operational Ideals

We turn now to those broad operational ideals that have come to govern the American approach to waging war in the 21st century. Such ideals are not to be

confused with actual tactical, theater or strategic principles, or with the principles of war themselves, all of which are subsumed under that universal body of disciplinary knowledge and theory associated with the art and science of war. Rather, we speak of those overarching operational ideals that are peculiarly American, a product of the unique US economic, political, social and geo-strategic identity. Many such ideals derive ultimately from the tension between the US status as the world's sole superpower—albeit one with finite power and resources—on one hand and its status as a liberal, peaceloving Western democracy on the other. Consequently, they often conflict among themselves. Though attributed to the military, these ideals are in several instances outgrowths of extra-military considerations. They do not pretend necessarily to be ideals that make for the greatest possible military effectiveness. They aim rather at maximizing military effectiveness within the constraints imposed by national selfhood.

In essence, US forces are imbued with the spirit of the offensive, characterized by an indomitable will to win and an aggressive determination to carry the

battle to the enemy. Their aim is to inflict on the enemy an early and decisive defeat.⁶² This spirit, while likely to produce a battlefield success, is often at odds with the instincts of political leaders, who may prefer a more graduated force application concurrent with

War is waged in ways that minimize collateral damage to areas and structures which are not military targets, minimizing casualties among the enemy civilian population, at the risk of reducing mission effectiveness. This ideal is ultimately ethical in its implications, but it appears here under operational ideals because concern for avoiding enemy civilian casualties, like concern for adhering to the laws of war in general, must today be factored into operational design.

diplomatic and other pressures. Paradoxically, once diplomacy fails and the Armed Forces are given their head, they may have to move at a pace even faster than their own doctrine would dictate. Political realities militate against protracted hostilities, so campaigns must be concluded in the shortest time possible. Other considerations follow:

- Arguably, the imperative to minimize casualties to US forces has come to be a principal, if not overriding, factor in a commander's warfighting deliberations.⁶³ However, there is no consensus on the best means to minimize friendly casualties and still accomplish the mission.

- Doctrinally, US forces cling to the maneuver warfare ideal, which entails a rapid, decentralized movement, with the aim of overloading and outpacing the enemy command and control structures' reactive capabilities and achieving a prohibitive positional advantage.⁶⁴ The enemy is thus demoralized, his organization for combat disintegrates and he loses the capacity for effective resistance. In theory, maneuver warfare is less costly in terms of lives, equipment and munitions expended because it is indirect, targeting the enemy's will rather than his force. In modern practice, the maneuver ideal has been qualified by a tendency to append industrial-style variations—the habitual use of massive preparatory and concurrent supporting fires as adjuncts to, and in some cases substitutes for, purposeful and rapid movement. Military theorists and practitioners alike agree that fire and movement are complementary tools, but doctrinal ferment continues with respect to the following fundamental question: Is war best executed by

movement, using fire to support it; or is war best executed by fire, using movement to support it; or is it even valid to generalize? In future war against a competitive foe, it remains to be seen what relative weight US forces will actually accord to maneuver and fire.

- US forces preferably wage war as part of a multinational force, one having the widest possible international representation. The object is not simply to gain additional power, but to enhance legitimacy.

- War is waged with forces jointly organized and directed. The joint ideal has been imposed by Congress and DOD but is not yet fully assimilated by the services though it is embodied in their doctrine. The Army, without organic means to move its forces to the theater of war and lacking heavy air support, is the most joint-minded of the services; the Navy, with its own organic air arm and the Marines as a land force is the least interested in joint operation participation.⁶⁵

- US forces always seek to capitalize upon technology. A technological edge offers the advantages of replacing humans with machines on the battlefield in many cases, thus reducing casualties and increasing logistics, transport, communications, intelligence and fire capabilities beyond any level the enemy can match. Information-based warfare techniques are particularly exploited using advanced computer technology to "digitize" the battle area. By deploying an array of sensors and surveillance devices that provide a real-time picture of friendly and enemy situations, US commanders can act quickly with assurance of the facts before the enemy can knowledgeably react.⁶⁶

- War is waged in ways that minimize collateral damage to areas and structures which are not military targets, minimizing casualties among the enemy civilian population, at the risk of reducing mission effectiveness. This ideal is ultimately ethical in its implications, but it appears here under operational ideals because concern for avoiding enemy civilian casualties, like concern for adhering to the laws of war in general, must today be factored into operational design.

- US forces undertake a spectrum of ancillary missions unparalleled in modern arms. Peace monitoring, peacekeeping, disaster relief, civil support, nation assistance, counterdrug support, antiterrorism and noncombatant evacuation operations—while perhaps politically essential or morally desirable—often degrade combatant force readiness to perform their prime mission—warfighting and preparing for war.⁶⁷

- Troops in the battle area are maintained and provisioned in the most unsparing manner possible consistent with the rigors of war. Such abundance of

1st Cavalry Division AH-64s assembling for a cross-border raid during Operation Desert Storm, late February 1991.

creature comforts is made possible by the US military's logistic system responsiveness.

Because US forces are determined to remain at the forefront of technological innovation, today's operational ideals are shaped by two salient features:

- Through systematic publication of joint doctrine binding on the services, the joint ideal in conducting war is gradually taking hold within the entire defense establishment despite the separate services' deeply etched individualistic identities.
- Joint US forces, acting as part of a multinational force, will likely be the model for military organization among the United States and its allies in all major military campaigns for the foreseeable future.

Leadership Ideals

It is difficult to generalize about US military leadership ideals, because successful commanders in the past have displayed wide divergency in leadership styles. There have also been wide differences among US service members as to the particular leadership style that has responded best. Nonetheless, the peculiar genius of American men and women sent off to fight the nation's wars has predisposed them to respond better to certain broad leadership approaches than to others. Such revered documents as the *Declaration of Independence*, the Preamble to the *Constitution* and the *Bill of Rights* have given rise to an American political tradition in which liberty and equality remain vibrant touchstone values among US citizens.

Though these values obviously cannot receive full or even substantial expression in military service, they do instill boundary expectations in the minds of service members that military leaders ignore at their peril. These expectations have generated two transcendent leadership ideals within the US military tradition:

- Regardless of the particular leadership style selected, leaders must always respect the innate human dignity of each subordinate.

- Leaders must recognize the status of US service members as thinking individuals rather than mindless automatons, giving them opportunity wherever feasible to exercise initiative, shoulder responsibility and employ their native ingenuity in accomplishing assigned tasks.

These US Army ideals, at least in rudimentary form, have been present since the American Revolution. What problems the Army has encountered with respect to leadership ideals relate more to a failure to consistently live up to its ideals than to lack of ideals per se.⁶⁸ The situation within the old Navy was somewhat different. Since each naval vessel was a world unto itself, cut off from the immediate re-



US Army

Military theorists and practitioners alike agree that fire and movement are complementary tools, but doctrinal ferment continues with respect to the following fundamental question: Is war best executed by movement, using fire to support it; or is war best executed by fire, using movement to support it; or is it even valid to generalize?... Against a [future] competitive foe, it remains to be seen what relative weight US forces will actually accord to maneuver and fire.

straints and controls normally imposed by higher authority, mutiny on the high seas was quite understandably the one supreme taboo to be guarded against at all costs. Consequently, though the Army was not without punitive and disciplinary excesses of its own, naval leadership historically tended to be more coercive, with stricter discipline and harsher punishment—certainly through the beginning of the Civil War and probably later.⁶⁹

A notable development in leadership ideals came on 11 August 1879, when US Military Academy superintendent Major General John M. Schofield delivered his famous definition of discipline to the assembled cadets corps. Focusing on appropriate discipline for "soldiers of a free country," Schofield suggested that to gain respect and willing obedience from US servicemen, the leader must reciprocate that respect in his manner of delivering orders.⁷⁰

A second notable development came just after

Despite the services' doctrinal ideal endorsement that their members are thinking individuals whose initiative should be encouraged, a distinct tendency persists for leaders to overcontrol their subordinates and "micromanage" their units. In doing this, they often pay a high price in terms of impairing morale, stifling initiative and curbing professional development. As the information age dawns . . . future operational success may well depend on how forthcoming leaders are in empowering subordinates to act independently on that information.

World War II, when that great war's leadership lessons were still fresh in the participants' minds. Drawing upon a comprehensive empirical military leadership study at the US Army Command and General Staff College, a group of combat-seasoned veterans formulated the "Principles of Leadership," which were officially incorporated into the Army's leadership doctrine in 1951. They have been adopted by the Marine Corps and remain consistent with leadership guidance promulgated by the other services. These principles are as follows:

- Be technically and tactically proficient.
- Know yourself and seek self-improvement.
- Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions.
- Make sound and timely decisions.
- Set the example.
- Know your soldiers and look out for their well-being.
- Keep your subordinates informed.
- Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates.
- Ensure the task is understood, supervised and

accomplished.

- Build the team.
- Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities.⁷¹

In today's services, an enlightened leadership philosophy based on scientifically derived principles of human motivation has taken hold. The Air Force, which did not gain full independence until 1947, appears to be least afflicted by authoritarian leadership. This is largely due to high educational standards of enlisted airmen and the close working relationship between aircrew officers and enlisted aircraft maintenance personnel, factors that tend to dilute the formalities of rank and station.

Despite the services' doctrinal ideal endorsement that their members are thinking individuals whose initiative should be encouraged, a distinct tendency persists for leaders to overcontrol their subordinates and "micromanage" their units. In doing this, they often pay a high price in terms of impairing morale, stifling initiative and curbing professional development.⁷² As the information age dawns, bringing with it unlimited possibilities for providing the lower ranks with relevant information, future operational success may well depend on how forthcoming leaders are in empowering subordinates to act independently on that information.⁷³

Surveying the entire spectrum of American military ideals—the Coast Guard's motto, *Semper paratus*, Always prepared; the Marine Corps' motto, *Semper fidelis*, Always faithful, the Army's motto, This We'll Defend—there is a pervasive earnest idealism that continues to animate the professional conduct of the men and women who defend America.⁷⁴ Such idealism in the military services is both fitting and necessary, more so even than in medicine or law. For, of all professionals, it is the soldier, sailor, marine and airman alone who must be prepared to face the ultimate trial and rigor of killing—and being killed—in service to their country. **MR**

NOTES

1. S.L.A. Marshall, *The Officer As Leader* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1966), 39.
2. The US Army Character Development XXI Workshop, Atlanta, Georgia, 8 to 10 May 1996.

3. Richard A. Chilcoat, "The 'Fourth' Army War College: Preparing Strategic Leaders for the Next Century," *Parameters* (Winter 1995–1996), 3–17.

4. The document that comes closest to articulating America's military ideals from a joint perspective is Department of Defense (DOD) GEN-36A, *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington, DC: DOD, American Information Service, 1988). The original edition, written by S.L.A. Marshall, was published in November 1950 and revised in an edition dated 22 July 1975. The next edition, still in effect at this writing, was published in February 1988. *The Armed Forces Officer* was conceived "to provide a foundation of thought,

conduct, standards and duty for officers," 1. It makes a valuable contribution on these themes in the context of broad professional instruction and advice to newly commissioned officers of all services, but it is not a current, comprehensive presentation of American military ideals.

5. As used throughout this article, the word "operational" refers broadly to the conduct of war itself and not simply to the intermediate level.

6. Anthony E. Harte, *Moral Issues in Military Decisionmaking* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 85–99.

7. The Armed Forces or services are understood to include the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The Marine Corps is a military service within the Department of the Navy. The Coast Guard operates under the Department of Transportation

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during peacetime, but in wartime or at the president's direction, it operates as part of the Navy. See Naval Doctrine Publication 1, *Naval Warfare* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 28 March 1994), 5-6.

8. Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

9. Air Force Manual 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, vol. II (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, March 1992), 113.

10. Builder, 18-20.

11. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, 1960, reprint 1971), 215-25.

12. COL Lloyd J. Matthews, "As Mighty As the Sword," *ARMY* (January 1978) 32-40.

13. For the Renaissance courtier, see Baldesar Castiglione, *The Book of the Courier*, trans. George Bull (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1967), 57-59. Castiglione commends seeking a "good reputation" in arms, though he warns against "outrageous self-glorification." For the 18th-century cult of honor, see Christopher Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (New York: Atheneum, 1988), 10, 74-80. For honor in America's Revolutionary Army, see William B. Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 53; Charles Royster, *A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 86-91, 204-10.

14. Janowitz, 222.

15. W. Adolphe Roberts and Lowell Brentano, selecters, *The Book of the Navy* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, Doran, 1944), 154; William P. Mack and Royal W. Connell, *Naval Ceremonies, Customs, and Traditions*, 5th ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 309; ADM David Farragut's actual words were "Damn the torpedoes! Four bells! Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!"

16. For passing commentary on chivalric vestiges in later ethical milieus, see Janowitz, 219; Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 37; John Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1924, reprint 1954), 100-107; Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military* (New York: The Free Press, 1937, reprint 1959), 96-97, 394-96, 447-49, 478.

17. Edwin Cady, *The Gentleman in America* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1949), 3; *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1973 ed., s.v. "Knighthood, Chivalry and Orders"; James Snedeker, *Military Justice Under the Uniform Code* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1953), 887.

18. Roberts and Brentano, 16-17, as reconstructed by A.C. Buell. Regardless of whether John Paul Jones spoke these actual words, they are consistent with sentiments he expressed elsewhere. See also Malcolm E. Wolfe et al., compilers, *Naval Leadership*, 2d ed. (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1959), 133-35; Mack and Connell, Appendix G.

19. Cady, 19.

20. Final Report of the Special Commission of the Chief of Staff on the Honor Code and Honor System at the United States Military Academy, May 1989, 5. Truth and honesty stood highest in George Washington's pantheon of virtues: "I hope I shall possess firmness and virtue enough to maintain what I consider the most enviable of all titles, the character of an honest man" as quoted in Kenneth H. Wenker, study director, *Ethics in the Air Force: 1988* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, February 1990), 181. See also *Naval Leadership, with Some Hints to Junior Officers and Others*, 4th ed. (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1939), 8.

21. Letter "To the President of Congress," 24 September 1776, in *American Military Thought*, ed. Walter Millis (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), 9. See also C. Robert Kemble, *The Image of the Army Officer in America: Background for Current Views* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1973), 17, 21-22, 39; Skelton, 13, 53; Vagts, 98-99; Royster, 86-88.

22. Kemble, 24-25. For an emphatic restatement in the early 20th century of this idea, see Vagts, 448-49.

23. Janowitz, 218-20.

24. Nick Adde, "Court Rules One Strike and You're Out," *Army Times* (19 August 1996), 17.

25. The 1950 edition of *The Armed Forces Officer*, a broad-ranging treatment of important values required by officers, published by DOD made the following categorical declaration: "The military officer is considered a gentleman . . . specifically because nothing less than a gentleman is truly suited for his particular set of responsibilities," as quoted by Janowitz, 219. However, the 1988 edition steps back from such an explicit declaration, claiming merely that "the concept of military officers is based on the notion of 'gentlemen,' who by definition possess the ideal qualities for military leadership," *The Armed Forces Officer* (1988), 4.

26. Janowitz, 219-20.

27. Janowitz, 220.

28. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 73-74, 303-4.

29. Article II, Section 2.

30. As quoted in Edward M. Coffman, "The Army Officer and the Constitution," *Parameters* (September 1987), 2-12.

31. Lawrence P. Cricker, *Army Officer's Guide*, 46th ed. (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1993), 20.

32. Frederick Bernays Wiener, *The Uniform Code of Military Justice: Explanation, Comparative Text, and Commentary* (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1950), 201-3.

33. Janowitz, 233-35.

34. Huntington, 230-32.

35. Huntington, 259.

36. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 1, *Soldier: General of the Army, President-Elect, 1891-1952* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 53; Huntington, 258-59.

37. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 280; Ambrose, 53; Omar N. Bradley, with Clay Blair, *A General's Life: An Autobiography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 448-49, 633.

38. Andrew Compart, "On Your Mark . . . Get Set . . . Vote!" *Army Times* (29 July 1996), 18.

39. Huntington, 80-97.

40. Kemble, 203.

41. Matthews, "The Politician As Operational Commander," *ARMY* (March 1996), 29-36.

42. Charles C. Moskos, "Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces," in *The Military: More Than Just a Job?*; ed. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), 15-26.

43. Enclosure to letter from MG Howard D. Graves, Commandant, US Army War College, to Judge Eugene R. Sullivan, US Court of Military Appeals (both members of the Special Commission of the Chief of Staff on the Honor Code and Honor System at the United States Military Academy), dated 6 January 1989; Final Report of the Special Commission . . . (May 1989), 22, 24.

44. Matthews, "The Need for An Officers' Code of Professional Ethics," *ARMY* (March 1994), 20-29.

45. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-0, *Leading Marines* (Washington, DC: Department

of the Navy, 3 January 1995), 3; Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Memorandum, subj.: *Character and Ethics Master Plan*, dated 30 January 1996, draft enclosure. The previous set of core values for the Navy and Marine Corps was incorporated in a "professional ethic" composed of competence, integrity and courage, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, 7.

46. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 1994), 5-7. The 10 December 1991 edition of FM 100-1 promulgated "The Army Ethic," consisting of four core values: duty, integrity, loyalty and selfless service. The Army is in the process of formulating yet another set of core values to replace the 1994 set. The new core values set—LDRSHIP—includes: loyalty, duty, respect for others, selfless service, honesty, integrity and personal courage. See Sean Naylor, "The Core of the Matter," *Army Times* (16 December 1996), 3.

47. "Air Force Secretary, Chief of Staff Emphasize Three Air Force Core Values," *Policy Letter Digest: Policy Issues and News from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force* (Department of the Air Force, May 1995). The previous set of Air Force core values consisted of integrity, courage (moral and physical), patriotism, competence, tenacity and service, (*United States Air Force Academy Character Development Manual* (US Air Force Academy, CO: Center for Character Development, December 1994), 51.

48. See E-mail letter from COL Wayne E. Kuehne, Chaplain, Director of Plans, Policy, Doctrine and Training, Office of the Chief of Army Chaplains, to COL Tom H. Norton, Chaplain, Director of Ethical Studies Programs, Department of Command, Leadership and Management, US Army War College, subj.: *Army Values*, dated 29 January 1996; Chaplain (COL) Geoffrey H. Moran, "How We Speak of Army Values" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College student paper, 10 April 1995). Between 1865 and 1956, 79 different qualities—values employed by raters to evaluate officers—were included on US Navy officer rating forms. Anthony L. Wermuth, Westinghouse Electric Corporation Center for Advanced Studies & Analysis Monograph No. 8, *The Institutional Values of the Navy* (Falls Church, VA: Westinghouse Electric Corp., 1972-1973), 44-45. Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-0, after defining the "core values of our corps to be honor, courage and commitment," goes on to declare that esprit, aggressiveness and courage "are the essence of our corps," 3, 13.

49. Huntington, 59-79. It is also necessary to distinguish an officers' code of professional ethics—which is normative in the sense that it prescribes proper ethical conduct—from Samuel Huntington's "professional military ethic," which simply describes in idealized form the broad officerly values, attitudes and perspectives which inhere in and are deducible from the professional military function.

50. COL Harry G. Summers, "Special Trust and Confidence," *Proceedings* (May 1989), 94-97.

51. Despite the frequent churning of core values by the services from year to year, the process involves recycling through a fairly circumscribed assemblage of enduring values and virtues. It is little exaggeration to say that all such ethics are variations of the West Point motto "Duty, Honor, Country."

52. Matthews, "The Need for An Officers' Code of Professional Ethics," 27.

53. "Duty, Honor, Country," nominally the motto of only the US Military Academy, is now broadly, though unofficially, ascribed as a motto for all US Armed Forces. Wenker, 3; James H. Toner, *The American Military Ethic: A Meditation* (New York: Praeger, 1992), 240; Philip M. Flammer, "Conflicting Loyalties and the American Military Ethic," in *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, ed. Malham M. Wakin (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), 158.

54. Crocker lists other traditional ethical principles that would be candidates for inclusion, 27-30.

55. Huntington, 254.

56. Janowitz, 218.

57. Wiener, 1; Snedeker, 28.

58. *Executive Order (EO) 10631*, issued by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 17 August 1955; *EO 12633*, issued by President Ronald Reagan in August 1988; Peter L. Stromberg, Wakin and Daniel Callahan, ed., *The Teaching of Ethics in the Military* (Hastings-on-Hudson, NY: The Hastings Center, 1982), 78.

59. DOD Directive 5100.77, 5 November 1974, superseded 10 July 1979.

60. Stromberg, Wakin and Callahan, 26.

61. DOD 5500.R, *Joint Ethics Regulation* (Washington, DC: DOD, August 1993). In 1986, a Department of the Army (DA) study group recommended that an interservice study be conducted to examine the need for an "Armed Forces Code of Ethics" (not to be confused with the narrowly focussed *Joint Ethics Regulation*). Though the group's recommendation was not favorably acted upon, it did serve to show that the impetus for ethical convergency remained strong. Matthews, "The Need for An Officers' Code of Professional Ethics," 26.

62. FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: DA, 14 June 1993), 1-2, 1-3, 2-10.

63. Robert H. Scales Jr., *Firepower in Limited War* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990), 3-4. US forces have traditionally placed a high premium upon human life, but concern with battle deaths has been magnified in the age of television owing to the political repercussions of widely reported and graphically portrayed friendly casualties. See also Rick Atkinson, "Warriors Without a War," *The Washington Post* (14 April 1996), A1, A22; Rick Atkinson, "Army Times" (29 July 1996), 30.

64. Richard D. Hooker Jr., "The Mythology Surrounding Maneuver Warfare," *Parameters* (Spring 1993), 27-38; and especially the exchange between Hooker and Tom Donnelly, "Attritionists—or Technologists?—vs. Maneuverists," *Parameters* (Summer 1993), 107-10. See also Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, *Wartfighting* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 6 March 1989), 27-30, 58-61; Naval Doctrine Publication 1, 31-34; Air Force Manual 1-1, vol. II, 81-82, 85.

65. Builder, *Masks of War*, 30, 152.

66. Chilcoat, 3-17.

67. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters* (Winter 1992), 2-20.

68. Faris R. Kirkland, "The Gap Between Leadership Policy and Practice: A Historical Perspective," *Parameters* (September 1990), 50-62.

69. Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1789-1889* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 196-200.

70. US Military Academy (USMA) *Bugle Notes* (West Point, NY: USMA, 1950-1951), 206; Robert A. Fittion, ed., *Leadership: Quotations from the Military Tradition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 84-85.

71. Fittion, 325-29; FM 22-100, *Military Leadership* (Washington, DC: DA, 31 July 1990), 5-7; Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-0, 105; Wolfe, 138-206.

72. Matthews, "The Overcontrolling Leader," *ARMY* (April 1996), 31-36. Note also the sentiments of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, as quoted in Fittion, 21-22.

73. Chilcoat, 9-10. Common situational awareness from higher to lower echelons, far from promoting empowerment, could tempt higher commanders to intervene unduly in tactical engagements. The jury is still out as to how digitization will affect control practice.

74. The Navy and Air Force have no official mottoes. CAPT James Lawrence's immortal words "Don't give up the ship!" have served as a rallying cry for the Navy since the War of 1812. A frequently heard slogan within the Air Force, "The mission of the Air Force is to fly and fight," was reportedly endorsed by GEN John P. McConnell, Air Force chief of staff, 1965 to 1969. Builder, *The Icarus Syndrome* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 266.

The Wrong Road to Character Development?

Colonel W. Darryl Goldman, US Army

IN LEWIS CARROL's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, Alice comes upon the Cheshire cat at the crossroads and asks, "Cheshire-[cat], . . . would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" The cat answers, "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to." "I don't much care where," said Alice. "Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the cat.¹

The Department of Defense (DOD) is struggling with a similar dilemma. An interminable parade of appalling misbehavior by men and women in uniform has riveted public attention on traditional military values such as duty, honor and integrity. The media zealously speculates whether the US military is in an irreparable ethics crisis. They ask, and we privately wonder, "Has the US military lost its moral compass in this relativistic society?" The military is proficient in devising programs to at least present an appearance that we are getting somewhere. But if we do not know where we want to get to, how do we know if we are going in the right direction?

The young men and women joining the military today are a diverse aggregation, generally without the homogeneous values of their grandparents. We have no effective mechanism for teaching them the values traditionally esteemed by our military services. We relentlessly challenge them to embrace ever-increasing ethnic, racial, gender, religious and cultural diversity, and they are surprisingly elastic. However, we fail to provide these young adults with the training and education required for appropriate cognitive development and change.

The incidence of senior leaders being removed from promotion lists, forced into early retirement or facing courts-martial exacerbates the turbulence by diminishing respect for authority. This staggering spate of leaders ending otherwise notable careers in disgrace is the most compelling evidence to date that the US military culture does not intrinsically

[The] propensity to create new, isolated initiatives to address varied human relations misconduct has been the fundamental failure in the way the US military has addressed character development since the Eisenhower administration. We continually assume that secluded enterprises addressing ethics, morals or values are consequential just because they give the impression that "we are doing something."

promote principled behavior.

What do we want for our future? We want to develop and sustain a cultural environment of trust and respect, where human dignity and worth are esteemed. We want our leaders to be American military heroes by actively role modeling, teaching and coaching tomorrow's leaders today.

Unfortunately, we are not on the right road to accomplish these goals, because our military continues to respond to human relations challenges as it always has—with individual, isolated and even competing programs for equal opportunity, violence prevention, sexual harassment awareness, religious and cultural diversity, accentuation, participation in Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, suicide prevention training, monthly themes and many other programs. These are created and sustained in ideological isolation, subsequently competing vigorously for scarce funding, personnel and political resources. We may even further fragment our efforts—as the Army did by partitioning the violence prevention program into six distinct subcategories as follows:

- Workplace violence
- Family violence
- Youth and school violence
- Gang violence

- Sexual assault violence
- Suicide prevention

This propensity to create new, isolated initiatives to address varied human relations misconduct has been the fundamental failure in the way the US military has addressed character development since the Eisenhower administration. We continually assume that secluded enterprises addressing ethics, morals or values are consequential just because they give the impression that "we are doing something." In fact, this fallacious faith in new, detached projects is evidence that they do more harm than good by diverting the attention of those in leadership who have the authority to cause real change.

Our military culture has become accustomed to a heterogeneity of unrelated efforts to help people treat one another with dignity. We are beset by ethics, morals and values program pieces. Service schools offer ethics courses taught by instructors with a variety of credentials but without servicewide standards or objectives governing these courses. We have regulatory documents and field manuals that state the services' "ethos" but without consistency. We promulgate vague service "core values" as "foundational" only to have them inexplicably change—again.

In fact, core values differ among the services. The US Navy and Marine Corps recently embraced "Honor, Courage and Commitment." The US Air Force holds "Integrity First, Service Before Self, Excellence in All We Do." The Army has combined values and ethics with leadership values. Army values: Compassion, Courage, Candor, Competence and Commitment." Army ethics: Loyalty, duty, selfless service and integrity; LDRSHIP values: Loyalty, Duty, Respect for Others, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage. At the "core," individual service values within the US military differ.

Additionally, there are noncommissioned officer and civil service codes; DOD Code of Conduct 5500.R, *Standards of Ethical Conduct*; US Military Academy (USMA) initiatives to create environments of trust and respect, and made-for-classroom "moral development" booklets. We have academy mottoes, honor codes, the *Constitution*, Officer's Commission, Oath of Office, *Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)*, Laws of War, Standards of Conduct and service customs and traditions. Officer, warrant officer, enlisted and Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) evaluation reports contain an "ethics" block though raters are not trained to evaluate ethical behavior or ethical decision making, and the rated personnel do not understand the criteria by which they are evaluated.

So, the problem is not that the military is not paying attention or has not offered solutions. The problem is that the military has no unified approach or agreement as to which road it wants to take because it does not have a clue as to where it must "get to." A likely analogy would be the proverbial husband

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who refuses the assistance of a map because he firmly believes "If I drive far enough fast enough, I'll eventually get there!" As the Cheshire cat said, If you continue without direction, you will most certainly get somewhere.

We must pursue nothing less than a *cultural change*. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald R. Fogleman essentially said the criticisms aimed at that service may have been a problem of the service's *culture*. Williamson Murray, a military expert and former Air Force officer, argued that if Fogleman really wanted to alter the Air Force's culture, he would have to aim for changes a decade from [then] and begin by revamping education and training for officers and by picking generals who share his view.²

On 19 May 1994, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the chiefs of staff and the service secretaries signed a document (subsequently made into a poster) which bears the auspicious title "The Department of Defense Human Goals."³ However, when examined carefully, these "human goals" are actually a series of admirable but independent objectives without a sense of common target. Each stated "goal" is so worthy, who could oppose any of them? But what vision are these "goals" to attain? How may we ensure compliance and measure whether we have reached our goals? The creation of a poster without a strategy for achieving its ideals may do more harm than good by reinforcing the military's faith in fresh, isolated initiatives.

Instead, what the US military needs is a clearly stated vision for the kind of environment we want in our military, and an intelligible strategy, plus the collective will to strenuously pursue it. Only if DOD makes character development a top priority—and permanently institutionalizes aggressive programs

Relativism, resistance to authority and individualism stand in direct conflict with traditional military values. Although the US military continues to hold the ethical high ground as a model for social change, the resulting strain has been a public relations meltdown with the American people. Even if one makes the argument that the military merely reflects the larger society's current mores, the fact remains that Americans are profoundly appalled by the sight of a uniformed soldier in handcuffs.

at every professional life-cycle stage—will the US military reverse its descent into cultural chaos.

“Cultural chaos?” you ask. Indeed. At no other moment in American history have our military men and women been called upon to steadfastly embrace diversity in the ranks. Their successes are a credit to the quality of our people. However, the diversity in race, gender, religion, first language and many other variables has heightened conflict between individual values and the military institution’s traditional values. We have had difficulty developing a consensus that “this is the way we do things.” Relativism, resistance to authority and individualism stand in direct conflict with traditional military values. Although the US military continues to hold the ethical high ground as a model for social change, the resulting strain has been a public relations meltdown with the American people. Even if one makes the argument that the military merely reflects the larger society’s current mores, the fact remains that Americans are profoundly appalled by the sight of a uniformed soldier in handcuffs.

When the military culture is incongruous with civilian society, pressures to redefine military values increase. Occasionally, change comes so fast that we are uncertain of what to do because we do not know where we are. Disorientation is obvious when services admit to “not knowing whether adultery and fraternization are issues that affect our ability to function.” As Dorothy said in *The Wizard of Oz*, “Toto, I’ve a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore.”

Historically, the military has adhered to a few favored approaches to teach ethical behavior. Since Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall initiated “Character Guidance” programs in all service branches in 1951, the production of booklets and teaching of random classes in units has constituted our most consistent approach to *character* training.

Marching soldiers into classrooms for an hour’s lecture by a trainer with unspecified credentials has never yielded significant results. Then again, we have not stated the desired outcome for these classes in terms of our military culture’s long-range goals. We merely hoped that, by osmosis, the hearers would take something with them when they departed. Even group discussion (cognitive dissonance as opposed to didactic learning theory) is not significantly better if we have no idea where we are going.

Another favorite approach is to create military academy *character development* programs. One rationale is if we can train our best, most promising new officers, they may ultimately have a beneficial effect on the larger service during their careers. Of course, the undeclared advantage is that since academies tend to get the negative focus of the public press, preemptive programs always have the services’ support. Although the point is arguable, academy graduates appear to be better prepared to be leaders, much to the credit of character development programs.⁴ At West Point, cadets receive 50 hours of ethics, honor and honesty and 63 hours of Consideration of Others training.

But the reasoning that the military academies’ efforts have a significant impact on the larger service is faulty. USMA currently supplies approximately 25 percent of the officers accessioned to the Active Component (AC) Army each year.⁵ Let us assume that this rate will remain steady, as will current AC officer, enlisted and DAC employee strengths. In this most optimistic scenario, academy graduates would constitute only 2.7 percent of the total force of AC Army officers, enlisted and DAC personnel.⁶ Realistically, a preponderance of academy character development program benefits are confined to the academy’s own walls and will have insignificant impact on the Army community as a whole.

Several years ago the Air Force Academy took the lead by establishing the Center for Character Development to administer an innovative, academy-focused, character development program. The first goal was to create a character development program that successfully integrated its honor code system with Air Force values and desired character development outcomes. The center fixed its policy as:



DOD must clearly state its vision and objectives, accompanied by nothing less than a commitment to change the US military culture. The pursuit of cultural change must aim to define, develop and execute a militarywide progressive, developmental training and education character development program. The program must challenge men and women at every professional level to live the concepts of the services' unified core values and develop and sustain an environment of trust and respect where human dignity and worth are esteemed. The program must begin at accessioning, precommissioning, basic training and civilian recruitment and continue seamlessly until retirement or other separation.

"People develop best in an environment of trust and respect, where human dignity and worth are respected." Action officers and division chiefs from the Pentagon and sister academies eagerly made pilgrimages to Colorado Springs, Colorado, to explore something truly novel and innovative in the character development field.

However, there was no grand strategy to experiment or test training methods and curriculum for broader application to the entire service. No schema were posed for testing the program's effect on servicewide mentoring or values evaluation. In short, the program was never intended to leave Colorado Springs except in the most idealistic sense.

USMA developed and instituted the Consideration of Others program to promote "those actions that indicate a sensibility to and regard for the feelings and needs of others, and an awareness of the impact of one's own behavior on them; being supporting of and fair with others." The successful achievement of coherence of honor code system and

human behavior outcomes prompted some Army leaders to ask "Why can't we apply this program to the entire Army?" Simply put, programs that succeed in the academy's confines are not necessarily applicable to the larger military culture. Then what of the other 75 percent of officers, warrant officers, junior and senior enlisted and DACs?

Creating the kind of environment that academies pursue is appropriate and befitting our history as a compassionate and attentive people. But rather than contriving isolated programs in a vacuum, should they not design them as an interrelated element of a larger, comprehensive, servicewide strategy so that officers from the academies enter the services committed to a common covenant shared by every member of their service? Of course, to accomplish this, the services must have a clear idea as to where they want to "get to" and include the academies as part of—rather than separate from—the larger strategy.

A third means the military prefers for providing ethics training and education is in its service schools.

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Classes provided have no servicewide scheme or common goals and focus on philosophical ethics, or "metaethics," rather than applied ethics. The command and general staff and war college courses address the ethics of war at the strategic level, with little mention of mentoring values. Furthermore, since the preponderance of service school institutional training is provided for officers, captains and above, it seems we have not yet taken seriously the concept that in today's high-tech battlefield, national policy may be made at platoon level with the firing of a single bullet.

The fourth, but least preferred means of "doing something" about ethics is the creation and publication of codes. Former and current Army officers continually promote an "officers code" as the answer to how we may create and sustain an ethical milieu. Retired Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews says, "It is time to distill the standards and ethical elements that exist in military culture into a professional code—the essence of our profession's most cherished values, enshrined in a single document we can look to with something approaching true reverence."⁷ Never mind that since DOD created the *Code of Ethics of Government Service* for civilian employees and the Army developed the Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer, no one has tested for, or apparently even inquired about observable changes in attitudes and behavior of those whom we would expect to be most affected by such codes.⁸ More codes will not help. By the time the loaded, ethics-related statements are defined with some consensus, the resultant "code" is little more than indefinite platitudes with no means of exacting compliance.

Implementing Change

So, where do we go from here? The only road to an environment of trust and respect in the US military is a DOD-led commitment to cultural change.

In my opinion, DOD must immediately take the lead in developing a joint character development initiative by forming a DOD planning group led by military leaders with the authority to make things happen. This planning group must then submit a DOD character development plan for Secretary of Defense approval in one year. The initial task must be to create a consensus of seasoned *and* new military members as to where we want to "get to" and which road(s) we will take. Only a joint program will furnish clear, coordinated language and goals and a means of measuring progress common to all services.

The sister services appear powerless to even place responsibility for ethics in one central agency. The Air Force created a new office at the secretariat level. To better understand how convoluted responsibility for ethics is in the Army, one must simply walk the halls of the Pentagon in search of where the ethics "buck stops." When I first made this Pentagon excursion, I began with my own office, the Human Resources directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER). "Well," the explanation came, "We believe we have responsibility for ethics, although that's not in any regulation."

The next stop was the Army Judge Advocate General's office. In a small cubicle, a man with a desk piled high with papers and books said, "It's me, I'm responsible for ethics training in the Army." I asked to see his authority and he showed me his copy of DOD 5500.R—the DOD regulation for civilians and military that prescribes which kinds of contracting are illegal, along with other inappropriate business entanglements.

"I see chapter 12 is about ethical decision making," I said.

"Well we throw that out. We're not qualified to teach that," he answered.

Down another long corridor, this time to the Chief of Chaplains' office. For many years the chaplains have taught "character guidance" courses and recently fielded an impressive "moral leadership" manual. "Moral leadership training is our forte by regulation," the spokesman said. "Ethics belongs to the ODCSPER." The circle was complete.

To be effective, DOD must clearly state its vision and objectives, accompanied by nothing less than a commitment to change the US military culture.⁹ The pursuit of cultural change must aim to define, develop and execute a militarywide progressive, developmental training and education character development program. The program must challenge men and women at every professional level to live the concepts of the services' unified core values and develop and

sustain an environment of trust and respect where human dignity and worth are esteemed. The program must begin at accessioning, precommissioning, basic training and civilian recruitment and continue seamlessly until retirement or other separation.¹⁰

Additionally, DOD must remake the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) into a center for character development, with allied and coordinated academic, policy and implementation centers within the individual services. Racial and gender-based discriminatory behavior is unquestionably destructive to institutional cohesion, but DEOMI has failed to address the greater human relations challenge of teaching people how to relate to one another with respect and dignity, regardless of their differences or similarities. While the pursuit of justice for every service member must never wane, race and gender issues represent only two destructive antisocial attitudes. The new center and DOD program must be administered by leaders with the potential for greater responsibility upon assignment completion and the institutional authority to make things happen.

Even as the Center for Character Development is in the process of being readied, DOD, in collaboration with the services, must quickly define the shared American military core values and state a common "ethos" in a unified character development program for the US Armed Forces. The services must then coordinate all their regulatory documents to reflect the new unified values language.

DOD must enlist the help of the most respected civilian and military experts to construct a unified, progressive and developmental curriculum that provides socialization for *all* personnel in institutional education, operational assignments and individual professional development.¹¹ Although the Pentagon holds a multitude of talented action officers ensconced in cubicles, this is a job for experienced field experts.

The curriculum should be increasingly challenging throughout the professional life cycle and must be consummated in mentor evaluation and feedback for continual program update. The services must ensure that both the curriculum and training methods thoroughly integrate school instruction, operational assignment training, self- and social development. Likewise, they must ensure that all training allows discussion and encourages cognitive dissonance for change. Basic training students, officer candidate school students and academy cadets must graduate into a subsociety in which other members, regardless of rank, share in a collective covenant of common values. Students in service schools, senior service


schools and leadership courses must be trained in a confederated curriculum and returned to their assignments to teach and mentor character and character development.

DOD must ensure that individual efficiency rating forms and rating processes (to include DACs) are the teeth of an overall character development program

The command and general staff and war college courses address the ethics of war at the strategic level, with little mention of mentoring values. Furthermore, since the preponderance of service school institutional training is provided for officers, captains and above, it seems we have not yet taken seriously the concept that in today's high-tech battlefield, national policy may be made at platoon level with the firing of a single bullet.

by insisting that ratings *develop* personnel and their character, rather than merely evaluate their performance. The military adage "People will do it if you put it in their job description," remains true. Simultaneously, we must strenuously pursue an area we address rather poorly—the awards systems. How do we reward ethical choices when a perception of degradation of performance encourages cold-blooded decisions?¹²

DOD must develop an aggressive means of marketing the character development program to all military and civilian members in the military community, their families and the general public to create and sustain an institutional identity with the decided-upon values and goals in the figure. We want to ensure that new or prospective personnel understand something of the commitment required; to attract



DOD must develop an aggressive means of marketing the character development program to all military and civilian members in the military community, their families and the general public to create and sustain an institutional identity with the decided-upon values and goals. We want to ensure that new or prospective personnel understand something of the commitment required; to attract persons with ability, dedication and capacity for growth.

persons with ability, dedication and capacity for growth; and to make departing military and civilian members more appealing to civilian industry. Also, we want the American people to fully understand that their military continues to hold the moral high ground and remains a model for social betterment.

An Air Force publication states the "Service's ability to educate, train and inspire outstanding leaders, and instill character, is linked to our commitment to develop and sustain an environment of trust and respect, where human dignity and worth are esteemed." A comprehensive character development program in the US military will accomplish the DOD "human goals" and far more. People with ability, dedication and the capacity for growth will want to work in an

environment where such values are rewarded. Parents of talented youth will again trust that the military can provide a safe environment for their children.

Equal opportunity, violence and sexual-harassment prevention and other human relations emphases will be incorporated as part of everyday human relations rather than continue as isolated, politically motivated programs. Members will defend individual rights regardless of race, color, sex, religion, age or national origin because they will know "who we are and what we are about."

Only DOD can replace the hundreds of disjointed, competitive and wasteful separate service initiatives to forge a comprehensive, collaborative change in our military culture. The question is, can DOD resist the temptation to take responsibility amid great flamboyant fanfare, only to print more posters, issue unenforceable, vague rules and create more unrelated program "pieces?"

Genuine cultural change will not be the road of least resistance or swift payoffs but instead will mean a significant outlay of valuable resources and much hard work. We must begin now and aim for results 10 years from now. The most difficult battle will be convincing service leaders to accept the interservice standardization essential for an effective program. However, if we are up to the challenge, our children, and their children, will someday be proud to fill the ranks where we and our forefathers stood before them. **MR**

NOTES

1. Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* (New York: Signet Classic Books, 1956, reprint 1960), 64.

2. Carl Builder, a RAND Corporation military analyst who wrote the book *The Icarus Syndrome*, says that Navy Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. failed in his attempt to change the Navy's culture radically when he was chief of naval operations during the late 1970s. "As soon as he left, the Navy reverted back to where it had been before, and sealed the wound after him. The culture of an institution this big is extremely difficult to change." "Air Force Critics Seek to Clip Wings of an Elitist Culture," *Los Angeles Times* (8 October 1995), 4, 18. Additionally, Eliot A. Cohen, a military affairs specialist at Johns Hopkins University, thinks real change in the services' culture must be wrought with heavy outside pressure from the Pentagon's top civilian political appointees.

3. "Department of Defense [DOD] Human Goals," poster, 19 May 1994.

4. Tom Philpott, "Academics: Are They Still Worth the Cost?" *The Retired Officer Magazine* (October 1995), 31-36. Philpott says, "Recent information from DOD's Manpower Data Center shows academy graduates are, in fact, better behaved than non-academy graduates. From 1990 through 1994, the services separated 297,000 officers. More than 19,000 left with 'bad paper' discharges for such reasons as misconduct, drug and alcohol abuse and financial irresponsibility."

5. Source is Accession and Distribution Branch (DAPE-MPO), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER), Washington, DC.

6. Based on active strength of 84,340 officers, 427,370 enlisted and 276,833 civilian as of 1 August 1995. Source is Military Strength Analysis (DAPE-PRS). ODCS PER, Washington, DC.

7. COL Lloyd J. Matthews, "The Need for an Officers' Code of Professional Ethics," *ARMY* (March 1994), 21-29.

8. Embodied in Public Law 96-303, passed unanimously by Congress on 27 June 1980. Developed and distributed in 1990, this is an informative distillation of the noncommissioned officer's guiding ethical precepts.

9. Don Hellriegel, John W. Slocum and Richard W. Woodman, *Organizational Behavior* (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1992), 511. Suggests organization's culture can be altered by changing: what managers pay attention to, how crisis situations are handled, criteria for recruiting new members, criteria for promotion within the organization, criteria for allocating rewards and organizational rites and ceremonies.

10. Charles Thompkins, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy Personnel Programs, heads up a new organization the Navy is calling Character Development and Leadership. Thompkins says they are using the "cradle to grave" approach in their program development, believing that the leaders are just as much a key to the training process as the junior members.

11. Hellriegel, Slocum and Woodman, 521. Defines organizational socialization as "the systematic process by which organizations bring new employees into their culture. In general meaning of the term, socialization is the process by which older members of a society transmit to younger members the social skills and knowledge needed to effectively perform the roles of that society." See also their seven steps to socialization on page 522.

12. Some authorities believe the most effective method for influencing organizational culture may be through the reward system. See J. Kerr and J.W. Slocum Jr., "Managing Corporate Culture Through Reward Systems," *Academy of Management Executives* (1987), 1, 99-108; N.K. Sethia and M.A. Von Gilow, "Arriving at Four Cultures by Managing the Reward System," in R.H. Kilmann et al., *Gaining Control of the Corporate Culture* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 400-420.

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Retaining the Moral Element of War

Major Brian R. Reinwald, US Army

In peace, the moral element seldom comes to be of value; in war it forms the precondition of every victory, the true value of a unit.¹

—General Helmuth von Moltke

MUCH DEBATE and philosophical resonance in US military and academic circles today focuses on whether or not we are entering into, in the midst of or departing from a revolution in military affairs (RMA). This speculative fog masks an important component of future warfare—the moral element of war.² Regardless of the inherent arguments, changes and any definition or innovations of the so-called RMA, the moral element of war will remain unchanged and constant in the foreseeable future. This integral component is often overlooked by forward-thinking optimists, force developers, doctrine writers and technologists when they proselytize about the profound changes that the future holds for warfare. Although our Army is in the midst of the RMA debate, the enduring relationship between the human participants and the conduct of war ensures that the moral element will remain one of war's dominant and constant elements. This realization is important to our Army's future because of our increasing tendency to rely too heavily on technology to accomplish our goals while slighting the moral element's importance.

Technology alone cannot win wars. Human interaction and imposition remain vital determinants to the efficient application of that technology. As we enthusiastically rush toward the 21st-century battlefield with a multitude of unanswered questions, we should look to the past to capture and benefit from truths that military history offers. Indeed, history may not be able to prove much of anything. It does, however, demonstrate the relationship between human actors and circumstance, between cause and effect, and between dynamic change and its results. Reflected in history's annals are certain constants, of

The excitement in our Army over the new technology, tactics and organizations being developed for the 21st century is more than justified. However, historical lessons and precedents are too often overlooked during periods of great change. . . . Overzealous military theorists and some senior military leaders today are quick to draw inflated conclusions about the profound changes in the nature of war that they believe will inevitably result.

Formal military education programs must focus on combat preparation as their priority. . . . Technological training should complement, not replace, historical and tactical study.

which life's uncertainty, warfare's confusion and the human participant's nature and character are the most significant.

The moral element of war—consisting of those dynamic forces encompassing human performance, emotion, motivation, group performance, leadership and intangible natural forces during war—will remain a vital component of war and unchanged in the future for two essential reasons.³ First, the true nature of war—the essence of war itself, not the manner in which it is conducted—will not substantially change, and thus its components retain their validity. Second, human beings and human nature will not change. Future war will be conducted by people either controlling or benefiting from highly advanced, technological devices and weapon systems. This means that individual actions, human imperfections, performance thresholds and varying personalities will still influence and determine a conflict's outcome.

The terms *war*, *conduct of war*, *nature of war*, *moral element of war* and *RMA* are characteristically abstract and host to numerous definitions. Nevertheless, a working understanding of their meanings is necessary in order to understand the parts' relationship to the whole as illustrated in the figure.

War and RMA

Prussian General Helmuth von Moltke would probably be shunned by segments of the military community today because he generally opposed the

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idea that systems could replace human talent. He defined war as "the violent action of nations to attain or maintain purposes of state."⁴ This definition remains convincing, as does Carl von Clausewitz's trademark interpretations that "war is the continuation of policy by other means," and "war is an act of force intended to compel our enemy to do our will."⁵ Clausewitz also recognized that the art of war could not be exclusively considered a science, as it encompassed "living and moral forces."⁶ He recognized that human participation in war would forever make it an unpredictable, sometimes illogical and imperfect endeavor. War, then, is aggression of physical and nonphysical means between at least two parties to accomplish a political purpose when other recourses have failed.


Conduct of war. The *conduct of war* pertains to the manner in which a party carries out the physical and nonphysical acts in war. In other words, it is war's *means* to accomplish the purpose. It encompasses the equipment, weapons, doctrine and types of forces employed in war. Technology is a key part of war's conduct, because it serves as the basis from which the other components are most often derived and changed.

Nature of war. The definition and common understanding of what is meant by the *nature of war* is more speculative and contested. However, this article defines the nature of war as being composed of warfare's enduring characteristics, which include the complicated interaction of political entities and goals,


time, cultural factors, the participants' military skills and capabilities and various moral elements such as human performance, emotion, motivation, group performance, leadership and intangible natural forces, constantly interacting across war's entire spectrum.⁷ Each element affects the others and either directly or indirectly affects the conduct of war.

Moral element of war. The *moral element* is clearly a component of the overall nature of war. Military art theorists and practitioners have long espoused the importance and relative permanence of war's moral element. Clausewitz discussed the moral element by describing the nature of war as the realm of danger, physical exertion and suffering, uncertainty and chance.⁸ He further asserted that moral elements "constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole."⁹ Napoleon stated that "the moral is to the physical as three is to one," and strongly believed that moral force—not physical force—produced victory.¹⁰ And one of America's greatest combat leaders, General George S. Patton Jr., said prior to World War I that "Wars may be fought with weapons but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and of the man who leads that gains the victory."¹¹ The Army's cornerstone doctrine for operations echoes this humanistic theme by stating that warfare is a "test of the soldier's will, courage, endurance and skill."¹²

French soldier and theorist Ardant du Picq aptly described the true nature of war as a uniquely human endeavor. He believed that human performance and emotions, especially fear, dominated the conduct and end result of all engagements, battles and campaigns. He recognized the impact of technological advances on the conduct of war but disregarded the effect of technology on the moral element. "The art of war is subjected to many modifications by industrial and



A 101st Airborne Division soldier moves cautiously along a stream bed while watching for snipers, Vietnam, 4 November 1968.



History demonstrates that even the most profound changes in technology, thought and doctrine do not change the true nature of war. Reasoned analysis reflects that the future will be no different in this regard. . . . The advent of the railroad, machinegun, tank and mobile warfare doctrine all had substantial, long-lasting impacts on the conduct of war but limited impact on changing the true nature of war.

scientific progress,” he wrote, “but one thing does not change, the heart of man. . . . In all matters which pertain to an army, organization, discipline and tactics, the human heart in the supreme moment of battle is the basic factor.”¹³ Concurring with du Picq, American author Richard Timmons wrote that “the nature of man will dominate the battlefield as long as conventional weapons prevail.”¹⁴

Thus, technological and intellectual change and their eventual battlefield application are merely means to an end. The moral element, specifically the human participant therein, transcends the entire spectrum of war and ultimately enables the means to achieve the end. Advancements are useless without skilled people who both understand the nature of war and are trained in the conduct of it.

The RMA. The RMA’s meaning is one of today’s most hotly debated topics. A commonly accepted definition describes RMA as “*a major change in the nature of warfare* brought about by the innovative application of technologies, which combined with

dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of operations.”¹⁵ Other definitions of RMA include: “a true RMA involves the synergy among new technology, doctrinal adaptation and organizational adaptation”; and an RMA occurs when “emerging technologies are applied to modern military systems, whose uses are optimized via customized operational concepts and force structures, resulting in vast increases in military effectiveness.”¹⁶

The fault with these and most other RMA definitions is their vain presupposition that technological advancement, application and doctrinal change comprehensively transform the true nature of war. True, some elements of the nature of war may be affected—predominantly time and the participants’ skills and capabilities—and will cause the conduct of war to change. But the nature of war—particularly its moral element—when viewed in the context of a constant component of war, remains mostly as it has existed for centuries.

Why the Nature of War Has Not Changed

History demonstrates that even the most profound changes in technology, thought and doctrine do not change the true nature of war. Reasoned analysis reflects that the future will be no different in this regard. In our recent past, three military-technological innovations from the steam and industrial revolutions, and the major doctrinal change of post-World

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War I armies, aptly demonstrate that the nature of war, and the ubiquity of the moral element, remain constant. The advent of the railroad, machinegun, tank and mobile warfare doctrine all had substantial, long-lasting impacts on the conduct of war but limited impact on changing the true nature of war. In each case, did the innovation or change greatly affect the true nature of war? Was the moral element of war rendered inconsequential in its interaction between the nature of war and the conduct of war? The answer to each of these questions is “no.”

Train transportation drastically changed the way armies could mobilize, move, maneuver and supply themselves. As first demonstrated in the American Civil War and in Europe in the 1860s and 1870s, the railroad enabled commanders to move and reposition forces relatively swiftly while simultaneously ensuring that supplies could move either with them or to them at the same rate. This substantially changed the manner in which campaigns and wars were fought. Strategy and operational art were revitalized as military leaders had available options that were limited only by the number of engines and railcars and the miles of available track. In the conduct of war, capabilities increased, strategy became more flexible and political decisions became increasingly complex.

The moral element remained critical during this period. Leaders had to plan and prepare to react to their enemy’s use of the railroad, defend their own railroad lines and hard assets and increase staff proficiency in order to maximize the railroad’s capability.

Operations were conceived and conducted based on efficient use of the railroad and thus were vulnerable to numerous unforeseen calamities—blown bridges, unserviceable track, broken engines, limited fuel, unsynchronized timelines and competition for finite resources. These and other problems posed new challenges for military commanders and offset many of the railroad’s advantages. The rewards were potentially greater, but the risks were multiplied as well. At the heart of the change was the moral element of war’s continued importance. More friction and unplanned events were inevitable. Leaders had to be wiser, more prudent and more flexible to succeed and maximize new technology’s capabilities.

The machinegun’s development and emergence in the mid-1800s remained inconsequential to warfare until most modern armies employed it in World War I. Used on a large scale, it had devastating effects at the tactical and even operational levels. It enabled ground forces to dominate the battlefield from a defensive posture and caused armies to develop means to counter its awesome capabilities against dismounted soldiers. The machinegun affected the conduct of war in four major ways:

- It increased tactical defensive capabilities.
- It gave birth to technological development to counter its effects.
- It caused the formation of new organizational structures.
- It necessitated offensive and defensive doctrinal change at the tactical level of war.

The machinegun’s impact on the conduct of war simultaneously increased the importance of the moral element of war. At the soldier and small-unit level, the machinegun became a weapon to be either feared or adored, depending on whether you were attacking one or using one in a defense. Its awesome firepower and horrific sounds penetrated to the deepest recesses of human emotion. A renewed type of fear, or courage, was again part of the nature of war. Capitalizing on this capability to demoralize and butcher dismounted soldiers required innovative tactical thinking and indiscriminate application. More important, overcoming the fear and physical challenges the machinegun posed to dismounted infantry required courage of the highest order, extraordinary tactical solutions and resolute leadership. None of the moral elements of war were weakened or rendered obsolete. All of the components remained important and affected not only the machinegun’s use but also the conduct of the war.

The tank, born of necessity, helped counter the machinegun’s defensive superiority during World War I, enabling soldiers to move tactically while pro-



A combined French and British unit awaits an attack during the last German offensive of World War I, June 1918. This position was overrun.

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tected by steel. It afforded commanders a strong, mobile, virtually all-terrain punch that could break through most static defenses. The tank caused post-war theorists to revisit standing doctrine, and the result significantly changed the doctrine and conduct of war prior to and during World War II. Major equipment, organization and weapon initiatives were the result of the tank's battlefield emergence.

The tank's development and use did not decrease the importance of the moral element of war. Like the machinegun, the tank had a great impact on the human participant's emotions and motivation. It was feared because of its sheer size and appearance and gave confidence to the dismounted infantry who accompanied it into battle. Its employment required a substantial increase in the human participant's proficiency. Even World War I tank warfare demanded more staff coordination, greater synchronization of the combat arms during the battle, more efficient command and control means, a massive logistic effort and determined, bold soldiers to lead the forces and operate the machines.

Intangible natural forces also gained greater importance with the tank's employment. Severe wet

weather, rough terrain or mechanical malfunctions could instantly stop the momentum of an attack. Limited visibility could help either the attacker or the defender but nevertheless diminished the tank's actual effectiveness. Most important, the tank caused a greater emphasis on the moral element of war because of its potential to strike at the most vulnerable part of an enemy's defense—the soldier's psyche.

The mobile warfare doctrine that arose from the lessons learned and technology of World War I set the stage for the conduct of war in World War II. This doctrine, which was essentially adopted in some form by all of the war's major powers, dictated that fast, strong armored forces, supported by mobile artillery and attack aircraft, would penetrate enemy defenses and bypass strong points in order to wreak havoc deep in the defending force's rear. This doctrine not only impacted on the way armies fought the war but substantially affected the development and acquisition of new equipment to meet doctrine's demands.

Mobile armored warfare's true aim was breaking the enemy's will to fight. The objective was to apply overwhelming force at the point of attack—usually at an enemy flank—with all available combat assets,

More lethal weapons, faster weapons platforms, increased strategic and operational options and a fluid, fast-paced battlefield all required intensive human decision making, influence, analysis and leadership to reap their potential benefits. Concurrently, the possibility that human error and the moral element could have a detrimental impact on operations also increased.

followed by rapid exploitation, to completely shock the enemy commander's equilibrium, mental state and reasoning ability.¹⁷ In essence, doctrine sought to defeat the enemy, not by destroying the majority of his weapon systems and soldiers, but by defeating his mind and causing culmination in his desire to further prosecute the war. The moral element of war not only became more important to the conduct of war but actually became a focal point for tactical operations.

In the examples cited above, major changes in the conduct of war resulted from the application of new equipment, technology or ideas. Other examples include the percussion cap, telegraph, wireless communication, bayonet, motor transport, steam engine, rifled bores and breech-loading rifles. All these examples can be considered to have been at least a minor part of an RMA. Even when viewed in the enormity of their importance to warfare's development, however, none of them substantially changed the true nature of war. In each case, the nature of war's dynamic elements remained critical factors influencing the conduct of war. The *conduct of war* changed—the *nature of war* did not.

Most important, the moral element of war remained intact. Its relationship to battlefield success increased proportionally with military technological advances, showing that more lethal weapons, faster weapons platforms, increased strategic and operational options and a fluid, fast-paced battlefield all required intensive human decision making, influence, analysis and leadership to reap their potential benefits. Concurrently, the possibility that human error and the moral element could have a detrimental impact on operations also increased. As du Picq wrote after experiencing firsthand the impact and effects of the railroad and weapon improvements in 1860s Europe, "Battles, now more than ever, are battles of men, of captains. They always have been in fact, since in the last analysis the execution belongs to the man in ranks. But the influence of the latter on the final result is greater than formerly. From that comes the maxim of today: The battles of men."¹⁸

The Human Factor

The second major reason the moral element of war will be unchanged by the RMA and continue to be one of warfare's dominant and unchanging forces is that the conduct of future war is dependent upon the interaction between the human participant and the highly advanced, technological devices and weapon systems of the future battlefield. The human participant is the critical component. We cannot effectively use technologies that are individually or collectively beyond human capability. Regardless of technology's advancement rate, humans will continue to evolve at nature's rate. This means that in our lifetime, the physical and mental capabilities of soldiers and leaders will remain relatively unchanged. Also important—yet often overlooked—is the fact that war at each level still must be conceptualized, planned, coordinated and executed with precision—all distinctly human activities with their accompanying possibilities for greatness or disaster. As author Stephen J. Blank surmised, "no technology can make up for basic errors in making or implementing strategy."¹⁹

Advanced technology does not diminish the importance of humans in the conduct of war. Rather, it makes them more important since the military force's success is more dependent upon correct, timely and precise application of advanced equipment or technology by human participants. The Army's emerging doctrine for our advanced technology stresses precision strikes, decisive maneuver and information dominance. The enabler for these doctrinal initiatives is the maneuver commander at all levels. The commander must be able to look at a "common relevant picture" of combat assets in a given sector or zone, gain accurate situational awareness of his and enemy forces, account for uncertainty and incidental probabilities, evaluate multiple courses of action, make decisions and then act. This is no easy task, even with the high technology available to him.

US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commanding General William W. Hartzog recently wrote that "if technology is to be truly useful it must enable, not encumber, our people."²⁰ Again, technology is merely a means to an end. The enabler of those means is the person at the controls, in addition to the numerous other humans interacting across the spectrum of war. TRADOC Pamphlet *Land Combat in the 21st Century* repeats this theme and emphasizes the vital importance of soldiers, commanders and leaders to mission success on the future battlefield.²¹

Furthermore, technology can neither completely organize future battlefield disorder nor clarify inevitable uncertainty. These are tasks for thinking mili-



VII Corps forces and Iraqi prisoners just north of the Saudi-Iraqi berm, 24 or 25 February 1991.

In essence, [mobile warfare] doctrine sought to defeat the enemy, not by destroying the majority of his weapon systems and soldiers, but by defeating his mind and causing culmination in his desire to further prosecute the war. The moral element of war not only became more important to the conduct of war but actually became a focal point for tactical operations.

tary professionals who are trained to act and react with strong will and sound judgment. Competent combat leaders and intelligent soldiers on the ground will continue to be essential for managing the inevitable chaos. Hence, "War is a continuous interaction of opposing forces which includes a thinking foe capable of considering many options, unpredictable behavior and deception. The entire nature of war is uncertainty; it abides no specific norms, evades precision and ebbs and flows in time and space according to many variables . . . in such an atmosphere, spirit, change, nature and sheer willpower often prevail . . ."²² Properly trained, intelligent and capable soldiers using advanced technology are indispensable in alleviating the negative aspects and capitalizing on the moral element of war's positive aspects.

Finally, the moral element of war encompasses the skill, character, intuition and leadership abilities of commanders and leaders. Any RMA cannot, no matter how vast or dynamic it may be, change the great influence the commander exerts on the battlefield. New concepts such as *information dominance*, *situational awareness* and *expanded battlespace* will be important factors in future wars. Current emphasis on training the techniques and art of *battle command* addresses these critical skills.

Retired General Frederick M. Franks Jr. wrote that "battle command demands more art than precise science."²³ His premise should prove especially relevant in the future, because commanders will have access to massive amounts of near real-time information, can move and maneuver faster than before and are faced with a fluid, ever-changing battlefield environment. J.F.C. Fuller's thoughts after World War I seem particularly applicable today:

"Neither a nation nor an army is a mechanical contrivance, but a living thing, built of flesh and blood and not of iron and steel. . . . The more mechanical become the weapons with which we fight, the less mechanical must be the spirit which controls them."²⁴

Our Army is becoming smaller, but a more lethal power-projection, digitized force that maximizes our nation's technological superiority. Recent senior leader emphasis weighs heavily on technological advancement and its potential for decisive and far-reaching effects. We must avoid wearing institutional blinders that shield us from the true nature of war and lull us into a false sense of security. What has provided us the winning edge throughout the Army's history has been a superiority in the human product and the "soft skill" functions that maximize our technology and positively affect the moral element of war. Doctrine, military education, leader development, recruitment of quality soldiers and a genuine combat focus are the "soft skill" functions we must concurrently evolve with technology to sustain our overall supremacy among the world's armies.

Our tactical doctrine must be sufficiently flexible to allow for individual initiative while prescribing logical guidance for conducting operations. It must blend proven combat principles and common sense with the modern capabilities of soldiers and technology.

Staff manuals and processes should be streamlined to enable leaders to make more timely decisions based on increased accuracy in situational awareness and near real-time reports from subordinates. The staff process at all levels must be a means and not an end unto itself. Bureaucratic processes in combat harbor disaster at worst, lethargy at best.

Formal military education programs must focus on combat preparation as their priority. Mandatory attendance at mid-career resident schools as a way to equitably level the playing field for promotion dilutes the process. Leader development must be self-initiated, yet intertwined with unit and institutional training and growth. Technological training should complement, not replace, historical and tactical study.

Quality soldiers are the most important resource we have, and their continued recruitment in the All-Volunteer Force will be a continued challenge. America's Army needs fighters—soldiers and commanders—who understand the nature of war and know how to fight and win. Our institution and nation too easily forget that our core business is fighting wars. Killing other human beings, destroying property and totally dominating the enemy are parts of this combat charter. Soldiers motivated by the lure of a college education or technical training for future civilian application may not be ideal choices for our future Army. We cannot promulgate dishonesty with potential recruits or with the country at large (via mass advertisement) by misrepresenting the fundamental purpose for which our Army exists.

However, we must recruit soldiers of sound character who are mentally and physically tough. They must have an ability to think and make decisions under periods of great stress while performing simultaneous tasks. Above all, our recruits must be disciplined and prepared to sacrifice their lives for their country in the performance of their duties. They are our most critical combat resource, and our continued

success depends on our ability to recruit total-quality soldiers and fighters.

The excitement in our Army over the new technology, tactics and organizations being developed for the 21st century is more than justified. However, historical lessons and precedents are too often overlooked during periods of great change. Any RMA that we may be in the midst of will not change the critical importance of the moral element of war. Unfortunately, overzealous military theorists and some senior military leaders today are quick to draw inflated conclusions about the profound changes in the nature of war that they believe will inevitably result from technological, organizational and doctrinal advances.²⁵

The multitude of questions and their associated arguments arising from the RMA debate should not detract military professionals from remembering and acknowledging the true nature of war. From the pragmatic perspective of military history, these "vainglorious" estimates neglect the sum and substance of the enduring nature of war—the moral element—of which the human element is a main component. The moral element of war will remain unchanged as we enter the 21st century and will continue to be a decisive factor in any war's outcome. We should press ahead at full steam, but with constant glances to the rear to remind us of the human foundation that has allowed us to stand as victorious conquerors on the smoking hill. The solution to problems, wrote du Picq, "lies in the study of what took place yesterday, from which, alone, it is possible to deduce what will happen tomorrow."²⁶ **MR**

NOTES

1. Helmuth von Moltke, *Moltke on the Art of War*, ed. Daniel J. Hughes, trans. Harry Bell and Daniel J. Hughes (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 172.
2. A nonnuclear, low- to high-intensity conflict.
3. Author's definition.
4. Moltke, 35.
5. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75, 87.
6. *Ibid.*, 86.
7. Author's definition. Clausewitz comprehensively analyzes the nature of war in Books One and Three in *On War*.
8. Clausewitz, 100-104.
9. *Ibid.*, 184.
10. David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1966), 155.
11. Carlo D'Este, *Patton: A Genius for War* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 221.
12. US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Government Printing Office, 1993), 1-2.
13. Armand du Picq, *Battle Studies*, trans. John N. Greely and Robert C. Cotton, in *Roots of Strategy*, Book II (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), 135.
14. Richard Timmons, "The Moral Dimension: The Thoughts of Armand du Picq," *Infantry Magazine* (November-December 1985), 11.
15. Earl H. Tiford Jr., "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions" (Strategic Studies Institute Report, US Army War College, 1995), 1.
16. Philip Ritcheson, "The Future of Military Affairs: Revolution or Evolution," *Strategic Review* (Spring 1996), 31; Paul F. Herman Jr., "The Revolution in Military Affairs," *Strategic Review* (Spring 1996), 26-27.
17. B.H. Liddell Hart discusses this "indirect approach" in his book *Strategy*, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Meridian, 1991). Liddell Hart believed that the enemy should be attacked

physically or psychologically at the point of least resistance.

18. Du Picq, 128.
19. Stephen J. Blank, "Preparing for the Next War: Reflections on the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Strategic Review* (Spring 1996), 21.
20. US Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet, *Land Combat in the 21st Century* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, Combined Arms Center, 1996), 1.
21. *Land Combat in the 21st Century* states that "the very nature of warfare is changing," with which I disagree. Among other references to the importance of soldiers, under "Characteristics of Force XXI Operations," it reads: "Nonlinearly requires soldiers and leaders to possess greater situational awareness . . . ; Key to distributed operations; the empowerment of soldiers and leaders to use their initiative, willpower and professional expertise to carry out critical tasks at all echelons"
22. Lamar Tooke and Ralph Allen, "Strategic Intuition and the Art of War," *Military Review* (March-April 1995), 11-12.
23. Retired General Frederick M. Franks Jr., "Battle Command: A Commander's Perspective," *Military Review* (May-June 1996), 5.
24. J.F.C. Fuller, *Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure* (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1936), 13.
25. There is a glimmer of hope, however, that most senior Army leaders understand the importance and enduring presence of the moral element of war and the decisiveness of human performance over technological capability. Army Chief of Staff GEN Dennis J. Reimer stated in a recent "Leader Development" meeting on 8 November 1996, that: "Leader development is the most difficult part of all the changes affecting the Army. We'll be able to handle the doctrine, tactics and concepts of the Army After Next, but leader development is absolutely fundamental to the success of the Army." United States Army Center for Army Leadership, "Leader Development Update" (<<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cgsc/cal/csa-html/index.htm>>, 1996).
26. Du Picq, 131.

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Responsibility, Commitment and Morale

Captain Thomas W. Britt, US Army

*Accept the challenges so that you may
feel the exhilaration of victory.*

—General George S. Patton Jr.

PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY is an important military concept. When soldiers feel responsible for their performance, they will do anything to achieve a goal and persevere in the face of obstacles. It is through responsibility that soldiers can take credit for exemplary performance or be held accountable for poor performance. Without responsibility, soldiers become disengaged from what they are doing, achieving performance outcomes that have little impact on their personal or professional development.

The importance of personal responsibility is mentioned numerous times in various US Army field manuals. It is not enough to tell soldiers to "be responsible" for their actions, we need to understand what causes soldiers to feel responsible for their performance, as well as what causes soldiers to become disconnected from their jobs and careers. For two years, the US Army Medical Research Unit-Europe examined responsibility and commitment determinants during military operations and their effects on morale and job "connection."

The "Triangle Model of Responsibility" was developed to better understand responsibility in diverse settings.¹ This article summarizes recent research applying the model to military operations. According to the model, responsibility is the "psychological glue" that binds a soldier to an event and to relevant prescriptions or rules that govern performance. The model views responsibility on any given occasion as a relationship between the *event* that has occurred or is anticipated (such as battle or mission); the *prescriptions* or rules that govern the event (such as rules of engagement [ROE] and general ethical codes); and the *identity images* the individual has relevant to the event and prescriptions (as soldier, hu-

The degree of responsibility a soldier feels on any given occasion is a direct function of the strength of the linkages among the elements and the elements' importance to the soldier. More specifically, high responsibility exists when a clear, well-defined set of prescriptions or guidelines is applicable to the event; the individual interprets the prescriptions as relevant to his identity or role; the individual has personal control over the event; and the event, prescriptions and identity images are important to the individual.

manitarian or parent). The event, prescriptions and identity images are the *elements* involved in any assessment of responsibility. The three elements and the linkages among them form a triangle when drawn schematically are shown in Figure 1.

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


Figure 1. The Responsibility Triangle.



Identity images are more important when they refer to more central components of the individual's identity. . . . A soldier may consider his identity as a "warrior" more important than his identity as "peacekeeper." The combined importance of the event, prescriptions and identity images constitutes mission importance. As mission importance increases, so do performance consequences for soldiers. When soldiers believe in what they are doing, they become engaged in their work and feel more responsible for and committed to their performance.

(rule clarity); the individual interprets the prescriptions as relevant to his identity or role (mission relevance); the individual has personal control over the event (personal control); and the event, prescriptions and identity images are important to the individual (mission importance). What follows is a discussion of each element and the linkages among the elements, using examples from the unique issues soldiers face during peacekeeping operations (PKOs).² I will then review recent research supporting the model and offer recommendations for increasing responsibility and commitment.

Triangle Elements and Mission Importance

Understanding how responsible a soldier will feel requires understanding three key pieces of information: the event, the prescriptions or rules that govern the event and the identity images relevant to the event. Each piece of information is defined as follows:

- The *event* is the performance or behavior that is anticipated or has occurred. Events can vary along a number of dimensions. An event can either be an

isolated occurrence, such as an exam or a movement in battle, or it can be broader, such as a soldier's performance during a training course or mission.

- *Prescriptions* refer to the rules or codes of conduct that are applicable to the event. They are performance guidelines that tell the individual what is required for exemplary conduct. Prescriptions are diverse, ranging from specific guidelines, such as company policy for ordering equipment or ROE for dealing with hostile forces, to more general ethical codes, such as "selfless service to one's country" and "do unto others as they would do unto you."

- Examples of *identity images* are roles, qualities, characteristics and aspirations a soldier possesses—being a parent, a noncommissioned officer (NCO), a conservative or a peacekeeper.

The prescriptions, event and identity images can all differ in their importance to the soldier or, for that matter, to society as a whole. Some events are more important than others either because they mean more to the soldier or produce more significant consequences. A battle's importance depends on its im-

plication for the overall campaign or the number of casualties incurred. Prescriptions depend on whether they refer to serious rules (murder versus shoplifting) or rules the individuals cherish to a greater extent (for example, some individuals hold the prescription of compassion higher than that of loyalty). *Identity images* are more important when they refer to more central components of the individual's identity. For example, a soldier may consider his identity as a "warrior" more important than his identity as "peacekeeper." The combined importance of the event, prescriptions and identity images constitutes *mission importance*. As mission importance increases, so do performance consequences for soldiers. When soldiers believe in what they are doing, they become engaged in their work and feel more responsible for and committed to their performance.³

Factors That Influence Responsibility

Responsibility is increased when soldiers have a single, clear set of rules that apply to the event in question. When the guidelines are unclear, or when more than one set of rules seems to apply to an event, responsibility is decreased.

Rule clarity. PKOs are often distinguished by issues surrounding rule clarity. One of the main psychological ambiguities that can face soldiers on PK missions is uncertainty about the mission and what is required of the soldier.⁴ L.L. Miller and Charles Moskos, in describing the experiences of service members in Operation *Support Hope* in Somalia, noted that understanding ROE was very difficult for soldiers exposed to hostile acts.⁵ PK mission performance rules may also suddenly change depending on certain contingencies. For example, an uprising by one of the parties involved in a conflict may necessitate the radical restructuring of guidelines from PK to peacemaking.⁶ Service members will then be required to go from a PK mode to a "semicombat" mode, once again encountering confusing rules that may conflict with other guidelines. Finally, rule clarity can become an issue during PKOs if soldiers do not have clear indications of what constitutes successful performance. In combat operations, the criteria for successful performance are often relatively clear—conquer the objective and stop enemy troops from advancing. However, in PKOs it is often very difficult for troops to understand what constitutes mission success. Further, political talks and negotiations often continue after soldiers return from the mission, providing them with little closure on what they have accomplished and whether they have been successful.⁷ Soldiers need to be given concrete examples of what constitutes successful perfor-

Increased feelings of responsibility result when soldiers view the prescriptions, rules or guidelines associated with the mission as relevant to their training and identity. This requires proper training for the mission and seeing a clear connection between the mission and the soldier's professional development.

Mission relevance can become a concern during PKOs. Past research has shown that approximately 50 percent of service members report that additional training is needed to succeed in PKOs.

mance during operations other than war (OOTW).

Mission relevance. Increased feelings of responsibility result when soldiers view the prescriptions, rules or guidelines associated with the mission as relevant to their training and identity. This requires proper training for the mission and seeing a clear connection between the mission and the soldier's professional development. Mission relevance can become a concern during PKOs. Past research has shown that approximately 50 percent of service members report that additional training is needed to succeed in PKOs.⁸ In an important step, the Army has developed PK training programs designed to prepare soldiers for PK challenges and is attempting to train all soldiers prior to deployment. Mission relevance can also become a concern during PK missions if soldiers question the mission's relevance to their professional development.⁹ If service members feel that PK missions are not really valued by senior leaders, they will exhibit reduced responsibility and commitment levels to the PK mission.

Personal control. Responsibility increases when soldiers believe they have personal control over their mission performance, performing out of an intrinsic desire to do well rather than simply following orders. Extensive research suggests that feeling personal control over work performance results in better task performance, more effective problem solving, greater task persistence, more positive emotions and even better psychological and physical health.¹⁰

It is the very lack of control soldiers feel during certain kinds of PKOs that may represent one of the most potent threats to feelings of responsibility, commitment and morale. One of the most difficult things for soldiers to do during certain PKOs is to stand by and witness horrific acts committed against the local population without being able to intervene.¹¹ Overly restrictive ROE can make soldiers feel "out of control," thereby decreasing their confidence in

performing even the most basic tasks.¹²

Personal control is also relevant to recent discussions about micromanagement and a “zero-defects” mentality in the Army.¹³ Micromanagement reflects soldiers’(or leaders’) perception that their leaders are

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not giving them sufficient personal control to accomplish the mission. Creating conditions that encourage personal control increases responsibility, allowing soldiers to take greater credit when they do a good job on a given mission. Restricting personal control psychologically disengages soldiers from the mission, resulting in soldiers not feeling pride in their work.

The present model’s primary predictions of responsibility, commitment and morale are a direct function of the three links—rule clarity, mission relevance and personal control—and the elements’ importance—mission importance. Responsibility, morale and commitment are greatest when:

- The performance rules are clear.
- The soldier perceives the rules as relevant to his training and identity.
- The soldier feels personal control over the event.
- The soldier believes in the mission’s importance.

Responsibility, morale and commitment should be greatest when all the factors are positive and should be weakened as each factor is reduced in strength.

Operation Constant Vigilance

Military researchers from the US Army Medical Research Unit—Europe surveyed a Patriot Air Defense Artillery task force (TF) while deployed on a contingency operation to Saudi Arabia.¹⁴ Included in the survey were questions assessing:

Rule clarity—“Guidelines for my job are clear.”

Mission relevance—“I am doing what I was trained to do.”

Personal control—“I have personal control over my job.”

Mission importance—“What I am doing on this mission is important.”

Responsibility—“I feel responsible for my job performance.”

Commitment—“I am committed to doing well in my job.”

Feeling disconnected—“I feel disconnected from my job.”

Results revealed that rule clarity, mission relevance and personal control each contributed to either soldier feelings of responsibility and commitment, or job disconnection.¹⁵ The effects of the factors plot responsibility, commitment and job “connection” as a function of the number of “positive” factors soldiers reported—greater rule clarity, mission relevance and personal control. Responsibility, commitment and job connection were greatest when soldiers felt the guidelines for their job were clear, they were doing what they were trained to do and felt personal control over their job. As each factor decreased in strength, so did responsibility, commitment and degree of job connection. Correlational analyses also showed that soldiers felt more responsible for and committed to their job when they felt that what they were doing was important.

An analysis of the different units composing the Patriot Air Defense Artillery TF also permitted another test of the responsibility model. Group discussions with each of the different units revealed that one TF unit was assigned to perform a task that was not relevant to its primary training—to serve as a guard force—and appeared to have less control over its job (this unit will be called Unit A); however, the job guidelines were fairly clear. We predicted the following outcomes for Unit A:

- It would score lower than the other units on mission relevance and personal control, but not on rule clarity.
- It would have lower responsibility levels and commitment than the other units.
- Responsibility and commitment differences between the units would disappear when we statistically controlled for differences in mission relevance and personal control.

This pattern of results would provide additional support for the responsibility model, showing that differences in mission relevance and personal control among units can account for unit differences in responsibility and commitment.¹⁶

Supporting these observations, Figure 2 shows Unit A scored lower than the other units on mission relevance and personal control, but not on rule clarity. In Figure 3, Unit A scored lower than the other units on responsibility and commitment. The differences between the units on responsibility and commitment disappeared when we controlled for differ-

ences in mission relevance and personal control.

The differences between the units in responsibility and commitment resulted from their differences in mission relevance and personal control. Result patterns show that the model is capable of accounting for unit differences in responsibility and commitment.

Operations Vigilant Warrior and Restore Democracy

Operation *Constant Vigilance* was a regularly scheduled deployment not instigated by any threat of aggression. We also tested the model by surveying soldiers supporting Operation *Vigilant Warrior*, which involved a buildup of US forces in Kuwait in response to threatened aggression by Iraq. Soldiers were surveyed during their deployment by a human dimensions research team from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) and the US Army Medical Research Unit-Europe. Included in the survey were questions assessing:

Rule clarity—"I am briefed regularly by my leaders."

Mission relevance—"What I am doing on this mission is what I have been trained to do."

Personal control—"What I am doing during this deployment helps accomplish the mission."

Mission importance—"I feel that what I am doing during this deployment is important."

Morale—"My personal morale is good right now."

The study focus was whether the responsibility model could also predict soldier morale. Results revealed that rule clarity, mission relevance and personal control each contributed to morale.¹⁷ Morale was highest when soldiers were briefed about the mission, were doing what they were trained to do and felt they were contributing to the unit's mission. As each factor weakened, so did personal morale. Results also showed that morale was higher when soldiers thought that what they were doing was important.

We also examined the model's utility in understanding soldier morale by surveying soldiers during

a PKO. Operation *Uphold Democracy* involved US forces deploying as part of a multinational effort to force General Raul Cedras out of power, but it

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quickly turned into a PKO in which US forces oversaw the transition of power from Cedras to President Jean Bertrand Aristide.¹⁸

US soldiers were surveyed by a human dimensions research team from WRAIR. The items assessing rule clarity, mission relevance, personal control and mission importance were the same as those used for Operation *Vigilant Warrior*. Morale was again highest when soldiers were briefed regularly, were doing what they were trained to do and felt they were personally contributing to the mission. The results also revealed that mission importance again contributed to soldier morale, with soldiers who believed the mission was important reporting higher morale.

Enhancing Responsibility, Commitment and Morale

The Army wants soldiers with high levels of responsibility, commitment and morale across a diversity of military operations. The model and research presented in this article suggest an array of actions leaders can take to engage soldiers in their work,




Figure 2. Unit Differences in the Factors.




Figure 3. Unit Differences in Responsibility/Commitment..

Rule Clarity

- Create clear expectations for performance.
- Keep soldiers informed about all mission aspects.
- Clearly indicate what constitutes mission success.
- Ensure soldiers understand they may have to move from one set of rules to another (peacekeeping to peacemaking).

Mission Relevance

- Give soldiers the necessary training for their mission, so that they perceive their mission role as relevant to their respective jobs.
- Have senior military leaders (officers and NCOs) discuss OOTW's relevance to soldier professional development.
- Emphasize that Army values—loyalty, duty, respect for others, selfless service, honesty, integrity and personal courage—are relevant to all mission types.

Personal Control

- Ensure soldiers feel personal control over their performance by giving them autonomy to do their jobs.
- In situations where soldiers have little control, encourage other forms of control. For example, "I am refraining from hostility to prevent greater escalation."
- Show the soldier how his/her performance contributes to overall mission success.

Mission Importance

- Emphasize the importance of what soldiers are doing.
- If there are doubts about a given mission's importance, either among soldiers or the general public, emphasize the "higher order" importance of doing a good job on whatever the mission requires.

Figure 4. Leader Actions for Increasing Responsibility, Commitment and Morale During Military Operations.

enabling soldiers to approach challenges with strong motivation to accomplish the mission no matter what the obstacle.¹⁹ These recommendations are summarized in Figure 4.

For example, *rule clarity* could be increased by clearly indicating what constitutes mission success and ensuring soldiers know they may have to move from one set of rules (peacekeeping) to another set (peacemaking). *Mission relevance* could be clarified by having senior commissioned officers and NCOs explain how OOTW is relevant to the soldier's professional development and by making sure soldiers get the proper training for unique missions. *Personal control* could be increased by giving soldiers more autonomy in carrying out their daily jobs and encouraging other forms of control when the ROE is

too strict. For instance, soldiers can feel "in control" by not responding to civilian taunts knowing that responding would only increase escalation. Finally, *mission importance* could be solidified by stressing the operation's significance and the importance of what the mission is designed to accomplish.

Many leaders are already sensitive to these recommendations, because most reflect sound leadership principles. Understanding these recommendations within the responsibility model may provide leaders with a heuristic device as well as an empirical basis for decision making. Like so many other qualities soldiers possess, enhanced responsibility and commitment feelings start with caring and competent leaders who create a thriving environment for soldiers in different military operations. **MR**

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Treat Prisoners Humanely

**Colonel Walter R. Schumm, US Army Reserve;
Lieutenant Colonel Bobbie B. Polk, US Army Reserve;
Major John Bryan, US Army Reserve;
Captain Frank Fornatore, US Army Reserve; and
Captain Jennifer Curry, US Army Reserve**

For over 220 years, our nation's founding principles have extolled the value of human life, and they form the basis for humane treatment of enemy prisoners of war. National ideals demand it, international law requires it, and fair treatment of prisoners tends to be reciprocated by most enemies. Because the U.S. Army's honor and reputation depend on firm but humane EPW treatment, we must uphold the highest standards of conduct.

"You've got to be kidding!"*

THREE ARE FEW AREAS in military operations where military personnel are more uninformed than in prisoner of war (POW) operations. Especially unsettling is the fact that enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations are important in operations other than war or in major theater wars, such as the Persian Gulf War. Between 1991 and 1993, in the low-intensity conflict in Bosnia, there were as many as 100 EPW camps. Many were operating in serious violation of the Geneva Conventions and international law prior to UN and NATO intervention.¹ During the Gulf War, US forces captured nearly 70,000 prisoners within a few days, a mass surrender that nearly overwhelmed our ability to properly care for so many EPWs. We had a similar experience at the end of World War II, when we held 170,000 German prisoners in camps designed for 30,000 prisoners.

*The use of a common phrase of derision, "You've got to be kidding," to denote the lack of knowledge or comprehension of a particular situation. In the context of war, it refers to the lack of knowledge or comprehension of the Geneva Conventions and Army Regulation 100-20, "Treatment of Prisoners of War—Administration, Employment, and Compensation."

believe the following information illustrates the contemporary importance of EPW operations:

International Law—The United States agreed to abide by the 1949 Geneva Conventions in the treatment of POWs and civilian internees; failure to comply with those accords would jeopardize our international reputation.³

Protecting Power—The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) often supervises EPW treatment and, though officially neutral, provides positive world public opinion for those nations that comply with its tough enforcement of Geneva Conventions standards.⁴

Pragmatic Military Viewpoint—Those who treat their prisoners well usually find that the enemy treats their own captured personnel relatively well. While the treatment of German POWs was condemned as "inhumane" during World War II, it facilitated the German capture of thousands of American and other POWs.

During the Korean War, the US side

condemned the Chinese treatment of

US POWs, while the Chinese condemned

the US treatment of their own POWs.

Those who treat their prisoners well usually find that the enemy treats their own captured personnel relatively well. While our treatment of German POWs was condemned as "too soft" during World War II, it influenced the Germans to treat our prisoners better than those of other Allied nations. The early release of the few US service personnel Saddam Hussein's forces captured . . . was tied to our humane treatment of his captured personnel.

Intelligence Collection—More reliable information is obtained with friendliness than with mistreatment. Mistreatment tends to cause EPWs to tell “what they think you want to hear”—regardless of its accuracy. Hanns Scharff, the “Luftwaffe’s master interrogator,” had successful results using kind treatment of US POWs during World War II.⁶ In the Gulf War, EPWs thought to have high-intelligence value were interrogated while at our EPW camps and, in some cases, were escorted to Riyadh for further interviews, providing the coalition with valuable intelligence.⁷

Labor Services—EPWs have provided labor services to the United States; for example, German POWs in World War II did a great deal of useful agricultural work.⁸ The magnitude of the labor available is suggested by the establishment of 666 EPW camps in the United States and 21 camps in Canada by the end of World War II.⁹

Peace Negotiations—Disagreements over the resolution of EPW issues can be a major barrier in peace negotiations and a factor that prolongs war and increases casualties for both sides in a conflict. We incurred 37,000 US casualties at the end of the Korean War as the two sides argued solely over the prisoner repatriation issue.¹⁰

Safety—EPW operations can be dangerous. During the Koje-Do uprisings in the Korean War, some US soldiers were killed and many more wounded. At the same time, Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd was captured temporarily by the communist EPWs before Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner restored control in June 1952.¹¹ When Boatner regained control of the EPW camp, his soldiers found 3,000 spears, 1,500 knives, 1,000 gasoline grenades and numerous other weapons—clubs, hatchets, hammers and barbed wire flails—that the communists had planned to use in a mass breakout the week after our troops moved in to restore order.¹²

EPW and Detainee Program—The Secretary of the Army is the Department of Defense (DOD) executive agent for the EPW and Detainee Program.

The Secretary of the Army plans, develops the policy and coordinates the program’s operation.¹³ The responsibility for EPW operations falls squarely on the US Army rather than the Navy, the Marine Corps or the Air Force.

Force Multiplier—If enemy soldiers are aware that capture means humane treatment, they are often more likely to surrender than to fight to the death—fearful of the consequences of being captured alive.

Moral High Ground—For over 220 years, our nation’s founding principles have highlighted the value of human life and are the basis for humane treatment of EPWs. When we live up to our own constitutional principles, we retain the “moral high ground,” extending conduct of war applications with an intent of marketing our nation’s ideals to EPWs who will eventually be repatriated back into their own country. Some EPWs may become reeducated with our ideals or may choose to become US citizens, as happened with many World War II German POWs.¹⁴ Notwithstanding our humane treatment, a few Germans did try to escape from POW camps in the United States.¹⁵

US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, *The Army*, has recently highlighted the importance, especially in peacekeeping, of maintaining the moral high ground in Army operations. It goes without saying that failure to abide by international law can result in severe punishments, including capital punishment.¹⁶ Without proper training, it would be very easy for our combat and combat support units to violate portions of the Geneva Conventions and damage the honor of the United States. This article discusses the key aspects of taking and evacuating POWs from the combat zone and highlights the rules that govern EPW operations.

Taking Prisoners

The most dangerous moment for soldiers and prospective EPWs alike is the moment of capture. The soldier cannot be sure that the surrender attempt is not a ruse or that the EPW might change his mind suddenly and try to take up arms again. Likewise, the EPW cannot be sure that his prospective captors will accept his surrender and then treat him humanely. The situation is fraught with potential misunderstanding and the chance for deliberate deception. For example, shortly after D-Day in June 1944, a document cites that: “Near the top of the Vierville bluff, Ranger Private First Class Carl Weast and company commander Captain George Whittington spotted a machinegun nest manned by three Germans. As Weast and the captain circled it cautiously, one of the Germans suddenly turned, saw the two Americans and yelled, ‘Bitte! Bitte!’

A North Vietnamese soldier is eyed warily as he walks through the sweep line after surrendering.

US Marine Corps



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Bitte!" Whittington fired, killing all three. Turning to Weast he said, "I wonder what *bitte* means."¹⁷

Nevertheless, capturing troops are "responsible to safeguard, silence, tag and evacuate their prisoners to the nearest EPW collecting point, where they are turned over to military police (MP) personnel."¹⁸ During the Gulf War, it was not surprising that "The few incidents of rough treatment of Iraqi prisoners occurred in the combat units, although mostly the treatment was correct."¹⁹ Nevertheless, combat stress and even provocations are no excuse for mistreating EPWs.²⁰ EPWs may not be abused, even to obtain combat intelligence or to get information—such as name, rank or unit. EPWs may not be used to try to render points or areas less vulnerable to attack.²¹ EPWs should be instructed on what to do in case of attack, including nuclear, biological and chemical attacks. EPWs should be provided food, potable water and appropriate shelter and clothing. FM 19-40, *Enemy Prisoners of War; Civilian Internees and Detained Persons*, provides a copy of an EPW treatment card for combat soldiers on proper EPW treatment.²²

Processing Prisoners

When processing EPWs, the following actions should be completed:

- EPWs will be searched for military documents, weapons or special equipment.

- EPWs will be silenced to minimize control problems.
- EPWs will be segregated by rank, gender and nationality to minimize control problems.
- They must also be safeguarded from harm by our own soldiers or the civilian populace, as well as to prevent escape.
- EPWs will be speedily evacuated from the combat zone.
- If possible, orders and instructions are to be given in a language that EPWs understand, as this expedites control and safety of all concerned, including US personnel.²³

FM 19-4, *Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security and Enemy Prisoner of War Operations*, and AR 190-8 provide DA Form 5976 and a Capture Tag, which is used to help form an audit trail for EPW items that are confiscated or that will accompany the EPW.²⁴ The Capture Tag comes in three parts: Part A remains with the EPW; Part B remains with the capturing unit; and Part C attaches to EPW equipment and other items.

AR 190-8, FM 19-40 and FM 19-4 discuss many fine points regarding EPWs. The bottom line: persons captured, interned or otherwise held in US Army custody during the conflict will be given humanitarian care and treatment from the moment of custody until final release or repatriation.²⁵ US personnel capturing troops, performing custodial duties

Inprocessing Iraqi prisoners of war during Operation Desert Storm.

US Army



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The bottom line: persons captured, interned or otherwise held in US Army custody during the conflict will be given humanitarian care and treatment from the moment of custody until final release or repatriation. US personnel capturing troops, performing custodial duties or serving in other capacities will observe this policy which protects all detained persons whether they are EPWs, known or suspected of having committed serious offenses that could be characterized as war crimes or in any other category.

or serving in other capacities will observe this policy which protects all detained persons whether they are EPWs, known or suspected of having committed serious offenses that could be characterized as war crimes or in any other category.

EPWs will be allowed to retain clothing, mess equipment—except knives and forks—badges of rank and nationality, decorations, identification cards or tags, religious literature or other articles of a sentimental or personal value that are not a security threat. Occasionally, overzealous US soldiers have been guilty of collecting “war trophies.” However, EPWs should not be stripped of military items—uniforms, buttons, insignia, helmets, gas masks, watches—for the sake of providing souvenirs for our own units or unit members.²⁶

Moving Prisoners to Initial and Division Collection Points

Seriously wounded EPWs are evacuated through medical channels. If possible, their identity will be

established before evacuation and reported, but medical attention will not be delayed to establish identity. Otherwise, EPWs are moved to initial collection points, usually forward division collection points sited near brigade trains, where they may be secured, interrogated and assessed for their condition, including treatment of minor wounds. At collection points, tactical necessity may mean that EPWs are confined only by strung concertina wire or engineer tape, which clearly marks off their area but is capable of easy displacement. EPWs may be required to dig their own protective shelters or foxholes. Evacuation speed means less logistics, better EPW care and more rapid nontactical intelligence collection by trained interrogators at EPW camps.

If possible, EPWs should be fed using captured supplies since they may object initially to unfamiliar US foodstuffs. Offering some foods, such as pork products, may be interpreted by some EPWs as an insult and lead to control problems. Further details on establishing and operating forward EPW collec-

tion points are discussed in FM 19-4. Depending on the tactical plan, division MPs may operate the forward EPW collection points and provide escort guard services.

Usually the division MP company personnel take charge of EPWs, escorting them from forward division collection points at brigade supply trains to a central division EPW collection point. While ground attack forces are trained to apply force to obtain objectives, MPs are trained to attain objectives through proper *restraint* of force. It may be difficult for combat forces to remain objective about enemy soldiers who were intent on killing them only hours before.²⁷ Recently, FM 100-1 lauded MPs for their uncommon maturity and professionalism as they resisted attempts in 1988 by General Manuel Noriega's Panamanian Defense Force to instigate overreactions that would have become useful anti-US propaganda and "conceded Noriega the moral high ground, with significant ramifications for US foreign policy throughout the Americas."²⁸ Taking care of POWs while properly securing them and protecting oneself is a challenging balancing act that well fits the MPs' job description. It takes great professional skill to transport EPWs who are trying to escape. "Halt!" must be yelled at least three times before escapees are fired upon and if fired upon, the intent should be to disable, if possible, rather than to kill.²⁹

"The basic rule for moving EPWs is that the losing organization provides the transportation while the receiving organization provides the security."³⁰ However, to ensure rapid EPW evacuation, receiving organizations may provide transportation as well as security escort from the combat zone. To the maximum extent possible, "backhaul" transportation uses vehicles that would otherwise be empty, as they return to the rear to pick up more supplies for the forward units. There are several reasons behind that goal:

- Removal from the combat zone provides greater protection and safety for EPWs.
- It is easier to provide the requisite EPW logistic support in rear areas, minimizing the logistic burden on combat units.
- It maintains the intelligence "freshness" obtained from selected EPWs through rapid interrogation at theater-level EPW camps.
- Evacuation of EPWs lessens interference with the rapid movements of combat units maneuvering on the battlefield.

The division central EPW collection point has more permanent structures than the forward collection points. It should be located near a main supply route (MSR), but not so close that an EPW breakout would immediately force MSR closure. It may contain tentage and larger shelters—pits or bunkers—

Groups of EPWs under guard by 82d Airborne Division MPs in southeastern Iraq, February 1991.



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against air attack. EPWs may be segregated into separate areas within the collection point enclosure. FM 19-40 provides a diagram of a typical division central collection point layout, and FM 19-4 provides further details on its operation.³¹ Notably, the division's preventive medicine section may be needed to support the central collection point, ensuring necessary preventive medicine countermeasures are employed to safeguard the health of EPWs and US soldiers.

Moving EPWs to Corps Holding Areas

Corps MPs provide escort from the division central collection point to the rear. The number of escort guards required depends on the morale, physical condition, number of EPWs, mode of transport, terrain and risk of enemy attack. Typically, there are at least

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two MPs per truck, two per aircraft, three guards per rail box car and six guards per passenger car.³² Foot marches require 40 guards per 320 to 480 EPWs in close column formation. EPW evacuation by foot is discouraged because of its slowness and vulnerability to weather and attack. Additionally, guards must be placed at the front, rear and sides of the EPW close column formations. Historically, EPW foot marches have not been successful. The 1942 Bataan "Death March" is a classic example of a badly conducted EPW foot march, one in which "the Japanese forced some 78,000 captives, many ill or wounded, to march more than 65 miles north from Bataan to Camp O'Donnell. About 650 Americans and between 5,000 and 10,000 Filipinos died during the march."³³

Upon arrival, the escort guard commander is given a receipt for both the EPWs and accompanying documents or materials. Processing EPWs at the corps holding areas is more detailed and may occur around the clock.³⁴ EPWs will be searched again, a closer examination of their documents will be made and selected EPWs may be interrogated for longer periods. If possible, EPWs will be deloused, showered and segregated if suspected of having a communicable disease. Food and water will be issued. Nevertheless, EPWs will still be evacuated as rapidly as possible from the corps holding area. The corps should have plans prepared to implement expanding the holding area and increasing logistic support in case of mass captures. Normally, an MP platoon can operate a holding area for 500 EPWs, while an MP company can handle 2,000 EPWs.

Moving Prisoners to Theater EPW Camps

Strict accountability for EPWs must be established in the corps area, even if it has not occurred previously due to combat exigencies. EPW transportation is usually by motor vehicle or possibly rail. Transportation should allow for rest halts, unless combat exigencies and EPW safety do not allow. The receiving facilities should be notified in

advance because of potential increased demand for clean clothing and laundry operations. During the Gulf War, rest stops were not provided for Iraqi EPWs en route to theater EPW camps due to the speed of evacuation. Consequently the EPWs, transported standing up in stake and platform-type trailers with sides, arrived with soiled clothing. In addition to transportation, logistic support for EPWs assumes a large role in the corps rear and theater areas and requires huge volumes of rations, water, clothing, blankets, tentage, concertina wire, lumber and other supplies. Unfortunately, requirements for EPW support are often given very low priority until the situation becomes critical.³⁵

Now designated as battalion internment facilities (BIFs), MP EPW battalions can accommodate up to 4,000 EPWs compared to the 12,000 accommodated by former EPW camps. The location of BIFs is a critical decision, since poor locations may require moving large numbers of EPWs and rebuilding at better sites, possibly at a time when resources are scarce. While locating BIFs in the middle of nowhere may enhance security, consideration must also be given to the feasibility of obtaining large amounts of water, supplies, medical support, construction materials, food, fuel and electricity.³⁶ Further, the area should be suitable for handling large amounts of waste products to be generated if burning is not feasible and should not pose a health hazard from mosquitoes or rodents—for example, near swamps. Collocating BIFs in order to scale down—similar to achievements of previous EPW camps—may occur in future conflicts. Guidelines for camp construction are discussed in FMs 19-40 and 19-4.³⁷ A BIF will normally contain eight compounds of 500 EPWs each to allow for segregation and ease of control. During the Korean War, it was found that larger compounds became more difficult to manage properly.³⁸

BIFs will in-process EPWs and maintain complete and accurate accountability through fingerprinting, photographing and placing identification bands on prisoner's wrists. Additionally, BIFs will screen for medical needs, physical security, ethnic background and any special skills—medical, cook or language—that might be of use in the BIF's operations.

Assessments should be made of EPW cultural and religious beliefs. While some EPWs may accept surrender and captivity, others may view it as dishonorable. In August 1944, 1,000 Japanese EPWs rushed the fence of an Australian camp at Cowra, shouting "Banzai!" More than 300 broke through the wire and escaped temporarily while 231 were killed and 107 wounded, preferring to die rather than to live as disgraced prisoners.³⁹



Groups of communist prisoners drill with tent poles to simulate rifles, Koje-Do, Korea, 30 May 1952. Within days after this photo was taken, the prisoners temporarily took over a half-dozen compounds during a bloody revolt.

A battalion internment facility will normally contain eight compounds of 500 EPWs each to allow for segregation and ease of control. During the Korean War, it was found that larger compounds became more difficult to manage properly.

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EPWs will be briefed on camp rules, requirements and standing orders during inprocessing. Inadvertent delays in inprocessing may be good occasions for reinforcing camp rules.⁴⁰ Loudspeakers might be used to replay camp rules to waiting prisoners. EPWs will be given haircuts, showers with lindane soap, personal sanitary items, mess equipment and new clothing, as needed.⁴¹ Massive influxes of EPWs may necessitate abbreviated inprocessing procedures.⁴² EPWs will be segregated by rank, gender and ethnic background—possibly by ideology or whether they resisted capture—to minimize unsafe conflicts between EPWs within their compounds and to make escape planning more difficult.

Normally, EPWs will cook their own meals, using equipment hand-received at the beginning and end of each day. It is assumed that EPWs will cook more to their own tastes than US personnel could, making

the most efficient use of raw food products and reducing waste and garbage. EPW labor will be used to manage camp sanitation, a critical area that can lead to diseases in epidemic proportions if overlooked. AR 190-8 discusses contracting out EPW labor in nearby communities under escort and supervision from work project teams that are organic to the BIF.⁴³ EPWs will receive compensation for authorized work from US Army appropriated funds, canteen funds or camp EPW funds.⁴⁴ Each BIF has a limited capability to quell minor disturbances in compounds, but larger disturbances will require intervention by MP guard companies assigned to provide perimeter security and larger reaction-force capability. While BIFs are authorized a limited number of medical personnel to assist with EPW health care, medically trained EPWs will be used to augment medical services available to EPWs.



Captured North Korean and Chinese soldiers who refused repatriation, Koje-Do, Korea, 25 June 1952.

Repatriation can become complicated if enemy soldiers, fearing retribution if they are returned to their homeland, attempt to refuse repatriation. No EPW will be repatriated against his or her will. During the Korean War, the United States suffered 37,000 casualties while the two sides argued over whether all EPWs or only volunteer EPWs would be required to repatriate.

Some rules from the Geneva Conventions concerning camp operations that are reiterated in AR 190-8 include:⁴⁵

- Copies of the Geneva Conventions will be posted in camps in the EPWs' own language, as well as the languages used by camp personnel.
- An EPW safety program will be established.
- Procedures for filing complaints confidentially will be established. EPWs may not be punished for making complaints, even if the complaints prove to be unfounded.
- EPWs will be protected from reprisals by other prisoners. AR 190-8 details a required camp poster that advises EPWs what to do if they feel endangered by other EPWs. Lax procedures that allow for a pattern of such reprisals may implicate camp commanders, making them indirectly to blame for EPW mistreatment, even when due more directly to hostile fellow prisoners.⁴⁶
- The Protecting Power—ICRC—will be allowed to visit and interview EPWs regarding their treatment and conditions.
- Allowances will be made for female and elderly prisoners with respect to hygiene and other physical

needs. Females will be provided separate but equal conveniences. Latrines will be available day and night for all EPWs.

- Only EPW facilities will be marked "PW," ensuring they can be clearly seen from the air during daylight. Depending on the theater plan, EPW facilities may also illuminate the "PW" markings at night. FMs 19-40 and 19-4 recommend lighting all exterior fencing at night, as well as strategic interior points to enhance security.⁴⁷ BIF locations will be forwarded to the ICRC and to enemy nations to reduce the chances of unintentional attacks on EPW facilities.
- Strict accountability will be maintained on all EPWs through the POW Information System, a computerized system linked to the POW Information Center in Washington, D.C.
- EPWs will receive a monthly medical examination, which may be used to verify fitness for work. Medical care will be provided free of charge. EPWs will be vaccinated as needed. Experimental medical research will not be conducted on EPWs, even on a voluntary basis. Injured or sick EPWs will be accorded the same medical treatment and medical

housing as US personnel but will not be housed in the same wards as US personnel. EPWs may volunteer to donate blood. Sanitary regulations will be posted in the EPWs' own language and explained to incoming EPWs.

- EPWs will be compensated at US government expense for personal property that is lost while in US custody.

- Money taken from EPWs will be accounted for in accordance with AR 37-1, *Army Accounting and Fund Control*.⁴⁸

- Officer EPWs will be provided quarters and facilities equal to their grade of rank, separate from enlisted EPWs.

- Subject to approval by the BIF commander, EPWs in enlisted-only camps will elect EPW representatives every six months by secret ballot. In officer or mixed camps, the senior officer will normally serve as the prisoner representative. EPW advisers may be chosen in officer camps or elected in mixed camps to assist the prisoner representative. EPW representatives may also appoint their own assistants, subject to approval by the BIF commander. EPW representatives may not exercise disciplinary actions over EPWs but will be granted free access to postal and telegraph communications to communicate with US Army authorities, the ICRC and other agencies authorized to assist EPWs.

- To protect EPWs from public curiosity, news media will not be allowed to photograph or interview any EPW, though exceptions may be approved by the Army Chief of Public Affairs.

- EPWs will be allowed to send, without charge, two letters and four postcards monthly and may receive an unlimited amount of letters and postcards.⁴⁹ However, EPWs are not allowed to mail packages, make telephone calls or send or receive maps, though they may send one telegram of 15 English words or less at their own expense if they have not received any mail for the previous three months.

- Disciplinary powers will not be delegated to or exercised by EPWs.

- US officers are required to return the salutes of EPWs, but US personnel are not required to salute EPWs, regardless of their rank. EPWs are not allowed to retain separate flags or pictures of their national leaders—though these are allowed as part of magazines, if not removed.

- EPWs will be trained on the meaning of the word "Halt." EPWs will not be fired upon during an escape attempt unless ordered to halt three times and unless they have cleared the outer fence. Neither physical nor imaginary "dead" lines will be used along camp fences. EPWs will be trained to respond properly to fire and air raid drills. Daily formations

EPW evacuation by foot is discouraged because of its slowness and vulnerability to weather and attack. Additionally, guards must be placed at the front, rear and sides of the EPW close column formations. Historically, EPW foot marches have not been successful. The Bataan "Death March" is a classic example of a badly conducted EPW foot march. . . . About 650 Americans and between 5,000 and 10,000 Filipinos died.

and routines—reveille, morning roll call, inspection of quarters, time for recreational activities, sick call, mess call, evening roll call and lights out—will convey an atmosphere of reassuring predictability and military discipline. Measures used to prevent escapes and to deal with riots are discussed in detail in FMs 19-40 and 19-4.⁵⁰

- When EPWs are transferred within theater or the Continental United States, they are authorized 55 pounds of luggage, officers are allowed 105 pounds of luggage and EPW chaplains are allowed an additional 110 pounds for religious articles.

- There are strict limitations on the type of work projects that EPWs may perform. Dangerous work, work that would be considered humiliating to US soldiers and work that is directly related to military operations are forbidden. In addition, EPWs are not allowed to work as personal servants to US service personnel, as officer mess bartenders, inside state prison walls or near convicts. EPWs are not allowed to work more than 10 hours a day outside the camp or to be allowed outside the camp for more than 12 hours a day. EPWs will be allowed a 1-hour lunch break each day.

Repatriation

Repatriation can become complicated if enemy soldiers, fearing retribution if they are returned to their homeland, attempt to refuse repatriation. No EPW will be repatriated against his or her will. During the Korean War, the United States suffered 37,000 casualties while the two sides argued over whether all EPWs or only volunteer EPWs would be required to repatriate.

Because Americans have been held as POWs in virtually every conflict since the American Revolution, including the Civil War, World War I, the Spanish Civil War, World War II, Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf War, we must uphold the highest standards of EPW treatment.⁵¹ Why? Our national ideals demand it, international law requires it and fair treatment of prisoners tends to be reciprocated by

We must uphold the highest standards of EPW treatment. Why? Our national ideals demand it, international law requires it and fair treatment of prisoners tends to be reciprocated by most enemies. Many units will have a role to play in ensuring correct treatment of EPWs, though MP, medical and combat units will most frequently deal with them.

most enemies. Many units will have a role to play in ensuring correct treatment of EPWs, though MP, medical and combat units will most frequently deal with them.

We cannot rest on our laurels simply because our forces have had an excellent track record in the treatment of EPWs in previous conflicts. It only takes one improperly trained or motivated soldier among a thousand to commit an offense against the Geneva Conventions that would cause our nation considerable embarrassment. Every day new soldiers are joining the Army without prior Geneva Conventions experience. Most US EPW MPs are Reserve Component units and must achieve the detailed, high standards the Geneva Conventions require with fewer than 50 days of training per year. Rigorous training in treatment of EPWs must continue in both the Active and Reserve Components. The honor and reputation of the US Army depend on firm and humane EPW treatment. We must not fail in this duty.⁵² **MR**

NOTES

1. LTC Walter R. Schumm, *Summary of EPW Activity in the Yugoslavian Conflict, The First Three Years: 1991—1993* (Omaha, NE: 530th Military Police [MP] Battalion [Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW)], 1994). Part of the recent peace process involved repatriation of prisoners from the various parties.

2. MAJ Donald V. Korte, COL Walter R. Schumm, CPT Robert W. Mayberry, SFC Matthew L. Tilford and 1LT Miriam C. Duckett, "Environmental Health Issues in Prisoner of War Camps," *Military Medicine* (1995), 160, 483–86; John R. Brinkerhoff, Ted Silva and John Seitz, *United States Army Reserve in Operation Desert Storm—Enemy Prisoner of War Operations: The 800th Military Police Brigade* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 12 June 1992); Ebbe C. Hoff, ed., *Preventive Medicine in World War II* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 1955).

3. Ian Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963); Richard I. Miller, ed., *The Law of War* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington Books, 1975); Jean Pictet, *Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985); Geza Herczegh, *Development of International Humanitarian Law* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984); US Army Field Manual (FM) 19–40, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internes and Detained Persons* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army [DA], 27 February 1976), 1–5. What we refer to as the Geneva Conventions, which were ratified and came into force for the United States in February 1956, are actually a collection of four documents that pertain to EPWs, civilians, the sick and wounded on land; and the sick, wounded or shipwrecked at sea. The exact conventions are available in many sources, including Leon Friedman, ed., *The Law of War: A Documentary History*, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1972); Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, ed., *The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents* (Leiden, Netherlands: A.W. Sijhoff, 1973). The 1977 Geneva Protocols I and II to the 1949 Conventions are contained, along with the 1949 Geneva Conventions in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, ed., *Documents on the Laws of War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); Edward K. Kwakwa, *The International Law of Armed Conflict: Personal and Material Fields of Application* (Boston: Kluwer, 1992).

4. Brinkerhoff, Silva and Seitz, 67; Kwakwa. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is not simply a wartime agency; during the peacetime EPW Exercise GOLD SWORD in the summer of 1993, ICRC officials visited most EPW units and observed the training. It was helpful that the 439th MP Detachment had a French linguist then assigned as a clerk, SPC Kallie Retzlaff, who discussed unit operations in the ICRC representative's native language.

5. Brinkerhoff, Silva and Seitz, 67.

6. Raymond F. Toliver, *The Interrogator: The Story of Hanns Scharff, Luftwaffe's Master Interrogator* (Hollywood, CA: AERO Publishers, 1978).

7. Brinkerhoff, Silva and Seitz, 55–56.

8. George G. Lewis and John Mewha, *History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776–1945* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History [CMH], 1988).

9. Ronald H. Bailey, *Prisoners of War* (Alexandria: Time-Life Books, 1982).

10. William Roskey, "Korea's Costliest Battle: The POW Impasse," *Parameters* (Summer 1993), 101.

11. W.L. White, *The Captives of Korea* (New York: Scribners, 1957); Walter R. Schumm, Kun Kildare, Fred Wiebelhaus and Joseph Kjosa, "Lessons from History: The EPW Situation in Korea," *Military Police* (Winter 1995), 48–51.

12. W.G. Hermes, *U.S. Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington, DC: CMH, 1966), 259.

13. Army Regulation (AR) 190–8, *Enemy Prisoners of War—Administration, Employment and Compensation* (Washington, DC: DA, December 1985, reprint January 1991), 1–3.

14. Walter K. Schroder, *Defenses of Narragansett Bay in World War II* (Providence, RI: Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation, 1980). Fort Getty, Conanicut Island, Rhode Island, was used to instruct German prisoners of war (POWs) at the end of World War II in the principles of democracy. However, the program was eventually closed because of public criticism that it was too "soft" on the enemy. Arnold Kramer, *Nazi Prisoners of War in America* (New York: Stein and Day, 1979); Judith M. Gansberg, *Stalag U.S.A.: The Remarkable Story of German POWs in America* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1977); Penny Clark, *Farm Work and Friendship: The German Prisoner of War Camp at Lake Wabaunsee* (Emporia, KS: Emporia State

University, 1988).

15. Reinhold Pabel, *Enemies Are Human* (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Company, 1955); Georg Gaertner with Arnold Kramer, *Hitler's Last Soldier in America* (New York: Stein and Day, 1985); John Hammond Moore, *The Faustball Tunnel: German POWs in America and Their Great Escape* (New York: Random House, 1978).

16. Leon Friedman, *The Law of War: A Documentary History*, vol. II (New York: Random House, 1972); Donald A. Wells, *War Crimes and Laws of War*, 2d ed. (New York: University Press of America, 1990).

17. Cornelius Ryan, *The Longest Day: June 6, 1944* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), 290–91. Of course, *bitte* means "please" (don't shoot). As noted, the moment of attempted surrender is inherently dangerous to both sides.

18. Brinkerhoff, Silva and Seitz, 10.

19. Ibid., 68.

20. AR 190–8, 1–5.

21. Hugh V. Clarke, *Last Stop Nagasaki* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984). Some Allied prisoners became casualties when Nagasaki was hit with the atomic bomb.

22. FM 19–40, 1–6, 1–7.

23. At the end of World War II, five Germans were convicted of not doing enough to protect three British aviators who were killed by a civilian mob after being shot down over Germany; two were hanged, one got life imprisonment and the others five and ten years of imprisonment. Friedman, 1482–86. It is not unlikely that some EPWs may understand English and could be used as hasty interpreters.

24. FM 19–4, *Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security and Enemy Prisoner of War Operations* (Washington, DC: DA, 7 May 1994).

25. AR 190–8; FM 19–40; and FM 19–4.

26. German noncommissioned officer SGT Pabel, wounded and captured in 1943 in Italy by US Army soldiers, remembered his capture, "At the collecting station I got my first bitter taste of being a prisoner. As soon as the stretcher had been placed on the floor, a bunch of souvenir hunters ripped some of my decorations off my blouse." Also cited in Bailey, 13.

27. Brinkerhoff, Silva and Seitz, 68.

28. FM 100–1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 1994), 33–34.

29. FM 19–4, 83.

30. Brinkerhoff, Silva and Seitz, 10.

31. FM 19–40; 80; FM 19–4.

32. EPWs must wear seat belts while in flight but may not be handcuffed to the aircraft. Locks should be removed from latrines. Pistols for guards may be equipped with rubber or plastic stun bullets and shotguns with half-loads may be substituted for rifles, so that the use of weapons will not endanger the airworthiness of the aircraft.

33. Ralph E. Hibbs, *Tell MacArthur to Wait* (New York: Carlton Press, 1988); Stanley L. Falk, *Bataan: The March of Death* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962); John S. Coleman Jr., *Bataan and Beyond: Memories of an American POW* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1978); Donald Knox, *Death March: The Survivors of Bataan* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1981); Bailey, 14.

34. FM 19–4, 77–80.

35. LTG William G. Pagonis, *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Logistics and Leadership from the Gulf War* (Boston: The Harvard University Business School Press, 1992), 151–53.

36. There is always the possibility of enemy rescue attempts. The 11th Airborne Division raided and captured a Japanese POW camp on 23 February 1945 and liberated over 2,000 Allied prisoners as described by LTG Edward M. Flanagan Jr., *The Los Banos Raid: The 11th Airborne Jumps at Dawn* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986); Anthony Arthur, *Deliverance at Los Banos* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1985).

37. FM 19–40, 3–4; FM 19–4, 122–25.

38. T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: Korea—A Study in Unpreparedness* (New York: Pocket Books, 1964), 634.

39. Bailey, 15. Some Japanese prisoners—those too ill to take part in the attack—committed suicide in their barracks beforehand. One attacker consented to the suicide plan, saying "It is a chance to die." Charlotte Carr-Gregg, *Japanese Prisoners of War in Revolt: The Outbreaks at Featherston and Cowra During World War II* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978).

PRISONERS

40. FM 19-4, 129.
41. Spraying EPWs with lindane dust or DDT is no longer considered safe.
42. FM 19-4, 117-20.
43. AR 190-8, chap. 4.
44. Compensating or paying EPWs may seem strange. However, prisoners can either be given the necessities of life on a free issue basis—as done during the Persian Gulf War—or they can earn the money to buy them. Paying prisoners increases control over them inasmuch as you have an additional item to take away if needed to establish discipline. Since some prisoners will, as allowed by the Geneva Conventions, send some of their money home, violating disciplinary rules may mean depriving their families of income, a situation many prisoners strive to avoid.
45. This is not an inclusive list.
46. Wilma Parnell, *The Killing of Corporal Kunze* (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1981). After a German corporal was killed at an American POW camp by his fellow prisoners who thought him too cooperative with the Americans, five German POWs were eventually convicted and hanged on 10 July 1945 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Douglas Valentine, *The Hotel Tacloban* (New York: Avon Books, 1984). At one Japanese POW camp, Australian soldiers became irate over the beheading of four of their comrades in an execution that appeared to have been approved by a British major also in the same camp; the major was murdered. Article 121 of the Geneva Conventions requires that prisoner deaths be investigated and that parties who are found responsible be subject to appropriate punishment.
47. FM 19-40, 3-4; FM 19-4, 127.
48. AR 37-1, *Army Accounting and Fund Control* (Washington, DC: DA, 30 April 1991).
49. It is of interest that the postcard was invented to service EPWs in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.
50. FM 19-40, 3-20; FM 19-4, 131-32.
51. Some good resources that assess POWs throughout history include MAJ Pat Reid and Maurice Michael, *Prisoner of War* (New York: Beaufort Books Publishers, 1984); Richard Garrett, *P.O.W.* (London: David & Charles, 1981); Robert C. Doyle, *Voices from Captivity: Interpreting the American POW Narrative* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994). For commentary on POWs before our prerevolutionary era, see Theodore Meron, *Henry's War and Shakespeare's Laws: Perspectives on the Law of War in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); M.H. Keen, *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965); Charles H. Metzger, *The Prisoner in the American Revolution* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1971); Larry G. Bowman, *Captive Americans: Prisoners During the American Revolution* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1976); John McElroy, *This Was Andersonville: The True Story of Andersonville Military Prison* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1957); Robert H. Kellogg, *Life and Death in Rebel Prisons* (Hartford, CT: L. Stebbins, 1865); Ovid L. Futch, *History of Andersonville Prison* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1968); Decimus E.U. Barziza, *The Adventures of a Prisoner of War, 1863-1864* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1984); William O. Bryant, *Cahaba Prison and the Sultana Disaster* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1990); William B. Hesseltine, *Civil War Prisons* (New York: F. Ungar, 1964); Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Peter Pastor, ed., *Essays on World War I Origins and Prisoners of War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Carl Geiser, *Prisoners of the Good Fight: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1986); David A. Foy, *For You the War Is Over: American Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany* (New York: Stein and Day, 1984); Arthur A. Durand, *Stalag Luft III: The Secret Story* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988); Charles B. Burdick, *An American Island in Hitler's Reich: The Bad Nauheim Internment* (Menlo Park, CA: MARKGRAF Publications Group, 1987); E. Bartlett Kern, *Surrender and Survival: The Experience of American POWs in the Pacific, 1941-1945* (New York: William Morrow, 1985); A.B. Feuer, ed., *Bilibid Diary: The Secret Notebooks of Commander Thomas Hayes, POW, the Philippines, 1942-1945* (Bethany, CT: Brevia Press, 1987); Alexander H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations Based on Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1946); Van Waterford, *Prisoners of the Japanese in World War II* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 1994); Robert S. LaForte, Ronald E. Marcello and Richard L. Himmel, ed., *With Only the Will to Live: Accounts of Americans in Japanese Prison Camps, 1941-1945* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1994); Eugene Kinkead, *Why They Collaborated* (New York: Longmans, 1959); William L. White, *The Captives of Korea: An Unofficial White Paper on the Treatment of War Prisoners* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957); James A. Mulligan, *The Hanoi Commitment* (Virginia Beach, VA: Teagle and Little, 1981); Jim and Sybil Stockdale, *In Love and War: The Story of a Family's Ordeal and Sacrifice During the Vietnam Years* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984); Malcolm McConnell, *Into the Mouth of the Cat: The Story of Lance Sijan, Hero of Vietnam* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985); Scott Blakey, *Prisoner at War: The Survival of Commander Richard A. Stratton* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978); Craig Howes, *Voices of the Vietnam POWs: Witnesses to Their Fight* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Jeremiah A. Denton Jr., *When Hell Was in Session* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell/Reader's Digest Press, 1976).
52. One reviewer of this article complained that it failed to reflect the proper emphasis on international multiculturalism and focused too much on Judeo-Christian ethics. The senior author's perspective is that much of the Geneva Conventions probably does reflect a humane, Western European (originally Judeo-Christian) view of how to deal with prisoners. Regardless of their origins or possible biases, we are obliged to comply with the Conventions, which do insist on respect for other religions and cultures.

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Almanac

Tales from *Twelve O'Clock High*: Leadership Lessons for the 21st Century

by Major Attila J. Bognar

The year is 1942. The place: Arbury Airfield, England. The American 918th Bomber Group has just returned from another mission against German targets in France. The 918th's performance continues to be dismal. The unit cannot put steel on target and is experiencing unusually high aircraft and crew losses. Bad weather and having to conduct daylight low-altitude bombing missions contribute to the group's poor performance. However, the 918th's weak demonstrations sharply contrast with the other three 8th Air Force bomber groups' general success. As a result, the 918th is suffering from significantly poor morale. More and more men are making excuses to miss duty.

Because of its difficulties, the 918th has the reputation of being the "hard luck" unit. Despite this, the 918th's men greatly respect their commander, Colonel Keith Davenport. Davenport is their friend and confidant; he can do no wrong. Davenport sees his unit's failures as resulting from impossible missions, dictated from higher headquarters, which he believes places inordinate demands on his men's abilities. Davenport believes higher headquarters has lost touch with reality, especially in understanding the tragedy of losing good men.

Concerned about the 918th's performance, 8th Air Force Commander General Pritchard personally visits Davenport. Accompanying Pritchard is Operations Officer Brigadier General Frank Savage. In a tense conversation, Davenport emotionally relates his concerns. Ultimately, Pritchard relieves Davenport, and Savage assumes command of the 918th.

So begins the classic World War II movie *Twelve O'Clock High*. Many viewers will at first find this film to be just another good vintage war movie. However, on examination, it becomes a superb treatise on understanding

the "charismatic leadership" paradigm, which will play an important role in the Army's future.

As the Army enters the 21st century, dramatic changes will occur in its force structure, organization, equipment and missions. Budgets will continue to shrink while deployments will become more frequent. With these changes, the need for superb, unwavering leadership will remain constant. By studying Savage's conduct and actions, Army leaders can thoroughly grasp the charismatic leader paradigm's basic concepts.

Charismatic Leadership

Charismatic leadership is perceptual in nature.¹ In *The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership*, A.R. Willner says charisma is not based on personality or context. "It is not what the leader is but what people see the leader as that counts in generating the charismatic relationship."² *Charisma*, then, might be attributional in nature. That is, followers might assign a leader charismatic qualities based on how they perceive his behavior.³ Essentially, the charismatic leader is dependent on perceived behaviors or attributes in order to remain in power.⁴ This aspect is particularly important since charismatic attributions are binary—either a follower perceives charismatic behaviors or he does not. Also, a charismatic leader to one follower may not be a charismatic leader to another.

Charisma, from Greek, means "gift from the gods." The German sociologist Max Weber used the word to describe a leader who could attain legitimacy, not through rules or traditions but by possessing qualities that endowed the leader with supernatural, superhuman or exceptional powers or qualities. Weber asserts that followers choose to accept the charismatic leader on the basis of his emotional appeal.⁵

Author R.J. House made one of the first attempts to demystify the charismatic leader by identifying specific traits and behaviors: self-confidence,



Second Place

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the need to influence others and a strong conviction in his beliefs. House

also determined a charismatic leader's followers exhibit implicit trust, obedience, affection and acceptance of the leader.⁶ Followers also held beliefs similar to the leader's and were highly involved in the organization's mission, believing they were essential to its success.⁷ Willner attributes the charismatic leader's success to his ability to create and foster an inspirational vision as well as to build confidence in followers through excellent rhetorical ability and a powerful aura.⁸

Researcher B.M. Bass revived charisma's mystical aspect by asserting that the charismatic leader views himself as having a special or supernatural purpose and that followers see the charismatic leader as larger than life.⁹ Bass also identifies charismatic leaders as possessing energy, self-confidence, self-determination, insight, eloquence, freedom from internal conflict, assertiveness, emotional expression, ambition and the ability to seize opportunities.¹⁰ Similarly, J.A. Conger and R.N. Kanungo say the charismatic leader is also exemplary, unconventional, radical, willing to take risks and often emerges at times of crisis or change.¹¹

The charismatic leader's most significant attribute is his ability to create a compelling vision that followers readily accept and share.¹² The vision acts as a focal point to energize followers to accept organizational changes and commit to new ideals.

Although a charismatic leader can inspire great commitment, sacrifice and energy, there is no guarantee his vision is worthwhile.¹³ In fact, some leadership scholars warn of charisma's "dark side," where unethical charismatic leaders, such as Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, use their visionary abilities for self-serving purposes with little regard for their followers' welfare.¹⁴

Charisma and Transformational Leadership

In 1987, J.M. Burns first described the concept of *transformational leadership* and further developed Weber's notion of the charismatic leader by postulating a leader able to change or transform his followers' actions and behaviors. In defining the transformational leader, Burns found it necessary to define the transactional leader.¹⁵

Transactional leadership relies on a series of exchanges or bargains between the leader and follower. The transactional leader primarily relies on the follower's compliance, which leads the follower to do what the organization expects of him. However, while the follower might comply with the leader in exchange for a reward, he might exhibit little commitment to the leader or organization. Unlike compliance, commitment is a process by which the follower does whatever it takes to better the organization, including personal sacrifice. As a result, a follower often does not share the transactional leader's beliefs, but rather, tolerates them, since the leader has the power to reward or punish.¹⁶

Many leadership scholars associate the transactional leader with the stereotypical manager, who dictates tasks to his followers and ensures they do such tasks correctly. Based on a follower's performance, the transactional leader administers rewards and penalties as well as provides discipline when necessary. Because of the managerial functions associated with the transactional leader, such a leader tends to maintain the status quo and is largely responsible for the bureaucratic aspects within an organization as he focuses on planning, budgeting, organizing and controlling. Conversely, transformational leadership is largely associated with the term "leader."¹⁷

Perhaps the greatest difference between the transactional and transformational leader—the manager and leader, respectively—is that "the manager does things right; the leader does the right thing."¹⁸ In this sense, transformational leadership is based on more than follower compliance; it includes shifts in the follower's beliefs and values. Followers internalize the transformational leader's end values, such as integrity and honor, and commit themselves to the leader and his vision.¹⁹ As a result, transformational leadership is built on follower commitment. Such a commit-

ment cascades from the highest to the lowest levels in an organization, inevitably affecting all aspects of an organization's culture.²⁰ Furthermore, in gaining follower commitment, the transformational leader focuses on long-term goals, inspires followers to share his vision, enacts change and empowers followers.²¹

Transformational and charismatic leaders have many attributes in common. They both seek to move followers from a self-serving to a selfless state and to move followers from a "what can the organization do for me" to a "what can I do for the organization" state of mind.

Transformational leadership consists of distinct factors, including charisma, intellectual stimulation, individualized consideration and inspirational motivation. Of these, charisma is probably the most important component. Bass identifies several key elements within the charisma dimension, including the creation of vision, a sense of mission, infectious pride and followers' trust and

respect.²² Charisma has consistently been found to positively affect job performance, satisfaction and commitment as well as leader effectiveness.²³ The figure lists a charismatic leader's key attributes.

A charismatic or transformational leader's followers experience increased self-confidence and pride, unequivocally identify with the leader and his vision—particularly with the values he instills. The followers' self-confidence is subsequently transformed into self-efficacy. This self-efficacy ultimately fosters higher levels of follower creativity, increasing productivity and success throughout the organization.²⁴

Still, it is important to note that the charismatic transformational leader also uses transactional methods in many day-to-day activities—but only as a means, never as an end. At all times, the charismatic leader's focus is on imbuing his followers with a value system that will allow them to perform at their highest levels for selfless purposes. Invariably, the charismatic leader

Charismatic Leader Attributes

- Demands high standards
- Is seen as superhuman
- Energizes followers
- Possesses great self-confidence and self-determination
- Establishes an overarching vision
- Has a deep sense of mission
- Has a need to influence others
- Nurtures pride
- Has a strong conviction in his own beliefs
- Exhibits exemplary conduct
- Is highly energetic
- Is unconventional and radical
- Is highly assertive
- Takes risks
- Is highly ambitious
- Maintains freedom from internal conflict
- Seizes opportunities
- Focuses on follower commitment
- Instills shared values
- Seeks to empower followers
- Is inspirational
- Is motivational
- Is eloquent
- Enacts change

achieves an influence over his or her followers that is truly transformational and surpasses the transactional style of leadership.²⁵

Charisma and Vision

Establishing a vision, looking toward some desired, idealized future state, is the key the charismatic leader uses to focus, draw in and gain his followers' commitment.²⁶ T.E. Dow describes vision as a "revolutionary image."²⁷ It acts not only as the catalyst for change, but also as the organization's bedrock, keeping it moving forward despite obstacles and challenges, transforming purpose into action.²⁸

A successful vision must attract commitment and inspire enthusiasm, create meaning by clarifying purpose and direction, establish a standard of excellence and bridge the present and future.²⁹ Simultaneously, a charismatic leader's vision must consider his followers' needs, values and hopes.³⁰ The vision must also instill self-confidence that will translate into a state of empowerment.³¹ Thus, the charismatic leader's most critical task is to consistently give attention to his vision, show its legitimacy and personify it by his actions.³²

Leadership Doctrine and the Charismatic Leader

Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, states that leadership is the most essential element of combat power.³³ The end state of effective leadership is when soldiers can execute the mission at hand based solely on the commander's intent. FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, defines leadership as "the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired result."³⁴ FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, defines leadership as the "process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction and motivation."³⁵ The charismatic leader concept is inextricably linked to these definitions, since this type leader ardently strives to create an organization committed to effectively realizing a shared vision.

As a whole, current Army leadership doctrine embodies the charismatic leader paradigm's most quintessential elements. For example, FM 100-5 succinctly describes charismatic leadership's most basic principles:

- Taking responsibility for decisions.
- Being loyal to subordinates.
- Inspiring and directing assigned forces and resources toward a purposeful end.
- Establishing a teamwork climate that engenders success.
- Demonstrating moral and physical courage in the face of adversity.
- Providing a vision that both focuses and anticipates the future course of events.³⁶

Like charismatic leaders, Army leaders must create environments in which followers will readily share their visions and commit themselves. As a result, Army leaders must continuously inculcate a sense of values in harmony with followers' needs and hopes. As such, Army leadership doctrine recognizes the importance of shared values between a leader and his followers, particularly in terms of followers understanding the commander's intent as stated in mission orders.

Any charismatic Army leader will inherently demand that his followers exhibit the individual soldier values of:

- Loyalty.
- Duty.
- Respect.
- Selfless service.
- Honor.
- Integrity.
- Personal courage.

Army leadership doctrine calls for leaders to act as standard bearers as well as guardians of the Army's professional ethic.³⁷ All of this value-rich philosophy in Army leadership doctrine is also the charismatic leader paradigm centerpiece.

Shared values build strong teams. The charismatic leader knows how to mold cohesive teams, showing innate trust in his subordinates and delegating decision making to the lowest level possible. Team building is a critical focus of Army leadership doctrine. For example, Army leadership principles call for leaders to develop a sense of responsibility in subordinates and to build the team. Army leadership competencies include teaching and counseling as well as soldier team development.³⁸

Army leadership doctrine also recognizes that team building happens only when the leader sets and enforces high standards in an environment where the soldier understands the task and is properly supervised. FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, states that

training builds self-confidence, promotes teamwork and esprit de corps and increases professionalism in soldiers, leaders and units, all of which are charismatic leader paradigm critical elements.³⁹ Thus, Army doctrine emphasizes the importance of creating technically competent followers.

Twelve O'Clock High Leadership Vignettes

After arriving at the 918th Bomber Group, Savage sees that discipline is extremely poor. The men exhibit little regard for military courtesy, are out of uniform and often drunk. Savage immediately reviews subordinate leaders' personnel files. Air Executive Officer Lieutenant Colonel Ben Gately has a strong file, but he is not at his place of duty. In fact, he is not even at the airfield. Savage orders the Military Police to arrest Gately.

When Gately is found, Savage condemns him for not pulling his share of the load and for being directly responsible for the prior commander's downfall. Savage relieves Gately as air executive officer but does not order his transfer. Instead, Savage declares, "I'm not going to pass the buck. . . I'm going to keep you right here."

Savage assigns Gately to a position as bomber commander and tells Gately to paint the name "Leper Colony" on his plane. Savage then reassigns all of the 918th's misfits and retreats to Gately's outfit.

Although Savage's actions may appear to be degrading, he is right on track. The charismatic leader is often unconventional, radical and assertive, generally acting as an agent of change. Savage demonstrates an uncanny insight or Clausewitzian "inner light." He realizes Gately can be a highly competent officer and pilot, but one who needs a wake-up call.

Savage's desire is for Gately to become self-actualized—to rise from a *selfish* to *selfless* state and be imbued with a strong professional ethic. Savage demonstrates a charismatic leader's transformational tendencies. By giving Gately a chance to redeem himself, Savage ultimately leads him to a profound state of empowerment. Gately eventually understands his actions directly affect the unit's ability to successfully accomplish its mission.

Savage's first air mission brief. As *Savage enters, there is a great deal of tension in the room. Despite this, he*

tells the men the 918th's reputation as the "hard luck unit" is going to stop. He orders a practice mission to troubleshoot for training weaknesses, focusing on flying and bombing fundamentals. Even though Savage recognizes the men's stress, he asserts there will be no rest until the unit's shortcomings are identified and corrected.

Savage also tells the unit its mission is to fight and to die if necessary. He emphasizes that the unit will be no place to "lick wounds." He offers a transfer to anyone with such self-serving attitudes.

In this scene, Savage exhibits a charismatic leader's radical, risk-taking nature. By offering a transfer to anyone who wants one, Savage is betting he can commit the men to his vision. In fact, this becomes the cornerstone of Savage's vision—that the 918th can become a high-performing, proud unit capable of conducting precision daylight bombing. A living vision is paramount to a charismatic leader's success and goes hand-in-hand with Savage's keen sense of mission.

Savage also seeks to energize the men to transform them into accepting a selfless state. He challenges them with high standards by enforcing a strong professional ethic, giving them a sense of purpose and direction. His emphasis on training is important; he knows competency leads to pride, and pride leads to top performance.

Savage innately believes he understands the unit's hopes and needs. He feels they hold the same values as he does—only they have forgotten. Savage knows shared values are critical to gaining his followers' commitment and loyalty.

Savage prescribes the cure. During interviews with the 918th's officers, Savage speaks with Flight Surgeon Captain Kaiser. Kaiser relates his candid assessment of the men's physical and mental conditions. He believes the men are sorely strained and that Savage's "shock treatment" is eroding the unit's already severely poor morale. Kaiser adds that the men are pining Davenport's loss and suggests Savage "ease up" and "just give them a chance to get used to you."

Savage then gives his own prescription for healing the unit. "Pride in this unit is the critical factor that will cure their low morale—the kind of pride that will make it the last thing a man wants to be left on the ground."

By generating pride in the unit, Sav-

age believes he can develop esprit de corps. He instinctively knows that when the unit begins destroying targets while reducing its own losses, a sense of pride will permeate the entire unit. Unit pride runs parallel to Savage's vision of the 918th being a high-performance unit.

Savage shows remarkable self-confidence in the face of numerous obstacles, particularly the unit's tendency to cling to Davenport's memory. Also, he learns the men have all requested transfers from the unit. But, Savage still believes he can turn the unit around. Such self-confidence is indicative of a charismatic leader who demonstrates a strong conviction in personal beliefs and maintains freedom from internal conflict. Such detachment is absolutely essential—a charismatic leader cannot be restrained by popular opinion or self-doubt. Instead, he is guided by inner principles that override internal conflict—he instinctively does what is right. Savage's self-confidence comes from his belief that he can resurrect the 918th.

Savage's second air mission brief. Just before the brief, Adjutant Major Harvey Stovall assures Savage he will buy Savage some time by slowing the transfer process. Savage understands doing so could invoke the inspector general's wrath.

At the brief, Savage informs the unit its performance is improving. Formations are tighter, bombing is slightly more precise and aircraft and crew losses are lower. He jokes, "Those enemy pilots took one look and didn't want any part of the 918th." Savage had hoped to elicit a laugh from the men, but they were silent.

Savage continues the brief, conducting an after-action review, challenging each man to justify his actions during the previous mission. Savage focuses on one bomber commander, asking him why he failed to stay with the group. The pilot responds that his best friend's aircraft was in trouble so he dropped behind to help out. Savage rends the commander for violating group integrity and tells the unit that "every gun in the B-17 is designed to give the group maximum defensive firepower, that's what I mean by group integrity. When you pull a B-17 out of formation, you reduce the defensive firepower of the group by 10 guns. A crippled airplane has to be expendable. The one thing which is never expendable is your obligation to this group, this group; that

has to be your loyalty, your reason for being."

Stovall is Savage's first convert. While Stovall treasures his friendship with Davenport, he understands that Savage is attempting to give the unit purpose, direction and motivation—something Davenport could not or, perhaps, would not do. Stovall makes it clear to Savage that his loyalty is to him, not Davenport. By doing so, Stovall indicates he has "bought" Savage's vision and is committed to it.

The crippled airplane incident emphasizes Savage's desire to transform the group from individual, self-serving members to self-actualized, selfless members. Savage continues to portray well-defined charismatic qualities including a profound sense of mission, an unwavering vision, self-determination, a need to influence others and energy. He does this despite the men's resistance to him and his vision. He firmly believes he can reawaken the men's comatose values.

New commander versus old commander. Davenport, now on the 8th Air Force staff, meets with Savage about the rumor that Savage is holding up transfer requests. He warns that the inspector general will investigate. Davenport tells Savage he "can't drive those boys... [You have] to win something from them; give them something to lean on." Savage retorts, "Lean on somebody? I think they're better than that!"

Davenport's advice suggests he is a caring leader. However, as a charismatic leader, Savage is far more visionary. He does not believe passes and leniency indicate caring; he believes they are a form of neglect. The last thing the unit needs is a loss of focus (purpose and direction). The unit's performance has improved because of the increased emphasis on training—but there is a long way to go.

Being free from internal conflict allows Savage to understand that real caring involves giving the unit the technical competence and physical and moral courage to successfully conduct its mission. This is the purest form of empowerment. By providing the men with such attributes, Savage is giving them the greatest opportunity to return alive. That is the true mark of a caring leader.

Savage breaks the radio. Savage and the men return from an extremely successful mission. The crews have pounded the targets and all aircraft have safely returned. However, before

the strike, Pritchard had called off the attack because of poor weather. The other bomber groups returned to base. Savage ignored the radio call.

When Pritchard asks Savage why he had not acknowledged the message to return, Savage quips, "The radio malfunctioned." Pritchard calls Savage's bluff and Savage responds, "The 918th got through today and hit a target when nobody else did. And, if Providence ever drops in my lap another chance like that to give this group the pride it ought to have in itself, I may have radio malfunction again, Sir. And, there's one more thing. I'm asking you for a commendation for this group—for their aggressiveness, skill and courage in reaching and bombing a target under extremely adverse conditions, and you don't need to mention the leadership, Sir." Pritchard puts the unit in for a commendation.

Again Savage demonstrates a charismatic leader's unconventional and radical nature. He risks his reputation and command by not responding to Pritchard's order to return. However, Savage also understands why Pritchard placed him in charge of the 918th. By ignoring Pritchard's order, Savage is actually following the higher commander's intent—whipping the 918th into shape.

Savage is relentless in his quest to rebuild the unit's morale and confidence. He continuously strives to energize his followers, gain their commitment, instill them with a sense of mission, imbue them with pride and gain their trust.

Savage's vision. *Despite its successful mission, the unit still fails to exhibit pride. Savage calls in Lieutenant Jesse Bishop, a medal of honor nominee highly regarded by the men. Savage asks Bishop why the men are not responding to success with greater enthusiasm. Stating that he cannot speak for the rest of the men, Bishop tells Savage, "I can't see what good we're doing with our bombing. . . . [It's] like we're some kind of guinea pigs. You've got to have confidence in something." Savage replies, "Sure we're guinea pigs, Jesse, but there's a reason. If we can hang on here now, one day soon somebody is going to look up and see a solid overcast of American bombers on their way to Germany to hit the Third Reich where it lives. Maybe we won't be the ones to see it—I can't promise you that—but, I can promise you that they'll be there, if only we can manage to make the grade now." Bishop re-*

sponds, "I'd like to believe you, Sir. I just don't have the confidence in anything anymore." Savage tells him, "It's easy to transfer out of the group, Jesse, but it's pretty hard for a man to transfer out of his obligation."

Savage is the epitome of a visionary leader. He can see far into the future and has a thorough grasp on the fact that the 918th's actions are not just directly tied to the next mission but are linked to the conduct of the entire war. Savage is clearly a systems thinker. He understands that the action of one element in a system has an influence on all of the system's other parts. He sincerely believes every man in his unit plays a critical role in the war's outcome.

Because he is a systems thinker, Savage also understands his responsibility to empower the unit to successfully accomplish the mission. Moreover, he believes the only way to make his vision a reality is through hard work, selfless service and a strong professional ethic. The unit must understand its obligation to the nation and uniform. This vignette also demonstrates Savage's inspirational and motivational behavior.

Savage's third mission brief. *The inspector general is conducting an investigation into the holdup of transfer paperwork. Savage clears off his desk, believing he will be found culpable of denying men the right to swift administrative action. However, the new air executive officer, Major Joe Cobb, announces to Savage that all transfer requests have been withdrawn. Cobb declares, "I knew those jokers couldn't buck you forever. They finally realized they had a chance to hit the target and get home when you were up front leading."*

Although Cobb thinks the men should receive a reward for good performance, Savage realizes the men are now becoming dependent on him. He decides to assign the next mission to Cobb's leadership, the next to Bishop and so on. Savage says, "I want this group combed for every man who shows signs of being able to lead a mule to water."

At the brief, Savage tells the unit its next mission will be into the heart of Germany. He jokingly says the Germans are putting up extra air defenses because they have heard about the mighty 918th. The men burst into laughter.

Savage's charismatic leadership is beginning to produce dividends. The withdrawal of transfer requests indi-

cates a shift in values—the 918th is beginning to share its leader's values. The unit has rediscovered its identity. The transformational process is well underway.

Still, Savage is relentless. He knows the unit still needs to improve; it is not time to rest. The men begin seeing Savage as almost larger than life, possessing exceptional powers, which energizes them. Where there was despair, now there is hope.

The 918th takes to the air. *The 918th has an extremely successful day of bombing against its first targets in the German heartland. However, on his return, Savage notices his driver, Sergeant McIlhenny, stuffing a flight suit into the trunk of the car. When questioned, McIlhenny tells Savage, "I've been checked out as a gunner, and I just had to make the big one." Savage busts the driver down to private for flying when unauthorized. Later, Cobb tells Savage that busting McIlhenny complicated things because he would then have to bust the chaplain, the doctor and Stovall. Cobb says, "I guess the whole ground echelon was someplace on this one." Naturally, Savage rescinds his order.*

As the 918th prepares for another mission, Savage learns that Gately, the Leper Colony commander, has flown the last three missions with a broken back and is now in intensive care. Savage rushes to Gately's bedside, telling the nurse Gately is "extra special." Gately cries.

The transformation is complete. The 918th has become self-actualized. The unit is fully committed to Savage's vision. Under Davenport's command, men were running from duty; under Savage's command, men are begging for it. Savage's motivating vision has given the unit purpose and direction. These are the overarching effects of the charismatic leader, with such effects directly resulting from the leader's strong convictions, insight, self-confidence and self-determination.

The big one. *The 918th receives its toughest mission. The 8th Air Force orders the unit to conduct, over a period of three days, precision daylight bombing against German ball-bearing factories. On the first day, Savage leads. He witnesses Cobb's plane going down in flames. The next day, Savage prepares to lead the mission, but he collapses from exhaustion and must stay behind. A fully recovered Gately commands the mission.*

During the mission, Savage remains in an almost catatonic state on the ground. He neither moves nor speaks until he hears the planes returning. When all aircraft return, Stovall proudly announces, "The boys really did it today." Savage retires to bed.

This vignette validates the 918th's transformation. The unit can successfully conduct even the most dangerous missions without Savage. The unit's commitment to Savage's vision has given it the ability to be a top-performing unit. The 918th can execute a mission through understanding the commander's intent—the highest compliment the unit can pay.

It is important to note Gately's redemption. He has progressed from the Leper Colony to being in charge of the unit's most critical mission. Savage has truly empowered Gately. Now Gately can transfer his own high professional ethic to those he leads. Savage's conduct and actions are now clear and stand as a testament to a charismatic leader's power and its effects on an organization.

After-Action Review

Tomorrow's leaders will encounter many situations in which they will need to exercise a charismatic leader's transformational qualities. Like Davenport, many leaders will believe higher headquarters has given them impossible missions, especially in light of continued budget reductions and fewer forces to conduct even more deployments. For the Davports, higher headquarters will always serve as a scapegoat for ineffective leadership. I dub this the "Davenport Syndrome." The Savages will rise above the Davports and ensure the Army successfully conducts its missions. The Savages are the leaders who will conquer 21st-century challenges.

All Army leaders, from squad to division, need to exercise charismatic leadership. This is the type of leadership soldiers seek, want and need. The charismatic leader's overarching goal is to transform followers into self-actualized soldiers who see their actions intrinsically connected to their organization's success. Such a selfless state would compel the organization's members to incessantly seek ways to improve the organization's capabilities while maintaining its strong professional ethic. As a result, followers would learn to implicitly trust their leaders.

The charismatic leader establishes a

vision that embodies a set of shared values. As a result, the organization's members experience increased self-confidence, pride, self-efficacy and, ultimately, high performance levels.

Few Army leaders truly rise above the transactional level. The day-to-day organizational demands often stifle a leader's vision. Increased operating tempos also thwart would-be charismatic leaders. Yet, the true charismatic leader remains undaunted by such distractions.

The charismatic leader is often seen as being superhuman or having some special mystique. In reality, he simply possesses a keen ability to understand human nature and to exercise sound, time-proven leadership practices. The charismatic leader paradigm offers all Army leaders the opportunity to truly exercise effective leadership and to maximize their followers' talents. I think we should all heed and exercise these principles. **MR**

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Insights

PRAIRIE WARRIOR 98: Looking Ahead

Colonel Jon H. Moilanen, US Army

Training leaders for the rigors of military leadership in today's complex environment is the US Army Command and General Staff College's (CGSC's) ongoing charter at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. *PRAIRIE WARRIOR (PW)*, the capstone Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) command post exercise (CPX), spotlights the "Leavenworth Experience" as an institutional pillar of Army training and education. CGSC has become the Army's premier university for the tactical and operational levels of warfare, making it the tactical field Army's intellectual heart and soul.¹

PW evolved from a 1989 testbed course that focused on large-scale, combined arms operations and inherent tactical command and control (C^2) issues. The new era of strategic change challenged CGSC to develop a relevant capstone exercise. International events included major global and regional power shifts in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the expanded importance of US vital interests in the Pacific Rim, the congressional mandate to downsize the US Armed Forces and an ever-increasing commitment of US forces to contingencies around the world.

Formally implemented in 1991 as a college CPX, *PW* objectives assessed functional CP responsibilities, leadership skills and conduct of joint and combined operations. CGSC increased faculty and student participation from the School for Advanced Military Studies and Army War College fellows of the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship. Participation by international command and staff college students and operational unit members complemented a multinational perspective of large-scale operations within a campaign. Student learning objectives expanded to a more detailed study of battlefield functions in joint and combined operations.

By 1994, *PW* had witnessed a major evolution of purpose. The CPX became a major venue for selected US Army Training and Doctrine Command battle laboratory excursions and

incorporated specific issues of the Army's Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force (LAM TF). Other areas of interest supported Phase III of the Army's General Headquarters Exercise. Examining initiatives, such as the mobile strike force, accented an emphasis on possible future warfighting concepts and organizational structure. The next three years included increasing involvement within advanced warfighting experiments (AWEs) as the Army investigated issues such as battlefield visualization, new combat service support (CSS) concepts and emerging technologies to improve command, control and intelligence integration. In 1997, CGSOC supported division AWE digitization initiatives and started to shift focus to student learning objectives that emphasized execution of tactical and operational orders.²

PW: The Educational Link

Learning objectives in 1998 are to plan, conduct and sustain joint and multinational combined arms operations and to emphasize corps and division levels of a combined and joint TF (JTF). Decision making will apply Army doctrine and joint planning and execution processes. Joint force employment will explore the synergy of service and functional component combat power at the tactical and operational levels of war. CGSOC's joint professional education ensures curriculum instruction and student learning present practical situations in joint and multinational settings.

Students gain an appreciation of digitization and the Army Battle Command System's (ABCS's) capabilities. Leaders must understand the potential of C^2 in digitized and nondigitized unit organizations. Similarly, leaders must appreciate international differences in C^2 procedures as well as communication capabilities. Shared operational awareness and the ability to quickly exploit this advantage through digitization create a keystone toward 21st-century success.³ Students practice identifying critical intelligence in this quantum in-

crease of information and how to rapidly make decisions for mission success and to maintain the initiative. Even with the advantages of improved situational awareness, recent digitization experiments demonstrate the requirement for a commander to issue clear, concise and easily understood intent.⁴

Constructive simulations are powerful tools and the most effective means for training commanders and staffs of division and larger units.⁵ Real effectiveness results from stressful training evaluated with the same quality provided to a warfighter exercise. National Simulation Center (NSC), Joint Training Confederation (JTC) and SPEC-TRUM simulations create a complex *PW* exercise environment. The US Air Force distributes the Air Warfare Simulation and the Theater Battle Management Core Systems to JTC simulations. Students confront practical complexities that bind military combined and joint operations with concurrent political, economical, sociological and other civil impacts.

The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) methodology assesses student performance. BCTP observer/controllers analyze student planning, preparation and execution during the CPX. CGSC and US Air Force Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) faculty and staff assist in these coaching and mentoring efforts. BCTP senior observers stress applying Army and joint doctrine, visualizing battlefield success, taking prudent risks and leading with initiative to achieve missions within a higher commander's intent.

The BCTP methodology accents the Army's training management cycle. Imagining this cycle as an ascending spiral of skills development, the after-action review (AAR) provides the most important products. The AAR aids in evaluating performance, exchanging insights and focusing professional learning. Students also assess their own performance and identify how to improve mission-essential tasks and sustain readiness standards. The *PW* institutional setting ingrains this

fundamental aim of the Army's battle-focused training doctrine—students experience the value of critical self-analysis and improvement and determine how to apply leader skills in operational assignments.

PW 98

PW 98 will emphasize exercise of corps and division operations at operational and tactical levels of war. Primary objectives of decision making and leadership will consider the complexities of a joint multinational force with military cooperation as the standing agreement of an alliance or the temporary arrangement of a coalition. Force projection, force protection and information operations are normal expectations within either environment. CGSC and ACSC students plan, execute and sustain a combined JTF in a force-projection Pacific Rim scenario.

The PW 98 scenario focuses on the fictitious country of Pacifica, using the Philippines' terrain, and the regional opposing fictitious country of Surran. Pacifica suffers through a long-term insurgency including recent military operations against Pacifican rebel army and insurgent elements. More recently, Surran escalated its covert support to the insurgency and introduced armed forces into Pacifica. A UN-brokered cease-fire failed, and the United States deployed a combined JTF as part of a multinational effort to ensure regional security and stability.

The land component commander (LCC) oversees a light corps headquarters with one light infantry, one air assault and one mechanized infantry division. Based on the conservative heavy

division in the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment (DAWE), the mechanized division uses selected ABCS to portray aspects of a digitized division operating with nondigitized corps units. Other ground maneuver forces include a light cavalry regiment and, when committed to land combat, a Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward). Additional multinational as well as US Active and Reserve Component units complement the force in support of alliance and coalition agreements. A French light motorized brigade, German airborne brigade and United Kingdom airmobile brigade operate under the tactical control of the US light infantry division. These three countries have participated for several years in varied PW regional scenarios as an educational exchange among command and staff colleges and operational units.

The air component consists of an air and space expeditionary TF under a Combined Joint Force Air Component Command (CJFACC). This command includes US Air Force and coalition fighter, bomber, surveillance and support assets forward deployed to bases throughout the region, as well as to several bases in Pacifica. The 310th Theater Support Command (TSC) (Provisional), a US Army Reserve unit, conducts echelon above corps (EAC) CSS functions and orchestrates the sustainment of units, materiel and personnel entering and exiting the corps area of operations.

A Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force commands and controls special operations forces (SOF) through a Special Operations Command and Control Element and Joint Psychological Operations Task Force. Students in these organizations conduct operational planning and monitor the execution of special operations during PW and a separate simultaneous CGSOC student SOF exercise. Using the same regional scenario, students demonstrate special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense and direct-action missions for the CJTF and corps. A division staff of student international officers works closely with SOF students in conventional and foreign internal defense missions on the island of Mindanao. On Luzon, SOF students help two brigade staffs of student international officers conduct rear area operations in support of the corps. Special and psychological operations receive particular assistance from the US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and the

4th Psychological Operations Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Land Information Warfare Activity helps integrate the emerging doctrinal aspects of information operations, including electronic warfare, deception, operations security, physical destruction and psychological operations.

As the geographical and institutional centerpoint for the student CPX, Fort Leavenworth connects US and multinational participants through constructive simulations and distributed communications among local and nationwide training facilities. The Air Force's Battle Staff Training School at Hurlburt Field, Florida, operates the Blue Air Response Cell and an Air Operations Center (AOC) staffed by CGSC and ACSC students with multiservice representation. The AOC links with a forward AOC at Fort Leavenworth to exercise emerging Air Force doctrine for CJFACC operations. The LCC's operations emanate from Leavenworth facilities such as the NSC, CGSC digitized laboratories and the Army National Guard's 35th Infantry Division Leadership Development Center. Similarly, US Navy and US Marine Corps students conduct maritime and amphibious operations to support the campaign. The main element of the 310th TSC (Provisional) exercises at Fort Lee, Virginia, while linking to a small forward TSC element at Fort Leavenworth. Students interact with US Army Reserve logisticians and perform exercise rear operations while sustaining the multinational force.

A Learning Organization: Advancing to the Future

This annual six-day student CPX culminates a 10-month education of US and international officers at CGSC. PW's value as a capstone demonstration of student military decision making and leadership reaffirms a century-long legacy of "Leavenworth Graduate" excellence.⁶ Today, as in the past, the Army challenges students and faculty to think about and plan for the future.

Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer states: "Training is the most important thing we can do for our soldiers, our units and our Army. . . . We must train our soldiers in a manner that allows them to develop their individual and collective skills and makes them proud to serve in the world's best Army."⁷ These words declare a fundamental aim of readiness. As CGSC enters the 21st century, PRAIRIE

Colonel Jon H. Moilanen is the director, PRAIRIE WARRIOR Planning Group, at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh and an M.A. from Indiana University of Pennsylvania. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, the Logistics Executive Development Course of the Army Logistics Management College and the US Army War College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Germany and Korea, to include tactics instructor, Center for Army Tactics and Tactical Commander's Development Course, CGSC; commander, 2d Battalion, 72d Armor, 2d Infantry Division, Korea; and commander, First US Army Readiness Group Snelling, Fort Snelling, Minnesota. His article "The Light Cavalry Regiment in Contingency Operations" appeared in the October 1992 issue of Military Review.

WARRIOR demonstrates an institutional charter to produce trained and ready Army leaders for today and the future. **MR**

NOTES

1. Tom Clancy and retired GEN Fred Franks Jr., *Into the Storm: A Study in Command* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1997), 118.
2. COL William D. Bristow and retired LTC Robert B. Kupiszewski, "The US Army Command and General

Staff College: A Changing Institution," *Military Review* (September–October 1997), 103.

3. John G. Roos, "Honing a Digitized Force," *Armed Forces Journal International* (October 1997), 42; Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, GEN William W. Hartzog's comments on the value of digitization in the "estimate-decision" process.

4. Hartzog and Susan Canedy, "Laying Foundations: From Army XXI to the Army After Next," *Army* (February 1998), 20.

5. LTG Thomas N. Burnette Jr., "The Second Training Revolution," *ARMY: 1997-1998 Green Book* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, October 1997), 116.

6. Christopher R. Gabel, "The Leavenworth Staff College: A Historical Overview," *Military Review* (September–October 1997), 98–99.

7. GEN Dennis J. Reimer, "Training: Our Army's Top Priority and Don't You Forget It," *Military Review* (July–August 1996), 62. This aspect of training has been a mainstay of readiness throughout the last decade of the 20th century. As chief of staff of the Army, GEN Carl E. Vuono emphasized an essential aim in the foreword of US Army Field Manual 25-101, *Battle Focused Training* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 1990). "Training is the Army's top priority; it prepares us to fight. As leaders, our sacred responsibility is to ensure that no soldier ever dies in combat because that soldier was not properly trained."

Letters continued from page 3

success. Since the Cold War's end, the US military has been involved in numerous operations dynamic enough to require an unexpected reassessment at some point during execution. Unfortunately, military and political planning at the highest levels has been ineffective in redefining missions and objectives soon enough to report mission changes in a timely, effective manner, adapting accordingly, to meet the ever-changing operational situations on the ground. As a result, commanders at every level must struggle with redefining explicit goals and associated criteria that determine success. Given the dynamics of a rapidly changing political-military environment—as seen in Somalia—the inability to define a succinct set of goals and objectives at the outset leaves leaders “pushing the blame” onto the obscure presence of mission creep.

In a 31 August 1994 *USA Today* interview, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili stated: “Deciding whether to enter an all-out war is easier than figuring out how to help in places like Rwanda, Bosnia or Somalia. One basic rule: Set goals and stick to them.”

Sticking to established goals is a challenge for US forces. Mission creep has forced the military to change goals in midstream without an apparent change of applicable objectives or criteria. Somalia best represents this phenomenon.

Somalia was a humanitarian mission that reverted to a foray in urban warfare in October 1993. Once UN Security Council Mandate 837 was translated to leaders in Somalia, the idea of clearly stating goals and sticking to them should have been the first priority. However, there was never a coherent mission reassessment at the highest levels, leaving subordinate commanders at the tactical and operational levels searching for success.

To avoid future mission creep, it is important for military leaders to clearly

identify criteria that measure the degree of success in attaining stated goals and objectives when a change in a mission occurs. In the July–August 1995 *Military Review* article “Measuring Mission Success,” Major Michael Barbero and I state: “This process is even more crucial at the strategic level, where national security interests, goals and objectives are the framework for deciding on military intervention.” Had this been done in Somalia, bloodshed could have been avoided and a natural transition made from a noncombative, humanitarian-type mission to a deliberate force reconnaissance, including combat-type operations. In short, those who define the Somalia debacle as mission creep should recognize that it was nothing more than an inability by political and military leaders to properly reassess the situation, then transition to an appropriate type of operation.

In the aftermath of the 5 June 1993 ambush that killed 24 Pakistanis, the United States played a prominent role in drafting UN Security Council Resolution 837, which called for the apprehension of those responsible for the ambush. The forces originally committed to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II were only to play a role in the operation’s logistic support. Kenneth Allard, in *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, says that the 1,150 US troops constituting the Quick Reaction Force were to provide a rapid response only when specific threats, attacks or other emergencies exceeded other UNOSOM II force capabilities. However, when the UN resolution passed, the forces in-country were not adjusted to appropriately support the ensuing manhunt.

Many said this manhunt was a result of mission creep. I believe it was nothing more than a deliberate change in mission. However, instead of matching the right force to the mission, the operation to find Mohammed Farrah Aideed outran 10th MD(L) force capabilities.

Thus, Task Force Ranger was formed, which included substantial forces from the 10th MD(L) and a Ranger battalion.

Allard’s article indicates that “UNOSOM II has been criticized as ‘mission creep,’ despite the fact that these changes in both mission and direction clearly resulted from specific decisions reached by the national command authorities.” A lesson learned is “for future planners to . . . avoid mission creep [by analyzing] . . . what the mission really calls for; this means constantly measuring the mission against milestones that best indicate its success or failure.”

The bottom line: We can blame mission creep or failure to properly reassess an operation, then properly match measurable criteria to the new set of objectives. Failure does not happen by accident, as the term mission creep presumes. Nonetheless, a way to avoid this misnomer is to set goals, stick to them, then reassess them at appropriate times to make the right decisions. This is clearly not a new concept but apparently one that some military leaders fail to remember.

Major Dominic J. Caraccilo, USA, 3d-187th Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

US Navy Nurse Corps Reunion

The US Navy Nurse Corps is celebrating its 90th anniversary on 13 May 1998. Since its inception in 1908, the corps has fluctuated in number to accommodate missions in war and peace. It began with 20 nurses, and currently there are 3,400 Navy nurses.

In 1987, this unique group of active duty, retired, Naval Reserve and former Navy nurses established the Navy Nurse Corps Association (NNCA), with chapters located throughout the United States. From 13 to 15 May, NNCA will hold its biennial reunion in San Diego, California. For more information on NNCA or planned anniversary events, call the NNCA Reunion ’98 Office at (760) 745-9424.

Book Reviews

KITCHENER'S SWORD-ARM: *The Life and Times of General Sir Archibald Hunter* by Archie Hunter

260 pages. Sarpedon Publishers, New York. 1996. \$29.95.

The difference between achieving mediocrity or fame can be as simple as seizing an opportunity at the right time. So it was with Archibald Hunter. While many British army officers were choosing careers in India or enjoying the ease of regimental life in England, Hunter applied for and was accepted into the new Egyptian army in 1884. Over the next 15 years, Hunter earned a reputation as a brave leader and shrewd tactician. This book chronicles his participation and campaigns in the Gordon Relief Expedition, the Dongola Campaign, the Battle of Atbara and the Battle of Omdurman.

Hunter was often teamed as a junior partner to Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener, who later became the British army commander. Kitchener obtained the means to fight; Hunter planned and executed the campaign. The era's poor communications, coupled with the distances involved, gave Hunter many opportunities for nearly independent command. His service was rewarded with promotion to general officer.

Hunter put his Egyptian experiences to good use in the Boer War at Natal and was one of the few British generals to leave Africa with his reputation intact. He was involved with the initial defense of Natal, the siege of Ladysmith, the relief of Mafeking, the surrender of Prinsloo and the beginning of guerrilla warfare. At Ladysmith, Hunter, who knew the value of leadership by example, personally led a successful raid to destroy several Boer cannon that were firing on the garrison.

From 1903 to 1908, Hunter served as a corps commander in India under Kitchener, the theater commander in chief. Because the British in India had always been sensitive to the Russian threat, they watched the Russo-Japanese War with great interest. Hunter accurately foresaw the tactics that would become standard in World War I and used them in his training exercises.

In 1910, Hunter was appointed commander of Gibraltar. He resigned in March 1913 because of conflicts with


the civilian population. He felt his military duties and responsibilities were a higher priority than economics. Thus, he did not see service again until World War I, when he took command of Aldershot, the primary British training camp.

Hunter resigned from Aldershot in September 1917 and was elected to Parliament while still in the army. He served one term, retiring in 1920 after 46 years of army service.

Throughout his career, Hunter was a major player in several historic events. In many ways, he was similar to General George S. Patton Jr. He was an excellent tactician; he was fearless; and he was a bold speaker. The Gibraltar affair and several controversies resulting from unguarded statements limited his World War I role.

This well-organized book is easy to read and amply documented, especially considering that at his request his personal papers were destroyed after his death. I recommend the book to all officers as testimony to the power of leading by example, understanding tactics and caring about soldiers.

MAJ William T. Bohne, USA, Retired,
Leavenworth, Kansas



THE NEXT WAR by Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer. 470 pages. Regnery Press Inc, Washington, DC 1996. \$27.50.

The Next War warns of coming disaster. Unfortunately, the warning is overly shrill. The points Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer make are

that the United States may have started cutting manpower too deeply, cutting back on logistics and training too much, neglecting important aspects of intelligence and not sufficiently pursuing research and development opportunities. These points are well taken, but they are taken too far.

Using Brigadier John Hackett's successful formula seen in his book *The Third World War*, Weinberger and Schweizer create a series of fictional futures. The locations of the fictional conflicts range from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East, Central Europe and Japan. Each vignette is skillfully written and highlights particular shortcomings in current policy. Despite the well-written stories, and the sometimes well-done action scenes, the reader senses the authors have pushed just a bit too hard. They seek to demonstrate, through minor disasters to near total defeat, how bad policy choices and the cutbacks of the 1980s and 1990s have imperiled US security.

In the vignettes, in addition to inherited problems, the authors always saddle fictional administrations with ineffective senior officials who fail to recognize a situation's seriousness. This further exacerbates the crisis and weakens US early response. Only through heroic efforts and great sacrifice can success be achieved—if at all.

At the end of each story is a short lessons learned report supposedly prepared by the US State Department. In each case, the US difficulty can be directly related to policy choices of the recent past or present. However, none are placed in the context of the American people or our political heritage.

The authors attempt to create the impression that security policy is drafted in a vacuum without considering other factors. What usefulness is there in high-tech equipment without the well-educated servicemen and women who operate it? If the cost of national defense is so high that little or nothing remains to invest in business and industrial growth, how long can society survive? The authors would have been well advised to read Paul Kennedy's *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* or

any of several books on the Roman Empire's fall. Great powers are seldom defeated from "without" unless they have rotted from within. And, far too often, rot originates in overspending and overstretching in defense and security areas.

The cost of solving every problem the authors highlight would be beyond the nation's ability. Throughout history, the United States has had to make choices in national security policy. Even while serving as secretary of defense during the greatest peacetime rearment in history, Weinberger had to make choices, accepting a certain degree of risk.

Through this book, Weinberger and Schweizer urge us not to wait until we must make difficult choices concerning security issues. We should heed the warning, but judiciously. We must select areas of the most urgency and make the difficult choices—which might not necessarily be the ones Weinberger and Schweizer warn about.

SFC John T. Broom, USA, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

FROM A DARK SKY: The Story of U.S. Air Force Special Operations by Orr Kelly. 340 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1996. \$24.95.

Orr Kelly provides a highly readable account of Air Force special operations (SO) from the beginning of World War II through Operation *Desert Storm*. SO practitioners are well aware their missions are inherently joint. To succeed, such missions must include each military service's unique capabilities. The Air Force currently provides aerial fire support, long-range fixed-wing transport and some helicopter support to Navy SEALs and Army SO forces. While Army and Navy SO may have the greatest mystique because of publicized accounts and movies about men who conduct these missions, many such exploits would not be possible without Air Force fire support and transportation. This is the role Kelly examines.


Because Kelly's research was hampered by the lack of World War II documents and the classification of recent documents, he used oral histories, personal interviews and firsthand narratives to present his history. While this approach leaves open the question of scholarly research, it enables Kelly to present an exciting story about a seldom-discussed SO aspect. Focusing on individuals and real-life exploits

gives the book a vividness that, were the stories not true, would only be equaled by a novel.

Kelly's bias, unfortunately, is exhibited in his brief discussion of the 1984 agreement between the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff to assign all SO helicopters to the Army. He clouds the issue by insinuating there was a plot to assign Air Force fixed-wing assets to the Army—a completely unfounded assertion. He also fails to mention the deplorable state of Air Force helicopters at the time and the reluctance of Army SO to use them. The author also does not discuss the decision, unpopular with Air Force generals, to convert all Air Force HH-53 helicopters to the Pave Low configuration.

Each chapter in *Dark Sky* could be its own book. Despite the bias, anyone interested in SO and the Air Force's contribution to such operations should read Kelly's book.

**LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**



BEATING PLOWSHARES INTO SWORDS: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1606-1865, by Paul A.C. Koistinen. 376 pages. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1996. \$39.95.

In *Beating Plowshares into Swords*, California State University professor Paul Koistinen offers a unique perspective on US war mobilization and examines the facets of warfare beyond battlefields and campaigns. *Plowshares* provides interesting commentary on the Revolutionary War, War of 1812 and Mexican-American War.

Acknowledging that military tactics and technology shaped the American Revolutionary War, Koistinen notes it was equally steered by the colonies' economic and political systems. He

blames the desperate circumstances at Valley Forge (1777-1778) and Morristown (1779-1780) on limited procurement and poor distribution, not on low production and supply unavailability. He also argues that bills of credit kept the nascent nation in the war. He praises financier Robert Morris for fighting inflation and controlling the flow of paper money and loans—both critical to the 1780 turnaround that kept the Continental Congress and its armies alive.

Koistinen points out that during the Civil War the North had many advantages over the South—a larger population and more diversified economy, an industrial sector, a developed telegraph system and a giant lead in railroad track mileage and gauge uniformity. The North's real and personal property was three times greater than the South's; its output of manufactured goods was 10 times greater; and the number of its incorporated banks, four times greater. Because of its material advantage, the North could make tactical mistakes the weaker South could not.

Battlefield problems and public dissent did impede the North's early campaigns. Nevertheless, Northern leaders kept the nation's efforts going. The South's lack of a strong central government led to mobilization control problems.

Although the South had an agrarian society, it could not feed or clothe its army. The South's "limited liquid assets, aversion to taxation and inability to sell bonds at home or abroad forced it to issue vast amounts of *fiat* money as the principal means for financing the war, which had devastating inflationary effects." The Confederate dollar was worth 91 cents in May 1861, 18 cents two years later and 4 cents by 1864. Koistinen suggests the South's core failures were the inability to properly finance the war and logistic shortcomings. He blames Southern leadership and economic immaturity, and he depicts the South's parochial, agrarian culture as failing to understand its industrial and financial disadvantages and adapt accordingly.

The 100 pages of detailed notes supporting *Plowshares* provide ample direction for research on the war's industrial and economic features. Overall, the book is lucid, carefully written and deserves attention from those who want to reaffirm the idea that victory in war encompasses more than battlefield tactics.

CPT Jeff Kojac, USMC, Marine Air Control Squadron 7, Yuma, Arizona

AMERICAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR

by John L. Romjue. 160 pages. Military History Office, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA. (Available from the Superintendent of Documents, GPO, Washington, DC) 1996. \$8.00.

Historically, armies seem to learn more from defeat (Prussia in 1806 and the United States in 1975) than victory (France in 1918 and Israel in 1967). Breaking this pattern was one of the challenges the US Army faced in 1991 as it began revising its doctrine after lightning wins in Panama and Southwest Asia and after outlasting the Warsaw Pact.

Substantial budget and personnel cuts and the need to accommodate new information-age technologies complicated doctrine revision. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) historian John L. Romjue's monograph describes how the Army dealt with various challenges as it revised its capstone doctrinal manual, US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, to conform to a drastically changed world.

Romjue's detailed narrative is what he calls "a case study of the intellectual and institutional processes" the Army used from August 1991 to June 1993 in revising its doctrine. Romjue's focus on the drafting, staffing and consensus building involved is appropriate, given then Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan's insistence that doctrine be the Army's "engine of change" and its formulation be as much "process" as "product."


Romjue's protagonist, General Frederick M. Franks Jr., then TRADOC commander, led the revision. In a short chapter, Romjue summarizes the 1993 FM 100-5's new ideas and contrasts them with AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1986 manual. Key changes in FM 100-5 included positing a strategic force-projection Army, new emphasis on joint and combined operations, the operations other than war concept, the operational tenet of versatility and Franks' ideas on "battle dynamics."

American Army Doctrine effectively relates why and how the doctrine was revised as well as what it says. While Romjue gives a brief assessment of the 1993 FM 100-5, he limits himself to the observation that the Army's first post-Cold War doctrine represents "both a culmination of ideas and a point of departure." Readers must look elsewhere for a critical appraisal of the doctrine or for comparisons of a doctrine

that goes beyond present capabilities with one that lags behind technology.

This does not mean Romjue should have written a different book. In fact, this study should take its place as a professional reference alongside Romjue's earlier monograph *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982*, and two Leavenworth Papers—Robert A. Doughty's *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76*, and Paul H. Herbert's *Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5*.

LTC Alan C. Cate, USA, 1-61 Infantry,
Fort Jackson, South Carolina



FIGHTING WITH THE SOVIETS: The Failure of Operation Frantic 1944-1945, by Mark J. Conversino. 284 pages. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1996. \$35.00.

In the spring of 1944, US Army Air Force units arrived in Russia as part of Operation Frantic. US Eighth and Fifteenth Army Air Force heavy bombers conducted "shuttle bombing" over Germany and Eastern Europe from British and Italian bases to and from Russian bases. US bombers also supported the Red Army's westward advance. In June 1944, the first US mission was to strike train marshalling yards at Debrecen, Hungary, to cut train tracks and destroy railcars.

Despite US success, toward the war's end the initial euphoria of Soviet-American cooperation wore off as relations tensed. Also, the issue of protecting US bases cast a pall over the operation when German air raids, lasting nearly 2 hours, left behind the smoldering wreckage of 43 B-17s and hit every other bomber on the field at one base. Germany's "scorched earth"

policy left US air bases in Russia in ruins. Yet, the Red Air Force believed too much defense was "loading" and saw nothing wrong with its air defense system.

US aircrew morale and living conditions also became major command problems. Camp conditions were unhygienic, particularly among Russian support personnel, which in turn caused health problems among US personnel. At one point, US pilots could not return to their bases in Italy because they had contracted dysentery during their brief stay at Eastern Command. Soviet practices were at least 50 years behind times, and US doctors were concerned about medical care availability for US sick and wounded.

US fraternization with local women and black market activity also were major sources of tension between the Soviets and Americans. US aircrews were denied access to civilian social contact and entertainment, and morale plummeted.

Author Mark J. Conversino presents a well-researched and well-written study of physical and cultural adversity. Anyone interested in current peacekeeping operations should read this book. It foreshadows some of the conditions US forces can expect to face in the future.

COL Richard N. Armstrong, USA,
Retired, Copperas Cove, Texas

MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENTS, 1863-1994: Volume I, Civil War to Nicaraguan Campaign and Volume II, World War II to Somalia, edited by George Lang, Raymond L. Collins and Gerald F. White. 896 pages. Facts on File Inc., New York. 1996. \$99.00 set.

Until the beginning of the 20th century, the US government awarded few federal decorations for individual or group achievement or for service and military campaigns. The few well-known exceptions were the Navy and Army Medals of Honor, the Presidential Gold and Silver Lifesaving Medals (circa 1874) and the Presidential and Department of War Certificates of Merit (circa 1847).

Several campaign and war service medals were created early this century to recognize service during previous conflicts, such as the Indian Campaigns (1866 to 1891), American Civil War (1861 to 1865), Spanish-American War (1898) and International China Relief Expedition (1900). Since then, more than 400 decorations, badges,

medals and awards have been created to recognize individual and unit service and merit.

Congress created the Navy and Army Medals of Honor in 1862. The first was awarded in 1863 and was the only medal or decoration awarded for combat gallantry until after 1917. The Pyramid of Honor, which includes both Army and Navy Distinguished Service Medals and Service Crosses, was created to recognize service members for various acts of meritorious service and valor. The Medal of Honor, the apex of the Pyramid of Honor, is based somewhat on the French *Ordre de Légion d'Honneur*, the Prussian *Orden Eisern Kreuz* and the British Victoria Cross and recognizes individual "conspicuous acts of gallantry," regardless of military rank.

A book about awarding medals and decorations is best when it tells the story behind an award, the recipient's personal history, the historic events surround-

ing the combat situation and the history of the award. However, this set is a bibliography and does not have in-depth personal histories of recipients or a history of the conflicts.

Individuals interested in military history will be attracted to this two-volume set—especially those who want access to this particular information.

Richard Milligan,
*TRADOC Analysis Command,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

THE WAR WITH SPAIN IN 1898

by David F. Trask. 654 pages. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE. 1996. \$29.95.

This volume, part of the *Macmillan Wars of the United States* series, integrates the strategic, operational and tactical aspects of the "Splendid Little War"—the Spanish-American War. Author David F. Trask first places the war in a strategic setting, discussing the effects imperialists such as Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge had

on America's entry into the war as well as "yellow journalism's" effect. Of particular interest is the discussion of Spain's view of the war and the diplomatic attempts to avert it. Trask emphasizes the lack of communications and the confusion about strategy between Washington and US diplomats in Madrid.

Trask then contrasts the preparedness of the US Army and Navy after the war began. The Navy was strategically and logistically better prepared than the Army and presented an array of strategic and operational choices to decision makers. Unlike other writers, Trask does not conclude Army bureaucracy performed as badly as frequently presented.

Trask discusses land and sea campaigns, stressing US materiel advantages and how they were squandered by poor planning and execution. Although the campaign for Cuba takes center stage, both from a naval and military

PASS IN REVIEW

THE PACIFIC WAR: Japan versus the Allies by Alan J. Levine. 200 pages. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. 1996. \$49.95.

Russian historian Alan J. Levine provides an interesting Pacific War treatment. Other than some minor detail inaccuracies, the reader and historian will find a quick but detailed story. His opening chapter gives an excellent road-to-war background on how the Japanese became embroiled in the conflict. *The Pacific War* is, overall, a good piece of work.—**MAJ Alexander A. Cox, USA, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina**

REPUTATION & INTERNATIONAL POLITICS by Jonathan Mercer. 236 pages. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. 1996. \$35.00.

Jonathan Mercer posits that decision makers view behavior that helps their policies in situational terms, but view behavior that harms their policies in dispositional terms. He ties his hypothesis to the formation and implications of international reputations and the impact of reputations on policy makers' decisions. He tests his conclusions on three historical crises. This interesting study of human behavior on a grand scale will interest international-relations students.—**COL Ruth Cheney, USA, Northwest Lead Agency, Fort Lewis, Washington**

PACIFIC DEFENSE: Arms, Energy and America's Future in Asia by Kent E. Calder. 253 pages. William Morrow & Co., Inc., New York. 1996. \$25.00.

Kent E. Calder explores the Pacific region's interrelated economic and security concerns. Key energy issues, such as a growing demand for the area's dwindling oil supply and the military implications of increasing nuclear energy use throughout Asia, dominate the discussion. Calder asserts that the region's political and economic insecurities make regional stability, which is so vital to US interests, difficult to achieve. He calls for an overhaul of US Pacific policy. This is a useful general overview of probable future issues critical to US interests.—**MAJ Richard E. Coon, USA, West Point, New York**

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE VIETNAM WAR by Ilya V. Gaiduk. 299 pages. Ivan R. Dee, Inc., Chicago, IL. 1996. \$28.50.

One Vietnam War subject not exhaustively covered is the Soviet Union's role. The author discusses Soviet and Chinese rivalry over North Vietnam, the war's impact on US and Soviet relations and the Soviet role in the peace talks. Interestingly, the outcome of the Soviet Union's Vietnam policy was that it adopted a more aggressive Third World stance that, among other factors, contributed significantly to its collapse. While this book is well written, one senses it does not reveal the full story.—**LTC John A. Hardaway, USA, Retired, National Battle Simulation Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

standpoint, Trask does not ignore other activities, such as the Puerto Rican Campaign.

Trask provides useful conclusions about the overall conduct of the war. His ideas about US war aims, the interplay of diplomacy, the conduct of operations and the impetus for reforming the Army's organizational structure are impressive. He presents a comprehensive and readable account that should become the standard work on the Splendid Little War.

LTC James J. Dunphy, USAR,
AG, Fairfax, Virginia

US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND STRATEGY, 1987-1994:

Documents and Policy Proposals, edited by Robert A. Vitas and John Allen Williams. 304 pages. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT. 1996. \$75.00.

Even before historians stopped arguing about how the Cold War began, Robert Vitas and John Williams have

ambitiously produced a resource guide about how it ended. Their intent is to present a road map for future study and research. They thematically lay out key post-Cold War issues and how policy-makers responded.

The document collection, which includes key speeches, laws and proposals, defines the post-Cold War US vision and new ways national security institutions, mechanisms and alliances can meet future needs. The authors examine regional conflicts—Central America, Operation *Desert Storm*, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia—the United States has confronted. The authors also highlight perplexing key issues in a world without superpower confrontation.

Each chapter contains excerpts from longer documents, but the authors fail to include any explanations or introductions other than short overviews at each chapter's beginning. Students and researchers will struggle to put these

"sound bites" in perspective—there are no explanatory footnotes identifying key people and terms.

Although the authors stress in their introduction that the collection is not meant to be comprehensive, they leave out key documents that set the framework for the national security debate. For example, they do not include Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's October 1993 *Bottom-Up Review*, but do include a 1990 White House memorandum, which is the only mention of the US National Security Strategy required by the 1986 amendment to the *National Security Act*. They also include a moderately useful index, sources and bibliography. Also, it was particularly disappointing to see no reference to the Internet in the sources and bibliography, even though there are over 3,000 sites on national security. Now there's a road map! Authors who want to provide a useful tool for 21st-century researchers must broaden their visions.

BLOOD ON THE SEA: American Destroyers Lost in World War II by Robert Sinclair Parkin. 360 pages. Sarpedon, New York. 1995. \$29.95.

Compiling historical sketches of the 71 US destroyers lost in World War II, Robert Sinclair Parkin brings under one cover the story of these ships and their brave crews. Each sketch provides the ship's namesake, circumstances surrounding its loss and brief technical details. I recommend this book to the general reader and for maritime-naval collections.—Harold N. Boyer, Florence, South Carolina

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT by Stephen Dycus. 286 pages. University Press of New England, Hanover, NH. 1996. \$49.95.

Vermont Law School professor Stephen Dycus strategically views the environmental issues being fought between the defense community and the legislature. He says it is difficult to enforce US environmental policy when national defense is at stake, and it is almost impossible to enforce an environmental policy abroad. Dycus does not hide his strong opinion against the current trend toward decreasing standards and easing enforcement actions. The book is easy to read and flavored with many case studies.—MAJ Robin J. Stauffer, USA, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

TOUCHED WITH FIRE: The Land War in the South Pacific by Eric Bergerud. 566 pages. Viking, New York. 1996. \$34.95.


Eric Bergerud takes an unusual approach in his treatment of the war in the Pacific. His intent was not to write yet another account of that World War II theater but to emphasize the absolute importance and criticality of the less-publicized battles in New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomon Islands. Other than military historians, few readers are aware of the details of these somewhat obscure but extremely complex battles. *Touched with Fire* is significant reading for casual readers as well as for World War II historians.—MAJ Alexander A. Cox, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

DECISION AND DISSENT: With Halsey at Leyte Gulf by Carl Solberg. 203 pages. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1996. \$24.95.

Based on the author's experience as a junior intelligence officer on Admiral William F. Halsey's staff during the Battles of Leyte Gulf, this book provides a unique insight into Halsey's decision making during these critical battles, which essentially destroyed the Japanese fleet. Particularly interesting is the description of the sloppiness of staff work and how this added to the mistakes made in the Gulf. Because Solberg's book is not a detailed history of the battles, readers already familiar with them will be the most likely to appreciate the book.—LCDR John O'Donnell, USN, Honolulu, Hawaii

This book is like the beginning and end of the Cold War—debatable. It clearly has utility, but it is also clearly not the definitive, or even an indispensable, resource guide. Surely one day a better work will come along. Until then, keep this collection on the bookshelf.

LTC James J. Carafano, USA, HQDA,
Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.



THE ADMIRAL'S BABY by Laurens van der Post. 340 pages. William Morrow & Co., New York. 1996. \$27.00.

Nothing fails like bad policy poorly executed, and soldiers too often unfairly bear the brunt of it. *The Admiral's Baby* is a remarkable story of how a lone British officer tried in vain to broker peace when the Dutch colonial Far Eastern empire was crumbling under the frenzy of nationalism following World War II.

When the Japanese surrendered in 1945, former European colonies in the Far East were left adrift. The French wanted to return to Indochina, and the Dutch were eager to reclaim the Netherlands East Indies, including Indonesia. British forces had the unenviable tasks of disarming the Japanese; recovering civilian and military prisoners of war (POWs); maintaining law and order and establishing a return to civil administration; and providing food, medicine and other essential supplies to Japanese-occupied territory in Southeast Asia.

Colonel Laurens van der Post, knighted in 1961 for his World War II service, was a POW for more than three years on Java. After his release, he remained to supervise the Japanese surrender and the British relief forces' arrival. He stayed two more years in a desperate struggle to quell civil war between the Dutch and Indonesians.

Japan's defeat awakened the nationalist movement and sealed the old colonial empire's fate in Southeast Asia. Failing to recognize things had changed, the Dutch stubbornly insisted Indonesia return to its prewar colonial status and demanded the British prepare the way for Dutch reoccupation. The Dutch vision was myopic: they believed they were the hammer; the Indonesians, the nails.

Van der Post, caught in the middle, saw the dilemma and danger all too clearly, but neither the Dutch nor the Indonesians would budge from their positions. With guile, audacity and clever political and diplomatic maneuvering, he forestalled widespread violence—but only for a while.

Despite tiresome poetic reflections on Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim* and eloquently verbose sidetracks into Buddhism and Islam, this book is an excellent primer on civil-military relations in the modern theater of political unrest and unconventional conflict. Van der Post's Indonesian experience has been repeated countless times since World War II, often with the same tragic results. Ever the soldier, van der Post correctly identifies the problem: "Nothing really fundamental had been learned from either the kind of peace which had brought the war about or the war itself."

For additional reading on related topics, I recommend *The Night of the New Moon* by van der Post, *Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era* by Sam C. Sarkesian and *The Savage Wars of Peace* by Charles Allen.

COL W.D. Bushnell, USMC, Retired,
Sebascodegan Island, Maine

UNORTHODOX STRATEGIES FOR THE EVERYDAY WAR-RIOR: Ancient Wisdom for the Modern Competitor, translated by Ralph D. Sawyer. 224 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1996. \$25.00.

"In general, the essence of military strategy lies in responding to change, being familiar with the past and knowing your army." These words, written in China more than 300 years ago by Ming scholar Liu Po-wen, seem an appropriate admonition to strategists attempting to find new ways to cope with a complex and changing world. *Unorthodox Strategies* presents an insightful, easy-to-read translation of Po-wen's original work.

Each of the book's 100 short sections considers a different strategic or

tactical concept, includes a historical illustration from the original, and contains Ralph D. Sawyer's thought-provoking commentary. Much like a modern military "book of days," *Unorthodox Strategies* can be taken as a whole or read at random with equal coherence and utility. Sawyer's commentary, written in language understandable to both soldiers and businessmen, is useful beyond its application to the study of military theory. The book also includes themes generally discussed in military manuscripts—offense, defense, strategic power and peace negotiations. Yet, it also covers unorthodox topics—arrogance, profit, doubt, forgetting warfare and the nurturing spirit.

While more than half its chapters include a reference to or quote from Sun-tzu, this book is more than an explication of the *Art of War*. It goes beyond Sun-tzu's teachings to include concepts and tactics found in other Chinese military writings.

The historical illustrations supplement the initial discussion, making this book interesting and informative. In some chapters, Sawyer adds depth and color to the historical illustration; in others he compares the book's underlying concepts to those of Sun-tzu and other classic writers.

Sawyer includes a brief introduction to the book's major themes and a short appendix concerning Chinese warfare's historical characteristics. Although Sawyer's translations are in contemporary English, this does not detract from the original Chinese flavor or meaning. Readers will find this translation and interpretation enjoyable and enlightening.

MAJ Richard S. Girven, USA,
USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: Principles and Case Studies, edited by Colonel Frank L. Goldstein and Colonel Benjamin F. Findley Jr. 364 pages. Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. (Available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.) 1996. \$21.00.

This collection of previously published works on psychological operations (PSYOP) gives the newcomer and experienced operator a coherent guide to US PSYOP principles and policies. Midcareer warfighters can learn how PSYOP efforts help achieve US objectives with the least use of military assets at strategic, operational and tactical

command levels.

The authors want up-and-coming commanders and staff planners to see that PSYOP should be conducted early and constantly integrated into planning to maximize force effectiveness and resource use. They believe poor PSYOP application at the strategic level leads to ineffective resource use at the operational level. Conducting tactical PSYOP is effective when synchronized with effective force use.

The information in this book closely follows joint and Army doctrine. Each of the book's sections and articles can stand alone. Part I describes the nature and scope of PSYOP. Part II is about national policy and PSYOP planning. Part III explores strategic, tactical and operational PSYOP. Part IV contains case studies of PSYOP applications.

The case studies point out tactical PSYOP effectiveness and US policy correctness in using truth as the bedrock of PSYOP messages. The studies also show that strategically applied PSYOP campaigns are highly effective in preparing populations to be predisposed to support or oppose an international or national entity's efforts.

The lack of material on effective "County Fair" operations in Vietnam is a major disappointment. PSYOP proponents must develop a useful message of how to achieve strategic and operational PSYOP success before lobbying for more command and staff emphasis and for including PSYOP in midlevel and senior military courses.


Other than portraying an optimal PSYOP operator as a "renaissance man for all seasons," the anthology's most serious deficiency is the absence of material covering how to select, train, educate and field seasoned operators for different command and staff levels. Because the editors bemoan the lack of PSYOP understanding at crucial strategic and operational levels and lack of PSYOP in military courses, their failure to recommend how to develop PSYOP operators for various positions is a big disappointment.

Goldstein and Findley include works as valid today as when written, even though some were penned 30 years ago. Each work has limited jargon. The authors selected for the anthology are recognized from PSYOP course materials and as conference speakers, operational commanders, analysts and professional journal contributors.

The target audience for this book is majors and lieutenant colonels entering

midlevel and senior military courses or beginning warfighter tours on operational- and strategic-level staffs. A PSYOP operator can easily use parts of the book to educate commanders and staffs about the importance of PSYOP in information operations.

**MAJ Bruce C. Ressner, USAR,
358th Civil Affairs Brigade,
Norristown, Pennsylvania**



THE END OF THE WAR IN EUROPE: 1945, edited by Gill Bennett. 251 pages. HMSO Books. (Distributed by Seven Hills Books Distributors, Cincinnati, OH.) 1996. \$50.00.

Fifty years after V-E Day, World War II still generates controversy. In the words of noted historian Sir Michael Howard, 1945 was a year of "total chaos and confusion." In April 1995, to commemorate the war's end, the International Committee for the History of the Second World War met in Oxford, England, to examine 1945's most significant events: the politics and policies of the governments involved, the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and the psychological profiles of key players. This book is a compendium of essays and commentary from that conference.

Author Gill Bennett wrote this anthology for the avid historian, offering fresh interpretations from some of Europe's most eminent historians. Correlli Barnett's essay compares the Western Front's cost-effectiveness in 1944 and 1945 with the Mediterranean theater's. Barnett writes that General Dwight D. Eisenhower's successful World War II offensive validated his own operational concepts as well as those of "Westerners" Sir Douglas Haig and General John J. Pershing in World War I. On the other hand, Barnett sees

the offensive as having discredited "Easterners" such as David Lloyd George in World War I and Winston Churchill in both wars. Barnett also finds remarkable similarities between Erich Ludendorff's 1918 Peace Offensive and Adolf Hitler's December 1944 Ardennes Offensive.

Six of the essays address Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. Malcolm Mackintosh presents the British perspective of the political aftermath of the Soviets' final campaign. David Dilks notes that by Potsdam's conclusion, Churchill and President Harry S. Truman enjoyed a closer relationship than Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt did during the latter stages of Roosevelt's life. Dilks senses Churchill's fear that the new world organization might prove impotent or positively harmful and sees Britain cooperating with the United States in the postwar world, contributing more to containing Russia than any other country over nearly 40 years.

All serious World War II students should own this book. Although the majority of readers may find the papers too esoteric, the conference's international flavor makes this collection a welcome addition to the historiography of this century's greatest conflict.

COL Cole C. Kingseed, USA, US Military Academy, West Point, New York

**THE APPROACHING FURY:
Voices of the Storm, 1820-1861**, by Stephen B. Oates. 495 pages. HarperCollins, New York. 1997. \$28.00.

Stephen B. Oates uses an unconventional method to tell the story of the personalities involved and the years and issues leading up to the American Civil War. The story is from first-person perspectives of influential individuals.

The bibliography shows the extent of Oates' meticulous research and editing of speeches, letters, newspaper accounts and personal papers on which he bases the monologues. Because Oates' technique can be confusing, the reader must frequently refer to the endnotes. For this reason, *The Approaching Fury* should not be used to document any individual views unless it is clear a particular individual actually spoke or wrote the words Oates uses.

The book begins with Thomas Jefferson agonizing over the Missouri Compromise's implications. Oates then incorporates the philosophies of Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun; examines

Military Review



1998

Writing Contest

Do you have an idea or opinion about where future Army leadership doctrine should be headed? With the new US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, scheduled for publication in 1998, aspiring writers with recent troop experience should consider entering *Military Review's* 1998 Writing Contest. The three **winning manuscripts will be published in *Military Review***, and their authors will receive cash prizes of \$400 for first place, \$250 for second and \$100 for third place.

Entries should focus on "time-tested" leadership principles, as well as new ideas about imbuing leadership values and ethics in soldiers, leaders and Department of the Army civilians. **Manuscripts should specifically address some aspect of FM 22-100.** Entries that do not meet contest theme or submission parameters will be returned without consideration.

Deadline for submission of manuscripts is 1 July 1998. All contest manuscripts will be considered for publication, provided they are original and have not been previously offered elsewhere for publication. Manuscripts should range from 2,000 to 3,000 words and be typed and double-spaced. A *Military Review* Writer's Guide is available upon request. Send inquiries or entries to: *Military Review*, US Army Command and General Staff College, 290 Grant Avenue, Building 77, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254, or call Mrs. Billie Hammond at (913) 684-9334 or DSN 552-9334 for additional information.

1997 Writing Contest Winners

1st Place: Canadian Captain Paul S. Delleman,
"Principles and Peace Operations: FM 100-5, a Failure in Doctrine"

2nd Place: Major Antulio Echevarria and Major Jacob D. Biever,
"The Nature of Modern Conflict: Tomorrow's Warfighting Challenges"

3rd Place: Major William S. McCallister, "Redefining Risk in a Changing Operational Environment"
Honorable Mention: Major Thomas T. Quigley, "Force XXI: Joint Task Force Implications"
David M. Keithly, "Revamping Close Air Support"

the outlooks of antislavery luminaries such as William Lloyd Garrison, Nat Turner and Frederick Douglass; and adds the views of women such as Harriet Beecher Stowe and Mary Boykin Chestnut. The thrust of political arguments is framed by the works of Stephen A. Douglas, Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln.

Oates' method of presenting the material makes this book extremely valuable as a summary of views and as a means of understanding the tumultuous years before the Civil War. This novel approach to the telling of history is highly readable.

LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA, Retired,
Leavenworth, Kansas

ARMISTICE 1918

BULLITT LOWRY



ARMISTICE 1918 by Bullitt Lowry. 344 pages. Kent University Press, Kent, OH. 1996. \$35.00.

This book is a thorough study of the armistice that ended the fighting on World War I's Western Front. Author Bullitt Lowry presents a preponderance of evidence that the 1919 Treaty of Versailles was anticlimactic. Its final conditions were included in the cease-fire terms the Allies dictated and Germany accepted on the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month in 1918. Soldiers and statesmen alike should remember that preliminary terms have a way of perpetuating themselves into the post-war world's foundations.

Lowry reminds us that this problem is not new and that how a war ends is as important as how it begins. For example, after the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein used some obscure specifications for free-fly zones to perpetuate his regime. Our failure to end that war as brilliantly as the coalition forces fought it has led to a new genre of study—conflict termination—in think

tanks and war and staff colleges.

This book is a thorough study of a short period of time—about five weeks. It is not for most general readers, because its strength is in its detailed analysis of negotiations among allies. If the book has a weakness, it lies in the discussion of US civil-military relations, such as the conflict between President Woodrow Wilson and General John J. Pershing about unconditional surrender. Pershing wanted to fight for that objective; Wilson did not. Their difference is no mystery. Pershing's hero and role model was General U.S. (unconditional surrender) Grant. Wilson, on the other hand, was born in Georgia and reared in Columbia, South Carolina, where William Tecumseh Sherman had conducted Yankee-style renewal with his destructive march through the South. When discussing a peace settlement short of Pershing's terms, Wilson told his confidants, "I should be ashamed to call myself an American if our troops destroyed one single German town."

Lowry believes this internal debate over unconditional surrender did not affect US policy in World War II because President Franklin D. Roosevelt cited Grant in press conferences. At the Casablanca Conference, where Roosevelt enunciated unconditional surrender as his aim in World War II, he privately told a French general that Wilson had been wrong and Pershing right: "The unwisdom of this policy had long ago become apparent to all."

Armistice 1918 is a useful study in war termination. It is truly excellent on interallied negotiations, albeit a bit weak on internal US civil-military relations.

Michael D. Pearlman, *Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*


ARMING AGAINST HITLER:
France and the Limits of Military Planning by Eugenia C. Keisling. 260 pages. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1996. \$35.00.

Over the years, the 1940 Campaign and the development of the German and French armies that became the principal opponents have received much attention. All too often conclusions are similar—the Germans, looking to the future, got it right; the French, looking to the past, got it wrong. Other accounts usually try to understand how the French could have made such bad choices.

Eugenia C. Keisling brings a fresh approach to the problem. Instead of

trying to understand why the French failed, she simply tries to articulate why the French did what they did. She does not concentrate on the failures of 1940; she concentrates on the choices made and their timing.

Beginning at the highest levels of French national policy and strategy, Keisling examines the interaction of



politics, economics and public opinion; focuses tightly on the military itself and examines how the French military attempted to carry out the French nation's public and political will through military policy and strategy; and highlights the doctrine, organization and leadership designed to support that military policy and strategy.

Several critical factors become apparent. France was limited politically in its options. It did not have the strength to fight a resurgent Germany alone. France could not financially or politically afford to create large-scale professional forces nor keep conscripts for long service. This compelled a "long-war" strategy of attrition and coalition building. These factors created the need for a defensive approach to war, which was reinforced by the French army's study of World War I, and actively investigating emerging technologies. But within the constraints of interwar France's political realities, technologies had to fit within accepted policy.

From every level, squad to national assembly, French choices were limited. The French army made the best choices it could within imposed constraints. The lesson of 1940 is not that there was a right way or wrong way to fight; it is that, usually, the range of options is much more constrained than armchair theorists would have us believe.

The way individual soldiers fight, the equipment they fight with, the doctrine

Army Values

MR

Special Edition Foldout



First and always, we must remember that we are a profession of arms. Our profession is unique and, as General Douglas MacArthur once said, predicated on, "the will to win. The sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory. That if you fail, the nation will be destroyed." We are a profession committed to unlimited and unrestrained service.

ARMED FORCES

Special Edition Foldout



LEADERSHIP



Bear true faith
and allegiance
to the U.S.
Constitution,
the Army, your
unit and other
soldiers.



D
Fulfill your
obligations.

Treat people as they
should be treated.



Put the welfare of
the nation, the Army
and your subordinates
before your own.



Live up to all
the Army values.



Do what's right,
legally and morally.



Face fear, danger or adversity (physical or moral).

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Continued from front...

Our profession's purpose says a great deal about our soldiers and what they do every day. Our mission is too great to be achieved by any one individual or any single task. There is a tremendous depth and breadth to our profession. The Army's purpose for being is to "win our nation's wars," but this means far more than just killing or the willingness to be killed. The American warrior has been, and will always be, more than the soldier fighting at the point of the spear. We deter and respond to aggression, but we also shape the international environment by building regional stability and reducing the possibility of conflict. The Army's responsibilities include everything from destroying targets to caring and safeguarding civilians and dividing warring factions. Often these very different tasks have to be done by the same force, with precious little time and space dividing one mission from the next. It takes the combined effort and sacrifice of the Total Army team to perform such extraordinary service. Every team member and mission contribute to the victories that secure America's place in a free and prosperous world. In the American profession of arms, even apparently mundane tasks take on extraordinary meaning. Throughout our proud history, these tasks have always been part of our mission and they always will be.

The Army is, at heart, a community of Active and Reserve soldiers, civilian employees and their families. Communities thrive when people care about one another, work with one another and trust one another. I believe today's Army carries within it this spirit and sense of community, the commitment to address our shortfalls and build upon our strengths. I am optimistic about the future and convinced that because we hold tight to a strong tradition of commitment to one another, we are and will remain the best Army on Earth.

Undergirding the constants that make our Army what it is are Army values. We must never be complacent about the role of values in our Army. That is why we have made a concerted effort to specify and define the Army values depicted in this special insert. Army values are thoroughly consistent with American society's values, but it is a bad assumption to presuppose that everyone entering the Army understands and accepts the values that we emphasize. The Army is a values-based organization that stresses the importance of the team over the individual. Values that emphasize only individual self-interest are cold comfort in times of hardship and danger. Rather, the Army emphasizes "shared" values, the values that make an individual reach beyond self. Army values build strong, cohesive organizations that, in turn, become the source of strength and solidarity for their members in difficult and turbulent times. Values-based leadership means setting the example and then creating a command climate where soldiers can put values into practice. It is leadership best described by the simple principle "be, know, do." Leaders must not only exemplify Army values in their words and deeds, they must create the opportunity for every soldier in their command to live them as well. To do anything less is to be less than a leader.

General Dennis J. Reimer
Army Chief of Staff



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X
Tear out or cut along perforation...

School for Command Preparation (SCP). Established by the Army chief of staff in 1978, SCP plans, coordinates and conducts command preparation training for battalion and brigade command selectees and their spouses. Additionally, SCP has the mission to conduct simulation-enhanced tactical training for command selectees, US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) students and CGSC instructors.


SCP's two divisions are the Command Division and Tactical Commanders Development Program (TCDP) Division. The Command Division conducts the one-week Pre-Command Course (PCC) and Command Team Seminar (CTS). At PCC and CTS, future commanders and their spouses receive up-to-date information on Armywide policy, programs and special items of interest from the Army chief of staff, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander, Combined Arms Center commander and Army staff principals. CTS provides each command team with the skills and awareness to make a positive contribution to family, unit and community during a command tour.

TCDP runs the Tactical Commanders Development Course (TCDC) and the Battle Commanders Development Course (BCDC). Both TCDC and BCDC are one-week courses that enhance future tactical commanders' ability to synchronize combat power and exercise the science and art of command. Both TCDC and BCDC use the JANUS Interactive Simulation to build each commander's experience base.

SCP is actively pursuing alternate means to provide up-to-date information to the PCC, CTS and TCDP students. The SCP homepage (<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/scp/index.htm>) provides students the opportunity to review the organization and curriculum, contact instructors and gain access to most course reference materials.

SCP continues to play a vital role in preparing the future leaders of our Army, training more than 700 brigade and battalion commanders and their spouses annually.

Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS'). Contrary to some rumors from the field, CAS' is not going away. In fact, CAS' will continue to be a robust and critical component of the new Captains Career Course. CAS' is still a prerequisite for attendance at the US Army Command and General Staff Officer Course, resident and nonresident. By 1 October 1998, company grade officer education will have undergone dramatic change due to a new TRADOC initiative, the Captains Professional Military Education (CPT PME) career course. This initiative is designed to improve the Army's efficiency in educating captains, and it is focused on combining the officer advanced courses (OACs) and CAS' into one Captains Career Course. CPT PME's main goals are to better synchronize officer training with assignments, reduce disruption to units



and eliminate the CAS' backlog. However, the essence of the present system has been retained and much remains familiar.

The Captains Career Course prepares company grade officers to command and train at the company, battery or troop level and to serve as staff officers at battalion and brigade levels. The course is divided into two modules. The first module is the common military and branch specific training (OACs). The second module is staff process training (CAS'). There is a one-year active duty service obligation for attendance at a branch captains career course. Since October 1996, Officer Personnel Management-managed officers who graduate from an OAC go directly to CAS', without having to take the Phase I correspondence modules.

The OACs continue to provide advanced branch training. They are branch-specific courses that provide selected company grade officers an opportunity to acquire the skills and attributes required to lead company-size units and serve on battalion and brigade staffs. Primary branch OACs will be reduced to 18 weeks, with common core tasks integrated.

CAS', located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, continues to provide staff process training. It is a branch-immaterial course, six weeks in length, that uses battalion, brigade, division and installation scenarios to train officers to serve on battalion- and brigade-level staffs. It develops officers to function effectively as staff officers by improving their abilities to analyze and solve military problems, communicate, interact as staff members and broaden their understanding of Army operations, organizations and procedures. CAS' is unique because it provides an officer's first integrated instruction with officers from different Army branches. CAS' provides the skills necessary for success in single-service, joint and combined environments. Officers who still need to attend CAS' and who are not coming directly from an OAC should contact their unit S3, unit training officer, unit Army Training Requirements Resources System manager or their branch manager for assistance.

Center for Army Leadership (CAL) Streamlines Counseling Process. CAL's Leader Education and Training Development Division is creating a new form, the "Developmental Counseling Record," which simplifies the counseling process found in the 1998 draft US Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*. Based on their experience, many leaders have adopted their own list of counseling topics. For example, during performance counseling, a leader might discuss a soldier's appearance, duty and leadership skills. Professional growth discussions might address future schools and assignments. We are interested in your comments on which areas you address during counseling sessions and how your counseling sessions are conducted. Call or E-mail Major Susan Donaldson at DSN 585-3577, commercial (913) 758-3577 or <donaldss@leav-emh.army.mil>.



Articles to Watch for:

Strategic Preemption and the Army After Next

*Brigadier General Edward T. Buckley, Jr., US Army, and
Lieutenant Colonel Atulio J. Echevarria II, US Army*

Battle Command and Teamwork:

Realizing 2020 Technology Potential

*Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, US Army, Retired,
and Major Jacob Biever, US Army*

Fighting Americans in 2025: The First Year

Colonel John M. House, US Army